EU-CIVCAP Policy Recommendations
Executive Summary of the Final Report
including Guidance for Policymakers
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## Abbreviations

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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>comprehensive approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>CBSD</td>
<td>Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSAP</td>
<td>country situational awareness platform</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DDR</td>
<td>disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration</td>
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<td>EDF</td>
<td>European Defence Fund</td>
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<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
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<td>ENTRI</td>
<td>Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management</td>
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<td>ESDC</td>
<td>European Security and Defence College</td>
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<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU-CIVCAP</td>
<td>Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU Civilian Capabilities for a Sustainable Peace</td>
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<tr>
<td>EU SatCen</td>
<td>European Union Satellite Centre</td>
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<td>EUGS</td>
<td>EU Global Strategy</td>
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<td>GOVSATCOM</td>
<td>Governmental Satellite Communications</td>
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<td>HIPPO</td>
<td>High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations</td>
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<td>IA</td>
<td>integrated approach</td>
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<tr>
<td>ICT</td>
<td>information and communications technology</td>
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<td>IO</td>
<td>international organisation</td>
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<td>JHA</td>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Member State</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>non-governmental organisation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPLANs</td>
<td>operational plans (within CSDP)</td>
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<tr>
<td>ORFEO</td>
<td>Optical and Radar Federated Earth Observation</td>
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<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe</td>
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<tr>
<td>P&amp;S</td>
<td>Pooling and Sharing</td>
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<tr>
<td>PESCO</td>
<td>Permanent Structured Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>PRISM</td>
<td>Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation</td>
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<td>RPAS</td>
<td>remotely piloted air systems</td>
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<td>SSR</td>
<td>security sector reform</td>
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<td>UAS</td>
<td>unmanned aerial systems</td>
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<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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Right: Roskilde University/Peter Horne Zartsdahl Beach sign, Mogadishu
1. Introduction

Approximately 1.5 billion people live in countries affected by repeated cycles of political and criminal violence. Although the number of total armed conflicts has declined in recent years, the consequences of ongoing conflicts remain devastating, as illustrated by the cases of Iraq, Syria or Ukraine.

The impact of conflicts extends from direct civilian casualties, internally displaced persons and human rights violations to regional and international security threats such as humanitarian crises and refugee flows. They also constitute a breeding ground for international organised crime and terrorism. Moreover, conflicts have a detrimental effect on economic and human development.

Given the scale and the nature of the consequences of conflicts in the countries concerned and beyond their borders, over the past few decades the European Union (EU) has increasingly invested in developing capabilities to prevent and respond to conflict. The objective of conflict prevention and peacebuilding is to create or reinforce local institutions and capacities that can mitigate the chances of war (re)occurring, to address the roots of conflict and ultimately, to promote long-term sustainable peace.

The EU-funded Horizon 2020 project EU-CIVCAP (“Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU Civilian Capabilities for a Sustainable Peace”) aims to improve EU civilian capabilities in order to promote sustainable peace beyond its borders. More specifically, this project has three inter-related objectives:

- **OBJECTIVE 1:** Assess EU civilian capabilities
- **OBJECTIVE 2:** Lessons learned and best practices
- **OBJECTIVE 3:** Enhance policy practice

**Capability-based analysis:**
- Conflict cycle
- Four cross-cutting issues
- Comparative analysis

**Objectives:**
- Lessons identified catalogue
- Best practices report
- Research-based policy recommendations
- Engagement with policy-makers (e.g. via events and publications)
- Expert network
- Key priorities for future H2020 EU security research

Improve EU peacebuilding capabilities
The EU-CIVCAP project adopts a comprehensive ‘conflict cycle’ approach by assessing EU peacebuilding activities through the entire conflict lifecycle: from early warning and conflict analysis to early response, the execution of EU civilian and military missions and support for local capacity-building (see Figure 1).

Conflict prevention and peacebuilding are not isolated initiatives, but rather are best conceptualised as a continuum of activities covering various stages of the life cycle of conflict. In order to provide a holistic assessment of existing capabilities and potential capability shortfalls, EU-CIVCAP examines conflict prevention and peacebuilding through the entire conflict cycle.

In addition, the project focuses on the following cross-cutting issues:

1) filling the early warning-response gap;
2) combining short-term vs. long-term approaches to conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
3) enhancing civil-military coordination in conflict prevention and peacebuilding;
4) ensuring local ownership. Figure 2 identifies some key questions around these issues, which the project aims to address.

Figure 1. Life cycle of conflict and EU-CIVCAP Work Packages

Above: EC Photo/Carlos Juan
The EU-CIVCAP project takes a comparative perspective by evaluating the EU’s record to date and comparing it with that of other international actors (UN, OSCE, NATO and EU Member States). It also examines the EU’s engagement in two key regions (Western Balkans and Horn of Africa). The evidence for this Final Report draws on extensive in-depth empirical research, including over 250 interviews with key stakeholders (policymakers, practitioners and civil society actors) engaged in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.

This is complemented with the recommendations discussed during the EU-CIVCAP workshops (Rome, Brussels, Belgrade and Bristol), our Peacebuilding Forums and the three “Research Meets Policy” Seminars organised in Brussels, involving a range of participants from the public and institutional sectors as well as from civil society and local communities.

This report seeks to distil the main findings and recommendations from the project organised around the following key themes: 1) Resources for conflict prevention and peacebuilding; 2) Prioritising conflict prevention; 3) An integrated approach to conflicts and crises; 4) Building inclusive and sustainable peace; and 5) Improving learning in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. By focusing on these key themes, EU-CIVCAP aims to provide a timely contribution to current discussions about the implementation of the European Union Global Strategy in the areas of civilian conflict prevention and peacebuilding. While some of the policy recommendations included here are more concrete and technical in nature, others point towards more ambitious structural reforms that could be considered in this area, including streamlining the decision-making process, bridging the civilian-military gap, exploiting policy synergies between security and development/humanitarian aid policies and making the integrated approach a reality.

**Figure 2. Four cross-cutting challenges**

- **Early warning/early response gap**
  How can the EU capabilities for conflict prevention – to lead, engage, fund and cooperate with other actors – be enhanced in order to narrow, or even close, this gap?

- **Civil-military coordination**
  What is best practice in civil-military coordination? How can civil-military synergies within CSDP be improved? How can we strengthen synergies between civilian and military instruments and actors on the ground?

