



EU-CIVCAP

Preventing and Responding to Conflict:
Developing EU CIVilian CAPabilities for a sustainable peace

Report on best practices in EU local capacity building

Deliverable 6.3

(Version 1.7; 24 September 2018)



This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No. 653227.

Summary of the Document

Title	DL 6.3 Report on best practices in EU local capacity building
Last modification	24 September 2018
State	Final
Version	1.7
Leading partner	University of Bristol
Other participant partners	BCSP, EPLO, TS
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Audience	Public
Abstract	This study has drawn on 80 interviews in Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Somalia/Somaliland and Cambodia in 2017-2018 to identify barriers to building local capacities in peacebuilding. While every initiative in local capacity building must be tailored to the local cultural and political context, common challenges were raised across all of the case studies. The report also presents a number of best practices to improve EU local capacity building efforts.
Keywords	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Capacity building • Local turn • Best practices • Peacebuilding • Western Balkans • Horn of Africa • South East Asia

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BiH	Bosnia and Herzegovina
CBO	community-based organisation
CPP	Cambodian People's Party
CSO	civil society organisation
EAO	ethnic armed organisation
EU	European Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
INGO	international non-governmental organisation
IO	international organisation
LNGO	local non-governmental organisation
NGO	non-governmental organisation
NLD	National League for Democracy
OSCE	Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
SGBV	sexual and gender-based violence
UN	United Nations
UNTAC	UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study draws on 80 interviews conducted with civil society, state officials, and international actors in Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burma/Myanmar, Somalia/Somaliland and Cambodia in 2017–18 to identify barriers to building local capacities in peacebuilding and best practices. While each local capacity building initiative must be tailored to the local cultural and political context, common issues regarding the local context, sustained peacebuilding, funding structures and reporting requirements were raised across all of the case studies.

Local capacity building is an essential component in establishing the basis for a long-term sustainable peace in post-war or post-conflict environments. In situations where inter-community trust has eroded and confidence in the government is limited, mechanisms must be put in place to facilitate the expression of local needs and to empower these communities to attempt to address these issues in a manner consistent with democratic governance. The dominant mode of delivering projects is through the formal civil society sector, and specifically through non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

To maximise the potential of this model, mechanisms must be put in place to facilitate greater community participation in the life cycle of peacebuilding projects, from design through to implementation and assessment. The creation of such mechanisms requires greater community engagement from the outset and longer-term projects to empower local voices.

Fostering local capacity in peacebuilding involves more than mediation, monitoring of human rights and addressing the direct causes of violence. While these are important components of peacebuilding, mechanisms to address local community needs are crucial to (re)build intra-community trust and to (re)initiate trust in local government.

The long-term establishment of democratic government underpinned by a robust civil society has come under threat from states that have sought to restrict NGO activities. The tendency to shift donor priorities to overlap with development issues has eroded the peacebuilding capacity in some post-war and post-conflict environments. Peacebuilding must be understood and treated as a long-term process and it is recommended that a percentage of donor funds should be allocated to such activities for at least a decade after peace is nominally achieved.

NGO workers overwhelmingly identified funding and reporting mechanisms as a hindrance to the effectiveness of local capacity building. The lack of sustainable funding, the onerous nature of the reporting requirements in European languages and the relative inability to plan for more than a three-year period were universally noted to impinge upon the effectiveness of local peacebuilding.

POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS IN BRIEF

Local context

1. **Fund a broader range of civil society actors.** A focus on funding formal associations has side-lined traditional forms of civil society, silencing actors with a crucial role in peacebuilding. The EU should require local practitioners to partner with community-based organisations—and other traditional forms of civil society—as implementation partners.

Sustained peacebuilding

2. **Intergenerational peace.** As time passes after violent conflict, a gap opens between the experiences of generations, which poses significant challenges to sustaining peace initiatives, addressing the structural causes of violence and ensuring inter-generational justice. A core component of peacebuilding initiatives should therefore involve inter-generational peace programming.
3. **Long-term stable peacebuilding fund.** Peacebuilding takes generations, yet donor funding quickly shifts to new priority areas. The EU should establish a long-term peacebuilding fund to ensure that peace initiatives are sustained for the decades following the formal end of violence.
4. **Empowering communities and addressing everyday problems as peacebuilding.** To build intra-community peace and to foster trust in local government, it is essential to address everyday problems (such as providing access to clean water and improving infrastructure). The EU should provide mechanisms for supporting flexible projects that allow for the rapid and efficient use of funds to respond to community-led initiatives as a mechanism of peacebuilding.

Funding structures

5. **Core funding.** The shift away from providing core funding has made it difficult for organisations to sustain their activities, requiring them to pursue additional funding sources, and thus diverting time and resources away from project delivery.
6. **Long-term funding.** By its nature, peacebuilding is an ongoing process and does not have a clear 'point of achievement'. While states may appear stable years after the cessation of violence, addressing the underlying causes of violence remains a crucial activity for generations after that. It is recommended that future development funding in all post-war and post-conflict environments reserve a percentage of funding to sustain peacebuilding capacities.
7. **Fund community engagement during the design stage of the tender process.** Allocate seed funding when funding calls are announced to facilitate community-led programme design.

Reporting requirements

8. **Reduce the reporting burden on NGOs.** To ensure that small local organisations are able to direct funding and human resources to project design and implementation, it is recommended that formal reporting requirements placed upon organisations by funders be reduced to one mid-programme and one end-of-programme review. NGOs should be allowed to submit the mid-programme review in an official language of the target country in which they operate. The costs of translating this review should be covered by the funders. This would reduce the local organisations' reliance on foreign development contractors and would ensure that the project reports would be easily accessible by the target communities.

1. INTRODUCTION

From the initial emergence of liberal peacebuilding in the early 1990s, there has been a sustained focus on promoting the roles of civil society actors, and in particular non-governmental organisations (NGOs), alongside measures to strengthen and reform post-war and post-conflict states. Drawing on liberal theory, civil society is presented as a core institution for instilling norms of democratic behaviour, playing a role in checking the power of the state and acting as an efficient mechanism through which to deliver policy. Following the limited success of liberal peacebuilding initiatives, the promotion of civil society has been increasingly accompanied by calls to integrate local communities into peacebuilding processes. Taken together, this host of initiatives that place the responsibility to build peace on the state and sub-state levels constitutes the **localisation of peacebuilding**. The shift to ‘the local’ is presented as a core mechanism through which to redress the imbalance between top-down and bottom-up approaches. Encapsulated in a host of concepts including ‘local participatory models’, ‘local capacity building’, ‘localisation’ and ‘local ownership’ (to name just a few), international actors such as the European Union (EU) and the United Nations (UN) have sought to restructure their peace initiatives to provide mechanisms for the effective integration of civil society and local communities into peacebuilding.

This local shift is intended to redress the needs of communities by providing mechanisms for them to articulate, adjudicate and advocate their needs. This is seen as essential to achieving the ‘buy-in’ of communities into the broader peace processes, to redressing local drivers of violent conflict and to ensuring that international interventions result in a peace that is both emancipatory and sustainable. This attention to the local level, however, has not resulted in any significant shift in the major actors involved in peacebuilding. Rather than directly engaging with communities, this drive to achieve local ownership has been pursued mainly through NGOs. As Timothy Donais (2015: 47) illustrates, the drive to empower local communities through a modernist ethos that favours the development of Western forms of civil society, “[i]n practical terms... has meant supporting non-governmental organisations oriented primarily toward either policy advocacy or the provision of social services”. This is a point made a decade earlier by Béatrice Pouligny (2005: 495), who noted:

Most of the recent peace operations and related programmes aimed at post-conflict peacebuilding... contain objectives and components (more particularly, those relating to human rights and electoral process) explicitly geared towards working with NGOs in the countries in which the operations and programmes are undertaken.

As such, we find that the pursuit of local ownership in peacebuilding, while having a more expressly emancipatory logic, has nevertheless continued to support NGOs as the primary delivery mechanism for peacebuilding initiatives.

This report is centrally concerned with identifying the barriers to the effective use of civil society actors as a pathway to achieve local capacity building in peacebuilding and the best practices to support local communities through civil society. The report identifies lessons to be learned from a range of peacebuilding initiatives in Burma/Myanmar, Cambodia, Bosnia

and Herzegovina (BiH), Serbia and Somalia/Somaliland. These form the basis of a series of best-practices recommendations on how to maximise the potential impact of localisation policies to foster long-term sustainable peace. Given the current policy focus on NGOs noted above, this study is focused specifically on the roles of formal civil society actors. While it raises a number of points related to how they can best integrate local communities into the breadth of activities related to the development and sustainment of peace, the intent here is to recommend how international organisations, in particular the EU, can work through civil society actors to foster and support such activities.