- **Short- and long-term coordination**
  How can the EU achieve a more integrated and comprehensive approach to international conflicts and crises? How can the EU improve coordination and enhance synergies with others working in conflict prevention and peacebuilding?

- **Local ownership**
  To what extent does the EU promote local ownership in its conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities? How can the EU make its initiatives more inclusive? How can the EU ensure the sustainability of reforms?
1. Enhancing resources for EU conflict prevention and peacebuilding (institutions, personnel, procedures and technologies)

The European Union and its Member States need adequate capabilities to prevent the outbreak of conflicts and to promote sustainable peace. Preventing wars and fostering peace are two of the most important goals of the EU, as described in the EU Global Strategy of 2016 and in the 2016 Implementation Plan on Security and Defence. The EU-CIVCAP project has developed a more strategic and holistic approach to capability development by linking goals to capabilities. In this regard, capabilities are defined as the ability to combine key conflict prevention and peacebuilding resources (e.g. personnel, procedures, technologies, etc.) to achieve its external action objectives. Drawing on this framework, the EU-CIVCAP project has assessed the capabilities of the EU and of some key Member States (France, Germany, Italy, and Sweden) in conflict prevention and peacebuilding in light of EU goals in the same domains.

EU-CIVCAP research found that the EU has developed a complex architecture for peace, significant civilian capabilities and the management infrastructure in Brussels to deploy these capabilities. The EU can rely on a wide range of tools and instruments to pursue initiatives in this area, including development and humanitarian policies, Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions, and other capacity-building initiatives. The EU and, above all, its Member States have also developed a range of dual-use technologies, which can also be used for civilian and military missions, including to respond to the EU’s objectives in conflict prevention and peacebuilding. This is particularly evident in the case of satellite systems and remotely piloted air systems (RPAS).

Despite the availability of resources and expertise, some gaps are still present both at the EU and the Member State level. For instance, civilian crisis management within the EU framework remains relatively modest compared to, for instance, civilian UN peacekeeping or the UN’s political and peacebuilding missions. While the EU has taken important steps to professionalise civilian CSDP, in several respects it still lacks behind the UN and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) and can learn from these two organisations with a longer track record in civilian crisis management. On the basis of the empirical evidence gathered, a number of findings and recommendations can be drawn, as presented below.

**EU institutional framework and support structure for civilian crisis management**

International organisations increasingly send civilians on crisis operations. Whether they are police deployed as an integrated unit, rule-of-law experts mentoring local officials or monitors looking after the implementation of a peace agreement, the purpose of these operations is to improve security. The EU, UN and the OSCE are the most prominent providers of civilian missions. When these organisations establish such civilian missions, they need to resource them. Civilian missions need to be planned and financed. Mission staff members need to be recruited and trained. And civilian missions require equipment and mission support. EU-CIVCAP research has analysed the EU’s civilian capabilities from a comparative perspective, taking into account UN and OSCE practices.

Based on the experience with EU missions so far and using insights drawn from the comparative analysis, EU-CIVCAP found significant improvements in recent years, in terms of financing and the procurement of equipment, including the Warehouse 2.0. Challenges remain, however, regarding funding and mission support from Brussels. It is important that the EU addresses these challenges, particularly to improve rapid response. Furthermore, additional attention should be paid to the implications of the integrated approach, and particularly regarding the internal-external security nexus for civilian capabilities.

**KEY RECOMMENDATIONS**

1. **Funding:** The EU needs to reallocate funding from the operational budget of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) to the administrative budget of the European External Action Service (EEAS) to strengthen the enabling mission support services in Brussels.

2. **Standing capacities:** Building on recent Core Responsiveness Capacity, the EU needs to work further towards standing capacities that can be used to rapidly launch missions and provide specialist support.

3. **Mission Support Platform:** The newly established Mission Support Platform should be significantly strengthened in terms of capacity.
Personnel and procedures

Personnel and procedures have significantly improved in recent years. Yet, to fulfil its objectives, the EU needs to work more in specific areas. The EU’s instruments for conflict prevention and peacebuilding are in place, but they need to grow in terms of practical coordination. Concerning recruitment, the systems to select and deploy civilian personnel used by the Member States are heterogeneous and many of them present some gaps (e.g. the selection of personnel with limited specific competences or with weak language skills), with consequences for the work of missions. The full implementation of the Goalkeeper system duly supported by Member States could considerably facilitate the civilian capability development process. In both training and recruitment, Germany and Sweden represent positive models for other Member States and for EU standardisation.

In terms of training, the European Security and Defence College and ENTRi (Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management) have improved the training system for peace operations, particularly in terms of standardisation and addressing specific civilian expertise, i.e. rule of law, security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration (DDR). Nevertheless, challenges remain, with the availability of staff and the training and duty of care for the contracted staff categories. CSDP training still fails to adequately consider issues of local ownership and to incorporate a deeper understanding of the specific context in which the personnel will operate with a significant knowledge of local culture, history and traditions.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Recruitment: Systems to select and deploy civilian personnel should be harmonised across Member States, with standard minimum competencies such as strong language skills.

2. Secondment of personnel: Highly trained personnel in conflict prevention and peacebuilding should be seconded by Member States to the EU institutions to strengthen EU capabilities in this area.

3. EU training policy: EU training policies need to be revised to ensure the standardisation and improvement of training of civilian personnel at the national level.

4. Pre-deployment training: The EU needs to make pre-deployment training sustainable, so that every mission member can benefit from training. This includes increasing the training budget of the European Security and Defence College (ESDC) as well as making budget once again available for flexible projects.

5. Training for contracted staff: The EU needs to provide pre-deployment training as well as relevant specialist training to contracted staff. All missions should have a specific budget allocated to pay for such training.

6. Training curriculum: The EU should ensure that local ownership and a deeper understanding of the specific context (culture, history and traditions) where the personnel will operate is duly incorporated into training activities. An improvement of de-briefing activities could also improve EU training and recruitment policies.