While this paper notes the inherent limitations in the abovementioned approach to local ownership, its aim is to identify best practices within this broad policy framework. To this end, the study first establishes the logic informing the 'local turn' (the growing emphasis on local emancipation and capacity building) in peacebuilding, paying particular attention to the presumed benefits of this re-articulation of the liberal peace agenda. As such, it analyses the nuanced shifts of academic and policy writing on local ownership, and the aims it seeks to achieve. This study will thus explore both the promotion of civil society as a core logic informing peacebuilding and the more recent articulations of the emancipatory peace that emphasise the role of 'the local'. The initial review of academic and policy literature will thus briefly establish the logic of working through NGOs, while noting the limitations of such an approach.

Following this overview, this report identifies the major areas of analysis of the case studies that form the basis of the recommendations. These are divided into three interrelated lines of enquiry. The first relates to *how local ownership and capacity building in peacebuilding are conceptualised in the case study states*. This will facilitate a discussion of what NGO representatives understand as local ownership broadly, and of how local ownership and participation can be best achieved in particular contexts. The second line of enquiry relates to *what are perceived as the substantial obstacles to achieving local ownership of peace initiatives, paying particular attention to the NGO-centric model*. Finally, each case study *highlights best practices related to the particular historical context and identifies lessons to be learned for current and future peacebuilding interventions*. The report concludes by identifying the common points arising across the case studies.

2. SCOPE OF THE STUDY AND METHODOLOGY

Achieving a sustainable peace in post-war and post-conflict states remains a pressing policy concern, with 57% of states returning to violence within a generation (Walter, 2010). While a debate remains over the most effective ordering of policy initiatives, it is generally accepted that peacebuilding requires a complex interaction between policies aimed at bringing about state, economic and societal reforms. This study is concerned with the narrower issue of how to achieve broad societal support for the peace processes and the long-term stability of the state. Crucially, it is assumed here that effective peacebuilding relies on the empowerment of local communities to enable them to feel that they are a part of the peacebuilding agenda,

and that concerns at the local level are addressed. This, by definition, takes place in settings where state legitimacy has been called into question and where there are entrenched issues of inter-community distrust, disempowerment, and a lack of positive peace. ***The specific policy issue being addressed is how to engender a sense of local ownership of the peace process and how to sustain it over the long-term following the cessation of violence.***

2.1 KEY CONCEPTS

Local ownership of peacebuilding has gained increasing academic and policy traction over the past 15 years. Over this period there has been a consistent emphasis on the role of local communities in achieving a sustainable and resilient peace. In order to develop best practices in relation to local ownership, it is essential to first interrogate the logic informing such a position, and to identify the anticipated benefits of pushing the responsibility to build peace in part down to individual communities. This will provide broad benchmarks against which the viability of local ownership strategies can be assessed.

The local

The concept of ‘the local’ is best understood as being in opposition to the ‘international’, and sometimes to the ‘state’, even if the precise nature of the boundaries is often obscured by complex networks of power (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 770). The local in this respect must be understood as a categorisation intersecting with the national and the international. “Indeed, it is often much less ‘local’ than imagined, and is the product of constant social negotiation between localised and non-localised ideas, norms and practices” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 770). This is particularly evident when we consider the roles of elites within local communities—elites that often have strong ties with the national government, and may simultaneously have international connections.

While the interest in ‘the local’ as a concept within peacebuilding has emerged relatively recently, the idea of ‘the local’ rests on a much more established body of policy and academic literature. The concept can be traced back to the earliest stages of international development, with articulations of ‘the local’ appearing in the first round of USAID participatory development in the 1950s and 1960s, where the concept of ‘community-based development’ emerged alongside an interest in state decentralisation. While the 1970s saw a shift away from such activities in favour of more large-scale development practices, the 1980s brought about a reaction against such policies, as “activists and scholars attacked this approach, seeing it as ‘top-down’ and inherently disempowering and biased against the interests of the poor” (Mansuri and Rao, 2013: 3). Giles Mohan and Kristian Stokke (2000) argue that there has been an important shift since the early 1990s towards thinking of ‘the local’ as a site of empowerment on the one hand, and as the space for development intervention and the generation of knowledge on the other. The release of the *World Development Report 2004: Making Services Work for Poor People* highlighted the importance of local accountability and decentralisation as essential components of the effective and efficient delivery of public

services (Mansuri and Rao, 2013: 30). On the other hand, its current resonance with the neoliberal prescriptions of the post-Washington consensus must be acknowledged. In this respect, a shift of responsibilities downwards onto communities in part reflects a drive to minimise the role of the state, while simultaneously prioritising scales of activity that are best able to identify, articulate and respond to community concerns.

The drive for localisation has been more recently incorporated into policy and academic work addressing peacebuilding. The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding—i.e. the prioritization of local actors and institutions and their roles in the building of sustainable peace—has developed in part against a backdrop of previous failures of peace missions to obtain a sustainable democratic system able to meet the needs of target populations (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013). It is informed both by a commitment to the democratic potential of civil society and by a suspicion of the state and elites in post-war and post-conflict settings. While local ownership is now routinely cited as essential to the achievement of a sustainable peace (Funk, 2012), what is meant by local ownership in the context of peacebuilding is the subject of significant debate. Donais (2012: 1) has defined local ownership as “the degree of control that domestic actors wield over domestic political processes; in post-conflict contexts, the notion conveys the common-sense wisdom that any peace process not embraced by those who have to live with it is likely to fail”.

At the heart of the advocacy for local ownership is an explicit recognition of local agency. Communities must not be seen as passive recipients of peacebuilding, but rather must have a crucial role to play across all peacebuilding activities. Local and societal efforts to reconstruct societies are now understood to be essential to peacebuilding efforts, and empowering communities is seen as a core mechanism of developing a resilient peace. However, the ‘local turn’ also obscures several complexities that must be addressed. First, while it is self-evident that locals must buy into the peace being promoted, the extent to which international actors, including INGOs (international non-governmental organisations), dictate the terms of the peace is unclear in the local ownership discourse (Donais, 2009). Next, the discourse of local ownership largely presumes a relatively unified ‘local’ without verifying this to be the case, obscuring crucial schisms within society, as well as the extent to which any established peace process will benefit some components of society over others.

Civil society and sustainable peace

The pursuit of local ownership in peacebuilding is consistent with the broader commitment to fostering civil society as a core mechanism through which to establish a liberal peace since the late 1980s (Duffield, 1997; Goodhand, 2006; Paris, 2001). This explicit link between a strong civil society and resilient peace was clearly articulated in early United Nations documents (such as the 1993 *An Agenda for Peace*) which continue to provide frameworks for how we constitute the objectives of peacebuilding.

Given the liberal core of peacebuilding, this study concentrates on the liberal framing of civil society. According to this framing, civil society should be understood primarily as a form of associational behaviour in a space that is distinct from both the state and the private sphere.

For Percy Lehning (1998: 223), “civil society, or ‘civic space’, occupies the middle ground between government and the private sector. It is the space we occupy when we are engaged neither in government activities nor in commerce”. The logic for liberal actors’ promotion of civil society as a peacebuilding tool is complex, but rests essentially on a few key assumptions. The first is that civil society is considered to be a space capable of aggregating the interests of communities and advocating them to government. In spheres where the trust in government is low, this provides a crucial means of addressing potential sources of conflict. Secondly, participation in civil society is perceived to be a fundamental means of (re)establishing social norms of consociational behaviour (Diamond, 1994; Gellner, 1996; Keane, 1998; Müller, 2006; Orjuela, 2003; Rodan, 1997). These forms of behaviour, of recognising that individual and community interests need to be moderated to ensure community cohesion, are understood to be a marker of peaceful democratic society. Finally, civil society, and in particular the formal NGO sector, is presented as an effective check on state authority, protecting human security.

Civil society should not, however, be treated as an *inherently* constructive or progressive force. It has long been recognised that alongside unions, church groups and bowling clubs, civil society also includes organisations that reject liberal democratic aspirations, or norms of tolerance. “Indeed, some forces within civil society hold to blatantly elitist and anti-democratic values. The implication of this is that attempts to foster the development of a liberal civil society need to focus energies on promotion of particular organisations” (Rodan, 2001: 57). There is a broad recognition of this within academic literatures, though the topic is seldom broached within policy literatures on the promotion of civil society in post-war and post-conflict environments. Indeed, this concern was not raised by participants in any of the interviews or focus groups conducted for this report.

Clearly not all of the initiatives that have deployed the language of civil society are objectively interested in the emancipatory goals of the ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding. As Roger Mac Ginty and Oliver Richmond (2013: 775) have highlighted, we should recognise that in some instances the adoption and promotion of ‘participatory methods’, ‘local ownership’ and ‘capacity building’ should be understood as providing a “veneer of local consent and legitimacy on top of a donor system dominated by actors from the global North”. Local authorities may also embrace or at least tolerate such initiatives for similar reasons. At the same time, however, we must not dismiss the fact that the core aims and observations of the ‘local turn’ that peacebuilding initiatives must not be restricted to the core of the target country, and that only by reaching out to society as a whole can there be a reasonable likelihood of long-term success.