Above: UN Photo/Flaka Kuqi
A student officer at the Kosovo Centre for Public Safety, Education and Development.
ICT for early warning and conflict analysis

The EEAS has established an early warning system (EWS) and a conflict analysis method to detect potential situations in non-EU countries that possibly could lead to a violent conflict if unattended. Our findings show that the EU mainly relies on Earth Observation geospatial information and analytical tools such as the Global Conflict Risk Index as evidence bases for the EU in predicting possible future conflicts and, consequently, for deciding on early reaction. While information and communication technologies (ICT) and Big Data offer a valuable addition to peacebuilding and conflict prevention activities due to their ability to generate, collect and share conflict-related data that might feed early warning systems, Member States and EU actors are generally not aware of the added value that ICT can potentially provide to the EU’s conflict prevention and peacebuilding. Therefore, it would be crucial for the EU to seek a better understanding and use of ICT and Big Data in conflict prevention and peacebuilding, both at national level and in Brussels.

EU Members States are currently deploying their ICT in the framework of either national or EU actions, but cooperation among them is limited. The EU should devise a policy to make sure that all actors at the Member State and EU levels that can contribute to face all stages of a conflict do not work separately, but rather in a coordinated manner. What the EU needs in this field is primarily a coherent political strategy that starts with all relevant players sharing a common understanding of the situation or the challenge at stake.

EU-CIVCAP research also highlighted the lack of a unified information exchange system within EU structures, with almost every EU policy area and service having its own classified system (civilian, military, intelligence, etc.). Given the lack of interconnectivity both on a technological level and on a human as well as physical level, good personal contacts and cooperation between different actors and services have so far been key to ensuring a certain level of exchange and sharing of information among the assorted Brussels-based bodies and EU delegations, but there is much room for improvement.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. ICT for early warning: The EU and its Member States should make better use of information and communication technologies (ICT) and Big Data and integrate them more fully into early warning, conflict analysis and peacebuilding.

2. Technological tools and EU policies on conflict prevention: Ensure that technological tools for early warning and conflict analysis are aligned with EU policies on conflict prevention and vice versa.

3. Better coordination between different tools and at different levels: Update, mainstream and coordinate the various technological tools and their use within different services dealing with conflict early warning and conflict analysis, in order to bridge gaps, improve interconnectivity and avoid duplication. Ensure better coordination among Member States and between Member States and the EU in early warning and conflict analysis.

4. Training in ICT for conflict prevention: The EU should train staff involved in these policies on new technological tools, including the use of ICT and Big Data for early warning and conflict analysis.
Dual-use technologies: Satellites systems and remotely piloted aircraft systems

In recent years, the EU has significantly invested in the development of dual-use technologies, which can serve both civilian and military purposes, since they can have positive implications in both security and economic terms. Among these dual-use technologies, satellites and remotely piloted aircraft systems (RPAS) can contribute to conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities, performing various tasks such as intelligence, surveillance, definition of borders, force protection and supporting police and law enforcement agencies. All these activities are included within the mandates of several ongoing civilian CSDP missions and can be supported using RPAS and satellites.

In this context, the role of the European Union Satellite Centre (EU SatCen), defined as the “joining link between commercial and EU civilian space programmes for Earth Observation, on one side, and EDA and other security and military users on the other”, is important to bridge Member States’ policies in this regard, as well as to connect existing and future military-civilian Earth Observation systems. As for RPAS, Amendola’s centre of excellence was identified as a leading example of cooperation between military and civilian actors. Given the importance of properly trained personnel when it comes to dual-use technologies, it could represent a model for developing specific training programmes on civilian-military cooperation.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. EU dual-use policy for conflict prevention and peacebuilding: A clear EU vision on how to use dual-use technologies in conflict prevention and peacebuilding activities is urgently required. Such a vision is necessary to ensure proper coordination both in operational terms and regarding EU funding of relevant research and technology activities, through Horizon 2020 projects and other initiatives such as the European Defence Fund.

2. Pooling and sharing: The EU should take advantage of the potential of satellites and RPAS in conflict prevention and peacebuilding by supporting the pooling and sharing of activities (both among MS and within CSDP missions) and by standardising procedures. This could be made by incentivising ex ante information sharing, thus overcoming the reluctance of EU Member States to jointly allocate resources for concerted programmes of capability development.

3. Training on dual-use technologies: Based on Amendola’s base model, the EU should develop specific training models on military-civilian cooperation in the field of dual-use technologies. This model should also be integrated into a revised EU training policy.

4. EU Satellite Centre: The capabilities of EU SatCen should be further explored and enhanced to facilitate access to earth observation data to address needs related to CSDP missions and other conflict prevention and peacebuilding tasks, in cooperation with European institutions and Member States.
Poolling and sharing of capabilities in conflict prevention and peacebuilding

Current developments such as the launch of Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), a European Defence Fund (EDF), the new Capability Development Plan, as well as work towards a Civilian CSDP Compact have formally superseded the notion of Pooling and Sharing (P&S) in the field of Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). The aims of the new EU initiatives, however, are substantially like those pursued with the P&S approach: to increase cooperation, to obtain better value from money in terms of capability development and to move towards the integration of civilian and military capabilities. Therefore, it is important to consider the potential and limitations of current efforts from the perspective of pooling and sharing.

EU-CIVCAP research identified useful examples and P&S opportunities for civilian capabilities and dual-use technologies in the areas of: satellite systems, including both Earth Observation (e.g. Copernicus the EU Satellite Centre, ORFEO, MUSIS) and Satellite Communications functions (Athena-Fidus, GOVSATCOM); Remotely Piloted Air Systems (e.g. EURODRONE) and training and recruitment of civilian personnel (e.g. Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management and European Union Police Services Training). Major implementation challenges remain, including the unwillingness of national governments to renounce full operational control over their civilian and military capabilities, the lack of information-sharing about procurement plans, low levels of ambitions and modest efficiency gains resulting from these initiatives.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Satellite systems for Earth Observation**: Appropriate data sharing and dissemination policies are required to develop Copernicus in order to contribute to the accomplishment of CSDP objectives. Along these lines, initiatives to further pool and share Earth Observation data at the European level are welcome, like Eurographics and the Copernicus In-Situ Component. In addition, public authorities and private actors may exploit P&S opportunities in this framework to foster the secure acquisition of Copernicus Sentinel platforms and to promote innovation.

2. **Satellite Communications**: Drawing upon the example of the GOVSATCOM project, the use of communication services during peacetime and crisis needs to be enhanced through efforts mutually conducted by Member States. To this end, suitable platforms are required to enable a satisfactory exchange of military and civilian communications.

3. **Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems**: Recent developments within the EU and other European multilateral frameworks should be continually monitored and coordinated in order to avoid a duplication of efforts in relation to existing programmes. For instance, P&S opportunities related to the EURODRONE could be multiplied if it becomes a PESCO project, with the potential involvement of other countries and supported by the European Defence Fund.