In contrast to the support for local ownership within the international community, the extent to which local states are willing participants in such initiatives is much less clear. Indeed, in numerous examples around the planet, there has been a clear pushback against any attempt to empower civil society or local communities, which in turn are perceived to potentially undermine the authority of the state, or (crucially) the position of elites within the target societies. This raises important questions about how such initiatives can be sustained over the long-term and how to achieve support for such endeavours within post-war and post-conflict governments.

NGOs as a proxy of civil society

While associational literature, like the broader liberal literature on civil society, recognises a broad range of formal and informal associations, including unions, church groups, community-based associations, social movements, alongside clubs and societies, in practice peacebuilding and development initiatives have focused on the role of formal non-governmental organisations. NGOs are the chosen expression of associational behaviour for a number of intersecting reasons, including their *potential* participatory and democratic modes of work, their technical expertise and their formal structures (and those structures' potential to facilitate effective management and financial oversight).

NGOs are usually presumed to be the most accurate expression of the local (Mohan and Stokke, 2000: 254). It is assumed that NGOs reinforce civil society because they are (ideally) participatory and because they (ideally) advocate democratic action. These organisations are usually staffed by 'professional' development workers who have undertaken significant training in peace and development practices. This training can be either formal (provided by undergraduate and graduate courses, for example) or informal (for instance, obtained through years of engagement in peace and development work). This expertise is believed to bolster the capabilities of NGOs *vis-à-vis* local communities, thereby increasing the likelihood of effective peacebuilding measures.

Finally, the practice of financial oversight over funding for development and peace initiatives tends to lead to the prioritisation of funding to organisations that are able to meet a number of criteria, so as to ensure that any money provided can be traced and that the impact of funding can be identified and verified. This usually requires an organisation to have a formal organisational structure with a management board, financial auditing and the capability to regularly report on project delivery. NGOs are best situated to take advantage of this environment, whereas by contrast, informal civil society groups are unlikely to be able to demonstrate the necessary accounting and management regimes.

Given these structural biases towards formal civil society actors, this study has focused on NGOs as agents of or pathways to local ownership in peacebuilding. This, however, requires greater attention to be directed to the consideration of the nature of the NGOs and the extent to which they are able to legitimately claim to directly represent local communities. The study further highlights the potential limits to achieving local ownership through such mechanisms.


Local vs. transnational NGOs

There is a tendency in the policy literature to seek to distinguish between local and international or transnational NGOs. Following the drive to local ownership in both peacebuilding and development, there has been a steady increase in a preference for funding and supporting local non-governmental organisations (LNGOs) over international ones. We see within the policies of many large international NGOs a drive to localise, a process enacted by acting as a donor and funding smaller local organisations to deliver policies, and/or localising by expanding the indigenous staffing of their country offices. The idealisation of

local organisations is further blurred by questions of who is employed in such NGOs. Numerous local NGOs are either led or staffed by expatriates, while country offices of large international organisations may be led and staffed predominately by locals. Furthermore, LNGOs that have entirely local staffing and leadership are not necessarily embedded within the local communities they are targeting. Likewise, groups working in rural spaces can be staffed by elites from urban centres. As such, more caution is needed in equating the presence and activities of NGOs with any inherent empowerment of local communities.

Crucially, if NGOs are understood – following the broader literature on civil society in peacebuilding – as a mechanism of local empowerment, then attention must then be paid to how NGOs set their agendas. Here the literature on both development and peacebuilding highlights the question of local accountability. It is well established that donors are able to dictate and shape NGOs’ priorities through funding programmes, and as such, “a major threat to the ‘local turn’ is that it is co-opted and neutralised by orthodox, internationally designed, funded and promoted approaches to peace building” (Mac Ginty and Richmond, 2013: 778). This has the potential to limit the capacity of local communities to define and shape their own priorities around building a sustainable peace, subjugating community priorities to those of donors and other international actors. At the same time, we have seen a suspicion of the NGO sector, and of civil society more broadly, by post-war and post-conflict governments. Whether expressed through a lack of cooperation with the sector or through the active suppression of civil society and NGOs, this suspicion represents a further restriction on local ownership initiatives enacted through NGOs.