4. **European pool of Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems**: An opportunity for P&S would be the creation of a European pool of RPAS assets belonging to Member States and managed by EU agencies according to the tasks to be fulfilled by EU agencies to undertake specific tasks, including in the areas of conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For example, this pool could be at the disposal of Frontex for missions of border control and maritime surveillance. Following this logic, the European fleet of RPAS could also be made available for CSDP missions when deemed necessary and possible. At the same time, surplus capabilities in a country should be put at the disposal of other Member States to foster common operational use, as well as the development of synergies among different platforms.

5. **Training and recruitment**: Mandatory pre-deployment trainings could represent a milestone for P&S around well-defined core capabilities and operational principles aimed at achieving an adequate level of deployment. Training on the use of dual-use technologies and to ensure interoperability should also be considered. Similarly, standardisation in the recruitment mechanism is needed both in terms of formal qualifications and soft skills and to ensure effective hand-over processes in CSDP missions.

6. **Civilian CSDP Compact**: The Civilian CSDP Compact represents a key opportunity to ensure the P&S of personnel, expertise and information across policy areas and actors at the EU level (the CSDP, Common Foreign and Security Policy, and justice and home affairs), as well as by Member States and in the field. Measures such as the country situational awareness platform and specialised teams are important to ensure a more responsive, flexible and timely civilian CSDP. Yet sufficient political, financial and operational incentives – ranging from the EU-level coordination of line ministries responsible for recruitment in capitals,
to the identification of new funding schemes for training and deployment of civilian personnel, to the further improvement of recruitment and procurement mechanisms – must be provided in the framework of the Compact to overcome existing operational challenges.

7. **PESCO and EDF**: EU Member States should consider how the variety and flexibility of PESCO projects and other projects funded by the new EDF could enhance capabilities for conflict prevention and peacebuilding. For instance, since one of the projects already deals with certain aspects of military education, it could be developed into a project for common training of personnel using dual-use technologies like RPAS with a view to improving civil–military cooperation, also drawing from the aforementioned Amendola model.

Below: EC Photo
Jean-Claude Juncker at the PESCO family picture
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

2. Prioritising conflict prevention

The EU has a wide array of policies, institutions and instruments that enable intervention in conflict prevention, but conflict prevention is not always prioritised or integrated into decision-making, which hinders effectiveness in this area. One of the main problems in this respect is that conflict prevention is used in different ways by different actors within the EU’s external action machinery, notably to cover both conflict prevention as a way in which the EU acts in and engages with the rest of the world, and as a set of distinct activities, particularly, for this report, conflict analysis, early warning and mediation. This multiple usage of the same term presents serious policy challenges that should be addressed by way of greater conceptual clarity – ensuring that all actors attach the same meaning to these terms.

Mediation is a key part of conflict prevention and the European External Action Service has its own mediation staff, but questions remain around the EU’s neutrality, its ability to engage in mediation and the effective use of preventative diplomacy instruments, such as the EU Special Representatives.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **An EU policy on conflict prevention:** The EEAS and the Commission should jointly clarify in internal documents how the EU promotes conflict prevention as a way of acting in the world; how it can support and be supported by stabilisation; and how specific distinct activities (particularly conflict analysis, early warning and mediation) contribute differently to conflict prevention, and the differences and synergies between them.

2. **Implementation of EU Global Strategy:** Implementation plans for the EU’s Global Strategy should ensure that conflict prevention is prioritised across all the thematic areas identified, not only for the implementation of the section on “an integrated approach to conflict”. Follow-up initiatives and action plans should address these concerns directly and clearly identify resources, including institutional expertise and leadership, for preventing conflict as well as responding to conflict.

3. **Mainstream conflict prevention:** EU institutions should mainstream conflict prevention as a matter of policy and practice across the EU’s external action machinery (DG for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, DG DEVCO, DG Energy, DG Trade and EEAS) and prioritise prevention as well as response.

4. **Resources for conflict prevention:** The EEAS and the European Commission should ensure that PRISM (Prevention of Conflicts, Rule of Law/Security Sector Reform, Integrated Approach, Stabilisation and Mediation) and DEVCO B.7 (the office concerned with Fragility and Resilience within Directorate B on Human Development and Migration within the Directorate General for International Cooperation and Development) are adequately resourced in terms of personnel, time, expertise and access to high-level decision-making so that the EU prevents important conflicts as well as responds to urgent crises.

5. **Preventive diplomacy:** The EU should further develop its capacities for preventive diplomacy, for example, by reinforcing and tailoring the support provided to EU Special Representatives and Heads of Delegations in charge of carrying out dialogue in conflict-affected countries (e.g. mediation and analysis training, support staff) and by including conflict expertise in their job descriptions.
Due diligence in EU development aid and trade

It is generally acknowledged that the EU, and other international actors, must take steps to ensure that their engagements in conflict areas are designed to be maximally effective and to avoid inadvertently causing harm. EU-CIVCAP research proposed a framework for due diligence in contexts affected by conflict, looking at two perspectives: i) the EU's political responsibility to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable development derived from its own commitments; and ii) its financial responsibilities to manage its resources and engagements in such a way as to maximise the effectiveness of its prevention and development goals.

This research found that there was little consistency in terminology in relation to analysis, risk assessment and stakeholders among various EU development and trade actors. Confusion at the abstract level also risks creating confusion at the operational level. Calls for better context analysis of situations affected by conflict are common, but what receives less attention is the need for the EU to reflect on its own positioning vis-à-vis conflict stakeholders as part of its analysis. Last, but not least, transparency and access to documents and templates can present an obstacle to scrutiny of EU due diligence in engagements in conflict-affected situations.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. A coherent EU approach to ‘due diligence’: Greater consistency is needed across EU instruments on the uses of similar terminology around risk, impact, dynamics, aspects and various sectors.

2. A more complex and comprehensive mapping of EU interventions: The EU must recognise that engagement with stakeholders does not equate to a clear understanding or mapping of conflict stakeholders; it must examine both positive and negative interactions with key stakeholders and analyse both the position and perceptions of the EU by the different conflict stakeholders as part of efforts to assess the risk of (in)effectiveness or inadvertent harm.

3. Monitoring of due diligence: There is a need to conduct more, and higher profile, reviews in order to generate more incentives for senior EU decision-makers to perform due diligence checks.
Conflict Prevention in civilian CSDP

The potential for Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions and operations to engage in conflict prevention is laid down in Article 43 of the Lisbon Treaty. Yet, prevention in the context of civilian CSDP missions has not really materialised. Aside from well-known obstacles of technical capacity, resources, structures and EU Member State interests, the EU-CIVCAP research has identified the ‘human factor’ (i.e. different personal conceptions/interests) as an additional element that explains why conflict prevention has lagged in this area. More specifically, this refers to: i) different interpretations of what conflict prevention is and what it is for; and ii) differing priorities among CSDP actors during the implementation phase. Interpretations of conflict prevention differ in terms of timeframe, end goals and primary motivation. Furthermore, individual experiences, belief-systems or cognitive heuristics (shortcuts) influence the interpretation and implementation of mandates. This research calls on policymakers and academics to pay much greater attention to psychological and sociological factors and what can be done to harness the diversity of CSDP actors to promote more effective and coherent approaches to conflict prevention within civilian CSDP missions.
Gender equality in EU conflict prevention

EU foreign policy should be guided by equality, among other principles, yet it is often heavily gendered, patriarchal and othering. ‘Gender’ is usually reduced to mean heterosexual women and girls, excluding sexual and gender minorities as well as the social divisions (such as race or class) that combine to form power relationships between different gender identities across and between individuals, communities, social and formal institutions. Men’s invisible agency flows throughout, while male victims of violence are ignored. Other women are passive, vulnerable, infantilised, instrumentalised and often sexualised recipients of European aid.

As a result, EU conflict prevention policy is gender-blind by design and therefore will Do Harm even when “successful” by reinforcing existing structural gendered inequalities and dominant (gendered) interests present in the conflict context. “Gender equality” in EU external action has been largely reduced to privileging the interests of European, predominantly white, middle class and heterosexual women within the masculinised EU security structures. Structural gendered inequality is routinely left out of the list of root causes of conflict. While the EU places heavy emphasis on the part of the Women, Peace and Security agenda that deals with improving the gender balance within the EU peace and security apparatus, this does not automatically lead to the EU contributing to increased gender equality in conflict-affected situations and may exclude Other women further.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. More comprehensive conflict analysis: To achieve added value for prevention and to avoid blind spots, EU conflict analysis that feeds into civilian CSDP missions should cover a broad scope of dynamics, stakeholders and root causes and examine a range of sectors, including input from non-elite and local level perspectives.

2. Clearer mandates: The definition of objectives and the planning for civilian CSDP missions should be explicit about exactly which dynamic and risk of violence is being targeted by the mission activities, key conflict stakeholders’ positions, and end goals regarding conflict prevention/transformation.

3. Operationalisation of conflict prevention: To enhance the translation of prevention into operational guidance, civilian CSDP operational plans (OPLANs) should connect key points from the conflict analysis specifically with the roles and tasks foreseen for a civilian CSDP prevention engagement.

4. Participatory analysis methods and training: To address biases and differing interpretations, EU conflict analysis should use participatory analysis methods as standard practice to promote more cohesive understanding (rather than just imparting knowledge) across relevant civilian CSDP staff. EU conflict prevention actors should use training methods and tools that emphasise exchange and cooperation among diverse civilian staff.

1. Challenging underlying gender conceptions: Researchers and practitioners should challenge patriarchal assumptions of power in EU foreign policy by developing a body of analysis that identifies the main challenges, entry points and opportunities for change, and clarifies feminist objectives for foreign policy and conflict prevention.

2. Update the EU Comprehensive Approach to UNSCR 1325: Ten years after its adoption in 2008, the EEAS’s Principal Advisor on Gender should coordinate a process to review and update the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to UNSCR 1325 on women, peace, and security, adopted by the UN Security Council on 31 October 2000, emphasising the importance of promoting gender equality across all foreign policy interventions in conflict-affected situations.

3. Gender analysis: Ensure that rigorous gender analysis is integrated into conflict analysis, and that gender equality objectives are moved to the heart of conflict prevention policies and programmes and their implementation is monitored and enforced.

4. Enhance monitoring implementation of gender commitments: Identify and use smarter indicators of success/backsliding rather than the quick wins associated with counting the number of women present in institutions.
3. An integrated approach to conflicts and crises

Strengthening the unique profile of the integrated approach

EU-CIVCAP research has appraised the evolution of the EU’s comprehensive approach (CA) to external conflicts and crises, including its recent evolution into the integrated approach (IA). It has also compared its approach to those of the United Nations, NATO and the OSCE. With the introduction of the integrated approach since the 2016 EU Global Strategy (EUGS), concrete steps have been taken to take the EU response to conflicts and crises to the next level. The EU’s new tools for integrated responses encompass different policy phases, such as planning and implementation; address all stages of the conflict cycle, from prevention to recovery; and advance essential cross-cutting issues, such as the evolution from early warning to early action. In this regard, our comparative analysis shows that the EU and the UN exhibit the most ambitious efforts to reform their structures to achieve an integrated approach by integrating lessons learned across the whole spectrum of comprehensiveness, taking a broader systemic and strategic stance, through the guidance provided respectively by the EUGS and by the High-level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO).

The practice of integration in the EU has shown a steady evolution from a narrow concept of civilian-military coordination, following the NATO blueprint, to a broad notion of systemic coherence, similar to the UN’s endeavour, which seeks to integrate multiple, interconnected layers of action. By presenting the guiding principles of this evolution, EU-CIVCAP research provides a framework for understanding how international actors can forge and implement a consensus towards integrated actions, so that different stakeholders can more effectively work together towards building peace and preventing conflicts. In this regard, the EU makes a strong and compelling case for integration because of the uniqueness of its institutional architecture and the high level of ambition set by its external action doctrine.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Integrated strategic and political priorities: The EUGS is leading to a proliferation of new policy agendas, each one requiring staff attention, resources and political capital. A main recommendation is to avoid ‘over bureaucratisation’ of policy priorities (e.g. multiplying written assignments, meetings and lengthy procedures) and to select a few, consistent concepts to invest in.

2. Institutionalisation (accountability and results): To avoid conflict between EU institutions, integrated actions should be streamlined, setting parameters for implementation and reducing transaction costs or barriers. For this to happen, the EEAS and DEVCO should take the lead in proposing targets and indicators, with the aim of establishing a broader results framework, including modifications in actions or responses to measure the delivery of services specific to conflict areas more effectively.