Figure 1. Typology of NGO localisation



Following the logic that civil society is and should be a core partner in peacebuilding, this study understands local ownership over this sector’s activities to be fundamental to the

establishment of a long-term sustainable peace (see also Juncos et al., 2017). Local ownership can be understood to relate to two axes: the first is the extent to which the organisation or movement is local, and the second is the extent to which the work programmes (or more specifically, their design and implementation) are dictated by local communities. Large international organisations have been advocating for ‘localisation’, firstly by striving to employ local people within their national offices, and secondly by pushing to outsource project delivery to local organisations, in order to move along the horizontal axis in Figure 1 (above). Yet, such NGOs are rarely constituted by local communities or representatives of them.

This typology provides the ability to assess the extent to which localisation in peacebuilding is being effectively designed and implemented. If local concerns and local implementation are essential, then programmes should strive to foster activities in the top-left quadrant of Figure 1, illustrating that projects are co-designed by communities, responding to perceived needs and implemented by groups affiliated with the target populations.

Critiques of the ‘local turn’

The ‘local turn’ in peacebuilding has not escaped critical scrutiny, and the concerns raised by various scholars are important to note. These critiques point to potential pitfalls that need to be addressed and where possible minimised. The major thrust of the critical voices is that the local ownership discourse has provided a cover for inherently neo-colonial processes underpinning international development and peacebuilding (Cooke and Kothari, 2002; Kapoor, 2005). The pursuit of a resilient peace, enacted through local ownership techniques, is in this way seen as a continuation of the logic of neoliberalism (Hébert and Mincyte, 2014; Richmond, 2012), and the evacuation of responsibility from the state, replaced by local reliance without any commensurate increase of local funding or authority.

At the same time, there have been concerns expressed that “local ownership... is much more a rhetorical device than an actual guide for implementers” (Scheye and Peake, 2005: 240), or that it is seldom achieved in practice (Bargués-Pedreny, 2015). Others see it as a displacement of the responsibility from the international community to the domestic society; an effective transfer of responsibility and, therefore, blame (Jackson, 2011; Rayroux and Wilén, 2014).

Given this review of the assumptions informing local ownership policies in peacebuilding and the critiques levelled against its enactment to date, the case studies have been structured to address the following two broad questions:

- 1) ***How can organisations conceptualise and enact local ownership?***
- 2) ***What are the perceived barriers to effective local ownership?***

The first line of enquiry seeks to determine what NGO representatives understand to be the meaning of local ownership, how they seek to implement such policies and how they see this contributing to the attainment of a sustainable peace. In each of the case studies this is read

in relation to the local context, which varies substantially across the countries under investigation. Each case study identifies what are considered to be the impediments to achieving local ownership in that given country. These address a broad range of issues relating to community-level affairs, the roles of states and elites and matters deriving from the roles of donors and the international community. The case studies then highlight particular best practices for achieving local ownership in peacebuilding.

2.2 METHODOLOGY

The extensive academic literature on peacebuilding has highlighted the importance of context-specific policies. Local socio-political dynamics must be considered in the design and implementation of peace processes, thereby necessitating the inclusion of a broad range of actors from the state level down to communities so as to ensure that the measures implemented are appropriate and effective. This also presents challenges to the ability to learn lessons from individual cases. Nevertheless, as this study illustrates, there are common issues that emerge across cases that highlight current shortfalls in the policies adopted by international actors in supporting peace.

Following these basic assumptions, the central question of this study is: ***What represents best practice in achieving local ownership in peacebuilding through NGOs?***

To answer this question, we address a series of sub-questions:

- A) ***Why***: What is the logic informing the drive to achieve local ownership in peacebuilding?
- B) ***What***: What do civil society actors and other stakeholders in peacebuilding understand to constitute local ownership?
- C) ***How***: What do stakeholders consider to be best practices in achieving local ownership in peacebuilding?
- D) ***Barriers***: What are the impediments to local ownership?
- E) ***Sustainability***: How can the EU foster long-term local peacebuilding?

This study embraces a mixed methods approach, drawing on surveys (using open and closed questions) (see Annex A) conducted during formal interviews. The questions included in the survey were developed following an extensive review of the extant literature on localisation and peacebuilding. The research teams all had experience in researching peace processes in the given countries and substantial ties with the respective NGO communities within those contexts. In total, 80 interviews were conducted for this report. The interviewees were identified by the researchers via their existing networks of contacts and through snowballing. The interviewees were all involved, in one way or another, in peacebuilding and included representatives of local and international NGOs, think tanks, donor organisations and EU and other international institutions, as well as academics and embassy personnel. All interviews were recorded (written-down) in note-form, then subsequently transcribed in full.