3. Training and incentives: A reform of training and recruitment procedures for EU staff working on violent conflict and crises situations should result in being able to use these instruments as a catalyst for sharing knowledge and breaking down silos among civilian, military, police, development, humanitarian and political personnel. A new incentive system should aim to attract and develop EU staff and support them better in implementing the integrated approach in their day-to-day jobs, rewarding those staff members who have been working more proactively towards a joined-up and conflict-sensitive approach.

4. IT solutions for the integrated approach: New technological solutions to foster coordination should be explored, by raising awareness of the possibilities provided by ICT on conflict prevention, peacebuilding and comprehensive/integrated responses to them.

Left: EC Photo/Simon Maina
Drought response
Improving intra-EU coordination on the ground

The Integrated Approach (and its predecessor, the Comprehensive Approach) has become a guiding principle in the implementation of the EU’s external action. However, EU-CIVCAP research found that the EU’s Comprehensive Approach to external conflict and crises has not been fully implemented in the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. A key challenge relates to the use of the EU Delegations to foster a more comprehensive action on the ground. The fragmentation of command structures continues to limit the EU’s ability to act as a consistent whole on the operational level.

Civil-military synergies

Ensuring a higher degree of civil-military synergies has been a key EU goal since the launch of the Common Security and Defence Policy. EU-CIVCAP research conceptualises civil-military synergies as an observable operational outcome of coordination by civilian and military CSDP actors, resulting in a) increased impact or b) reduced resource expenditure. Our research found that formal mechanisms for coordination have been established at most levels between relevant actors, but that outcomes in terms of tangible synergetic effects were often elusive. A ‘difference in mindset’ between military and civilian actors is still regularly perceived as obstacles to effective synergies. Thus, individuals are more likely to establish synergies across international boundaries and organisations within their own sectors than they are across the civil-military divide. In particular, our research found three persistent challenges: i) mandates for coordination are left open to individual interpretation and rarely specify civil-military synergies; ii) there is limited authority for decision-making or prioritisation between EU instruments at the operational level and iii) host nations rarely have the capacity to manage or coordinate multiple international actors with overlapping mandates.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Intra-agency cooperation at the operational level**: This could be done by utilising the EU Delegations as envisaged in the Comprehensive Approach (providing centralised conflict risk analysis, joint reporting and co-location) or by creating stronger and more unified command structures at the operational level.

2. **EU Delegations**: EU Delegations should be modernised, and their operating models updated. Drawing on UN efforts aimed at creating a new generation of country teams and a new and stronger leadership in the field, the EU should reframe the terms of reference, mandates, physical presence and operational models of staff working in EU Delegations, establishing new accountability lines and coordination platforms for fast mobilisation of capacities and resources when coping with pressures in the host country.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Task-based mandates with a focus on civil-military coordination**: Mandates must offer a more detailed and task-based approach to civil-military coordination. Too often, catch-all objectives to ‘coordinate with relevant actors’ are left open to interpretation, and thus outcomes remain dependent on ad-hoc personal relationships and individual interpretations at the highest level (Heads of Mission/Delegation or Force Commanders), making civil-military synergies vulnerable to staff rotations.

2. **Delegation**: More decision-making authority should be delegated to mission leadership and staff to allow CSDP instruments to exercise a higher degree of responsivity and adaptability in dynamic environments. Delegation should include authority for taking actions in support of regional strategic objectives or other EU actors.

3. **Lead coordinator**: The EU should embrace opportunities for using high-level competences to offer leadership in coordinating (international) civil-military actors with overlapping mandates, especially where no other lead agency is apparent.

4. **Integrate civil-military chains of command**: The EU should consider integrating civil-military chains of command at the theatre and operational level, similar to the UN Country Team concept.
Synergies with partners: Working together with the UN and OSCE

The reality of EU crisis response, conflict prevention and peacebuilding is that the EU hardly ever deploys alone. The EU is often part of a larger multidimensional international presence, either through financial instruments in support of other IOs/NGOs, or through co-deployment. Hence, a better understanding of how the EU interacts with partners on the ground is critical. Indeed, the recent EU Global Strategy has made relations with partners a priority for EU external relations, including the EU’s conflict response strategies. The integrated approach, with its emphasis on partnership and a multilateral response offers promising opportunities in this respect. The EU has a comparative advantage in leading multi-actor international coordination at the operational level in complex environments. This is due to its high level of staff competences and perceived legitimacy as an independent value-based actor.

Coordination between partners is relevant, but it is even more important to examine how the EU and its partners can genuinely work together to achieve a unity of effort. EU-CIVCAP research shows that what the EU and other international organisations bring to crises across the world is, largely, complementary. At the same time, however, there is potential for further synergies. Coordination tends to take place at the operational and tactical level, whereas a genuinely joint strategic approach to crises is lacking. And when complementarities are achieved, they tend to be implicit and the result of parallel civilian missions rather than a truly collective and integrated approach. Our research also finds that cooperation often takes place either via formal or informal channels, but not a combination of both. This is problematic as formal and informal channels offer complementary advantages. Our research has revealed that the EU and other international organisations exchange resources extensively. At the same time, the exchange tends to be limited to financial resources and diplomatic and political support. Finally, the EU does not always think in political and strategic terms about its contribution to the broader international community and it gets insufficient leverage from its financial contribution. Also, the EU should be more aware of how it is perceived among other international organisations.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Leadership for coordination: The EU should embrace opportunities for using its comparative advantage (high-level competences and perceived value-based legitimacy) and offer leadership in coordinating multiple international actors with overlapping mandates. This effort is especially important in circumstances where no other capable lead agency is apparent.

2. A strategic approach: The joint strategic approach of international actors and organisations to conflict countries should be strengthened. Coordination on the ground is often limited to operational and tactical issues. Strategic discussions, including at headquarters, should be better coordinated with other international partners.

3. Diplomatic support: The EU should further recognise the importance of political and diplomatic support for the activities of other international organisations. Backing up partners, for instance through statements from Brussels, increases their authority.

4. Coordination channels: There is a need for both formal and informal coordination channels between international actors and organisations in crisis regions. Informal channels rely on personalities, while formal channels can be limited in scope.

5. Scope of capability exchange: The exchange of resources between international actors and organisations largely centres around funding and information exchange. There could be further efficiency gains through resource exchange in other domains, such as staff, equipment and mission support.

6. Leveraging resources: There needs to be a more strategic approach to how the EU leverages its resources. As a result of institutional fragmentation within the EU and even within the EEAS, the funding of other international organisations does not necessarily result in political gain.

7. Managing perceptions: The EU should monitor how it is perceived by other international organisations to avoid damage to its reputation and to improve its inter-organisational public diplomacy.
KEY FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

4. Building capacities for inclusive and sustainable peace

Effectiveness and coordination

Capacity-building programmes—including training activities, mentoring and advising, and the provision of equipment and large infrastructure—have become key to strengthening capabilities at the individual and organisational levels and in promoting sustainable peace. EU-CIVCAP findings highlight that capacity-building programmes have been able to strengthen pockets of capacity in specific organisations and institutions, but they have done so in a manner that has not always been well coordinated with other donor activities or local priorities, and in an environment of wider political, economic and institutional weaknesses that have constrained their impact and on which they have been dependent.

Above left: EC Photo/Kena Betancur
The United Nation flag at the United Nation Headquarters

Below: EC Photo/Simon Maina
Displaced people in South Sudan, mostly women and children, who are waiting for a food ration.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Incorporate local expertise: Capacity building is not well-served by a top-down, ‘cookie cutter’ approach that seeks to impose externally derived models of reform on diverse and complex local environments. EU missions and operations should be informed by in-depth fact-finding missions incorporating local expertise.

2. Invest more on hard capacity building: ‘Hard’ capacity building, in the sense of equipment and infrastructure that will endure, tends to be valued more highly by local recipients. Such initiatives need to be accountable and sustainable in the medium and long term. The implementation of the new initiative on ‘Capacity Building in Support of Security and Development’ (CBSD) constitutes a key opportunity for the EU, but also a crucial test.

3. EU Delegations: Establish a ‘rule of law’ team in the EU Delegation to ensure intra-EU coordination. This creates a single point of contact for all EU components, allowing Brussels-based institutions to devolve more responsibility to Delegations, and enabling Delegations to extend their work regionally while providing policy advice to Brussels, facilitating better learning.

4. Avoid ad-hocism in coordination mechanisms: Where possible, designate a responsible coordinator, while ensuring that mandates are flexible enough to react to rapidly changing situations. Better coordination should be achieved through the design and implementation phases, along with awareness raising at all levels, of long-term planning mechanisms, standard operating procedures and decision-making responsibilities.
Local ownership

After the failures that accompanied international interventions in the 1990s, increasing attention has been paid to the need to ensure local ownership (see for instance EU Global Strategy and the 2016 Joint Communication on Security Sector Reform). While it is not always clear what is meant by ‘the local’ (e.g. national governments, civil society, local communities, etc.), the increasing emphasis on promoting local ownership stems from the fact that its inclusion is understood to be essential to successful peacebuilding, providing the crucial link in the search for effectiveness and legitimacy in international peacebuilding initiatives. Despite this rhetorical commitment, however, EU-CIVCAP research found that EU capacity-building activities have often occurred without local involvement at the levels of problem identification, project development and evaluation.

Sustainability

Ensuring the long-term sustainability of reforms is key to achieving sustainable peace. EU-CIVCAP research identified two elements of vulnerability in relation to sustainability of capacity-building initiatives. The first concerns the sometimes-finite nature of donor projects, budgets and personnel appointments. Such initiatives are often self-contained, in the sense that they are conceived and implemented on the basis of producing a specific deliverable, whether that is the delivery of strategic advice, a training programme or equipment donation. Even if these activities are successful on their own terms, they may founder over time if they are not sustained by appropriate follow-on support, or if they create isolated islands of capacity in otherwise unreformed organisations. Second, wider structural impediments at the local level (economic, institutional and societal) may blunt the impact of individual projects. For instance, specific successes in training personnel will only have a limited influence if those same personnel are not then employed in positions for which they have been trained, for reasons of organisational politics or even simply a lack of communication or awareness in the institution concerned.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. **Local context is key**: Where possible, external donors should engage meaningfully with local knowledge and interlocutors in determining the nature and scope of the challenge at hand. Local actors should be central to the planning, implementation and evaluation of EU projects and activities.

2. **Importance of local knowledge**: Training of EU personnel should also touch upon issues of local ownership and should impart knowledge of the local context, including where possible language training. The EU should also give due consideration to the possibility of extending the duration of deployments to foster trust-building and institutional memory.

3. **Focus on the community level**: While a lot of emphasis in EU SSR and other capacity-building activities is put on the national government through encouraging national ownership of the process, the EU should also encourage more engagement from civil society actors, including at the community level.
Building capacity of local civil society organisations

The narrative of local ownership has been embraced and integrated into the planning of both donors and NGOs. EU-CIVCAP research found that many EU initiatives to promote local capacity building/development have followed a minimalist understanding of local ownership, i.e. as a way to obtain the cooperation and collaboration of communities in the broad peace processes and to ensure that the work of NGOs in this sector is effective. Running through this is an interest in reflecting local needs, but within a space where both the EU and NGOs see the local communities as lacking in capacity to either determine their own peacebuilding needs or to implement programmes. A maximalist conception of local ownership, which seeks to meaningfully engage local communities throughout all the phases of the project, has not yet been embraced by the EU and other donors. Other barriers to promoting local capacity refer to the fact that donor priorities change and are developed outside of local contexts. As such broad priorities often do not echo local requirements. Short-term and overly rigid funding structures and a general lack of overhead costs also prevent the development of local capacities.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Knowledge of the local context: This is a key requirement in ensuring long-term sustainability of reforms (see policy recommendations on local ownership above).

2. Match resources and ambitions: The ambition of donor programmes should be tailored to the resources available to support them. Feasibility and impact assessments should be carried out prior to and after the deployment of EU missions and operations, both by internal and external evaluators.

3. Long-term support: Capacity-building activities must be accompanied by support and training for maintenance and upkeep if they are to be effective. Equipment provided should be suitable to the environment as well as the operating parameters and the technical skills of local actors.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Ensure community engagement throughout the life of the project: Local participation should be ensured in project design – not just implementation and delivery. EU initiatives should employ local staff and not simply as volunteer labour. EU actors should work with existing community structures where possible, rather than introducing new (and costly) externally-driven practices.