The empirical work revolves around a series of country case studies defined by EU-CIVCAP's work programme: Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Somalia/Somaliland, Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar. Drawing on diverse cases provides a basis from which to identify common issues arising across contexts, to highlight potential best practices in achieving resilient local ownership of peacebuilding, and to note barriers to effectiveness arising from the common policies of donors and NGOs. In addition, a multiple case study approach allows for the identification of issues arising from specific aspects of each local context.

The findings derived from the initial round of interviews were subsequently tested and validated in focus groups, which drew in civil society representatives in the cases of Kosovo/Serbia (Krusevac) and Somalia/Somaliland (Mogadishu and Hargeisa). These provided an opportunity to test observations made by the various research teams to validate their observations and recommendations alike. This has provided a crucial check of the interpretation of the data carried out by individuals embedded within the particular case countries. In the case of BiH, the non-availability of actors due to 'workshop fatigue' was highlighted as a crucial reason behind why it was not possible to organise a focus group. In the case of Cambodia and Burma/Myanmar, focus groups were not held due to the security situation arising from the respective states' crackdowns on civil society organisations (CSOs). In both instances, representatives of NGOs stated that to organise a focus group involving representatives of the peacebuilding sector would likely result in problematic scrutiny of those organisations. In the case of Burma/Myanmar, the survey results were validated through NGO representatives on a one-to-one basis. The overall findings of this report were further tested during an EU-CIVCAP's Work Package 6 workshop in Bristol, UK in May 2018, which included civil society representatives and peacebuilding activists from a number of the target contexts.

3. CASE STUDY: KOSOVO AND SERBIA

Contextual background

Serbia has strongly rejected Kosovo's independence declared in 2008, and relations between Belgrade and Pristina remain highly volatile, despite the ongoing EU-facilitated dialogue for the normalisation of relations (the so-called Brussels Dialogue) (EEAS, 2016). The Brussels Dialogue, which is currently led at the highest political level was criticised in interviews with Kosovar NGOs as being non-transparent and non-inclusive,¹ undermining its legitimacy and severely limiting local ownership (Murati, 2016). It was not until early 2018 that the EU demonstrated some willingness to include 'consortia of established local civil society organisations'² from both Kosovo and Serbia in the Dialogue process by publishing a call for

¹ Interviews KS03 and KS20 (see Annex B).

² Civil society organisations are understood here to "encompass non-governmental organisations, grassroots organisations, cooperatives, trade unions, professional associations, universities, media and independent

project ideas. The call aims to support communicating the benefits of the Dialogue to the broader public, encouraging public debates and facilitating peer-to-peer interactions between various actors from Kosovo and Serbia (European Union, 2018). The EU has otherwise supported some civil society initiatives fostering cooperation between Serbia and Kosovo through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), but there has been no direct link between this kind of support and the Brussels Dialogue (Delegation of the EU in Serbia, n.d.).

Apart from the EU, a number of other donors have provided funding for civil society organisations to run projects with key words such as reconciliation, transitional justice and interethnic dialogue.³ A particular effort on the part of civil society is the ‘track II dialogue’ between Kosovo Albanians and Serbs (both Kosovo Serbs and representatives of Serbia), which has been facilitated with financial support by the Swiss Federal Ministry of Foreign Affairs parallel to the high political Brussels Dialogue (Plänitz and Stojanovic Gajic, 2017: 39–55).

This case study reviews local initiatives supporting inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation, as well as those publicly scrutinising the political peacebuilding process between Kosovo and Serbia (or, as the EU chooses to call it, “normalisation of relations”). These range from support for social inclusiveness and facilitating inter-ethnic contacts in Kosovo and establishing communication between different groups in Serbia and Kosovo, to ‘track II mediation’, to efforts towards increasing transparency of the Brussels Dialogue and accountability of political decision-makers who directly or indirectly influence it. These are carried out at four levels: regional, bilateral (e.g. a CSO from Belgrade working with a counterpart from Pristina), national and municipal, with the last one referring foremost to the ethnically divided city of Mitrovica.