2. Adequate long-term financial support: Funding for peacebuilding efforts needs to be provided over the long-term – and sustained. Funding mechanisms need to allow for the evolution of programmes and for institutional/community learning. EU initiatives should provide financial support for community engagement also during the project design phase, including modest costs for workshops to ensure meaningful local engagement. The EU could also consider allowing local NGOs to report in their own language, rather than require funds to be spent on translation services.

3. Support community-based organisations: NGOs are a pathway to achieve local (grass-roots) ownership of peacebuilding, but they are not the only pathway. Mechanisms to directly fund local communities and to fund community-based organisations need to be developed.

4. Addressing everyday problems as a mechanism to build local ownership: Addressing small mundane issues can provide concrete evidence of the ability of local communities to address the problems they face. This builds trust and communication channels locally and can support broader peacebuilding initiatives.

5. Encourage capacity building for peace: The EU should focus on inter-generational peace and dialogue as part of capacity-building projects. For instance, information sharing between communities should be facilitated as rumours and false information can undermine peace processes.

Left: EC Photo/Arnaud Zajtman
Children sitting on a dump in the centre of Bamako, Mali.
Developing a learning culture
The EU has made considerable progress regarding the development of a learning culture within the realm of foreign/security policy. This process has resulted in clear improvements to the institutional framework and conduct/performance of various tasks regarding conflict prevention and peacebuilding. However, the EU’s approach to learning and best practices is still very erratic; there are multiple approaches to learning, both informal and formal, and variable compliance with the rules on learning that do not take the form of explicit procedures. Improvements to the EU’s learning culture will not be sufficient, on their own, to equip the EU to cope with the various security policy challenges it currently faces, within the area of conflict prevention and peacebuilding, but they could ensure that past mistakes are not repeated and that best practices are incorporated into current and future initiatives.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Further institutionalise and harmonise learning practices: The EU needs to harmonise its learning practices and possibly consider the use of more rigorous monitoring rules, including the appointment of a knowledge directorate within the EEAS to help improve the process.
2. Learning in conflict prevention: Learning should also extend to other policy areas beyond CSDP. Hence, the EU should ensure that previous experiences and lessons identified in conflict zones are captured by an adequate knowledge management system that strengthens the evidence base for future conflict-prevention work.
3. Learning officers: The EU should consider the establishment of permanent learning/knowledge officers within all major units involved in foreign/security policy (in the Commission and EEAS).

Better academic/policy-making engagement
Drawing on the EU-CIVCAP best practice, policy relevance and outreach should be built into EU-funded research projects from its very inception. Researchers should continuously assess the policy implications of their research by engaging with policymakers and other key stakeholders throughout all the research phases (design, evidence gathering, testing of research findings). Policy recommendations should not be quickly added as an afterthought but built into the drafting and peer review process.

KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Policy briefings: Research projects might consider institutionalising the practice of engaging with policymakers by asking for a one-page policy note to be attached/published alongside each research paper.
2. “Writing for policymakers” workshops: For future projects, perhaps a “writing for policymakers” workshop could be organised early in the project cycle.
3. Policy-oriented events: Events, especially participatory workshops such as the Research Meets Policy seminars, are probably the most effective delivery vehicle for research-based policy work. They are also an invaluable vehicle for getting input from the policy world (diplomats, EU officials).
The EU Global Strategy has helped reinvigorate the civilian dimension of CSDP, as well as the EU’s wider engagement with conflicts through its new focus on conflict prevention, resilience (see 2017 Joint Communication), and the EU’s integrated approach to conflicts and crises. For instance, discussions on strengthening civilian CSDP aim at addressing the various challenges that civilian CSDP is facing in terms of relevance, added-value and positioning in the broader integrated approach to conflict and crisis. Based on the output of the first phase, a new Civilian Capability Development Plan was adopted in September 2018 and Member States will be invited to commit resources based on the capability gaps identified. A Civilian CSDP Compact to be adopted in late 2018 is aimed at reforming civilian CSDP in line with the dramatic transformation of the strategic environment over the past years; the evolution of crisis management priorities such as police, rule of law and civilian administration; the upgrade in the connections between the military and the civilian dimensions; and the intensification of challenges at the internal-external nexus.

The capability needs assessment that will accompany such conceptual work offers a highly relevant opportunity to consider some of the above recommendations derived from EU-CIVCAP analysis.

Looking ahead, and despite considerable progress in recent years, there remain significant challenges for the EU as a conflict prevention and peacebuilding actor. The empirical findings of the EU-CIVCAP project can contribute to addressing some of these challenges through institutional reform. Hence, this report identifies key policy recommendations to enhance the EU’s civilian capabilities in relation to personnel, procedures and technologies; to close the gap between early warning and early response; to improve better coordination with other international peacebuilding actors, including enhancing synergies between civilian and military actors; and to ensure that capacity-building activities are locally owned and sustainable. While current developments surrounding the implementation of the EU Global Strategy are a promising start, only sustained political commitment from the EU Member States over the medium and long term can help address the challenges the EU faces in promoting sustainable peace and ensuring that the EU acts as a coherent, comprehensive and strategic actor in this area.
## Summary

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<th>Title</th>
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<td>Abstract</td>
<td>This report seeks to distil the main findings and recommendations from the EU-CIVCAP project and is organised around the following key themes: 1) Resources for conflict prevention and peacebuilding; 2) Prioritising conflict prevention; 3) An integrated approach to conflicts and crises; 4) Building inclusive and sustainable peace; and 5) Improving learning in conflict prevention and peacebuilding.</td>
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Below: CEPS/Toby Vogel  
EU-CIVCAP Final Conference, 12 September 2018
All participants have demonstrated excellence in the field and have participated in many other projects at national, European and international levels.
The goals of preventing the outbreak of conflict and promoting sustainable peace remain a fundamental challenge to policymakers and analysts alike. The European Union (EU) and its member states require an adequate set of capabilities if they are to address this challenge in a timely and effective manner.

EU-CIVCAP provides a comprehensive, comparative and multidisciplinary analysis of EU civilian capabilities for external conflict prevention and peacebuilding in order to identify ‘the best civilian means to enhance these capabilities’ and address existing shortfalls.

EU-CIVCAP is led out of the University of Bristol’s Global Insecurities Centre (GIC), which is housed within the School of Sociology, Politics and International Studies. The University of Bristol leads a consortium of twelve institutions across eight different countries in Europe.