Conceptualising and enacting local ownership in Serbia

Dealing with *local* ownership and *local* civil society requires settling some terminological issues arising from difference in the way local CSOs are defined from outside (including in the theoretical framework of this paper) and the way they define themselves. For instance, one interviewee vehemently stated: “As a matter of fact, we are a national organisation, not local,”⁴ implying that his organisation is mainly focusing on the national level (working country-wide and primarily addressing state-level authorities) and not the municipal. This is more easily understood knowing that the term ‘local CSO’ in Serbia means one that is primarily active at the municipal level and is usually smaller in terms of staff and funding than the ‘national’ CSOs. Hence, the axis of ‘localness’ stretches across several types of CSOs:

foundations - all non-profit” (European Union, 2018).

³ Donors included, among others, Switzerland, Norway, the UK, the Netherlands (through the MATRA programme), Germany, Finland, Denmark, USAID, OSCE, Balkan Trust for Democracy, National Endowment for Democracy, Open Society Foundation, European Fund for the Balkans, Friedrich Ebert Foundation and the Council of Europe.

⁴ Interview KS12, Annex B.

- CSOs primarily active at municipal/subnational level (8 CSOs in the total sample)
- CSOs primarily active at national (country) level (11)
- CSOs primarily active at the regional level (2)

Some of the CSOs primarily active at the national level have ‘sister’ organisations in the region: for instance, there are Youth Initiatives for Human Rights in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Serbia, Croatia and Montenegro, which are structurally independent but also cooperating on various projects. Similarly, the Humanitarian Law Center Kosovo was established in 1997 as a branch office of the Humanitarian Law Center Belgrade but has operated independently since 2011.

Self-understanding of civil society

There are two factors defining and shaping civil society in Kosovo and Serbia. First, “belonging to civil society is a matter of organisational self-identification”.⁵ In the words of one interlocutor, the “Serbian Orthodox Church could be a part of civil society, but it is not, because it does not regard itself as such”.⁶ Another feature of this self-identification is a strong belief, consistent with the liberal conception of civil society, that civil society’s function is to increase transparency and accountability of the government,⁷ i.e. that civil society works to protect the public interest.⁸

Second, donors’ definitions are crucial in drawing the boundaries of civil society in Kosovo. Calls for project proposals typically expect civil society organisations to be legal entities i.e. formalised. According to one interviewee, “there is a mental framework among donors defining what a civil society organisation should be like and it is very difficult to break it”.⁹ The same interviewee sees an example of this expectation in project proposal templates, which ‘prefer’ organisations doing work with measurable outputs.

When it comes to international NGOs, their affiliation to civil society is rather murky, as many tend to act as donors along with implementing their own projects for which they carry out fundraising. One interviewee formulates concerns that are often heard informally among local CSOs: “They [international organisations working in a particular local environment] will never have space in civil society and be considered as credible, because they are competition [for funding] as well as donors.”¹⁰

⁵ Interview KS12.

⁶ Interview KS12.

⁷ Interview KS07.

⁸ Interview KS12.

⁹ Interview KS10.

¹⁰ Interview KS20.

NGO local ownership

Regardless of whether NGOs were founded by people from local communities (or by foreign entities, almost all rely almost entirely upon funding from foreign donors. Some CSOs were set up as spin-offs of previous projects implemented by foreign entities, but the fact that those projects had managed to establish themselves within the local community, and that such CSOs involved local staff from the very beginning, makes them local as much as international. CSOs founded by foreign entities may employ either local staff only or combine local and international staff. Another important factor defining ‘localness’ is the way CSOs are perceived by the broader community.

Civil society organisations in Northern Kosovo (four municipalities with ethnic Serbian majority, not integrated in Kosovo) and in Serbia, especially those dealing with fundamental rights, reconciliation and transitional justice, are frequently labelled in public as “foreign mercenaries” or “traitors”, which discredits their role.¹¹ An interviewee from Northern Kosovo pointed that in his community his organisation was labelled as “Albanian” (Interview K5). A comparative survey from 2017 indicates that only 32% of citizens in Serbia mainly or completely trust NGOs, while in Kosovo the figure was 58% - the highest in the Western Balkan region (Mandic, 2017: 11).

This highlights the importance of achieving local level cooperation and support of NGO-led activities. The disparity of experiences between Kosovo and Serbia illustrates how initiatives that are perceived as emerging from outside communities are easily distrusted and dismissed. To achieve local ownership of peacebuilding, civil society initiatives need to be seen as emerging from communities.

Local participation models

Among the interviewed organisations, the most common model for involvement of different social groups in peacebuilding processes is inter-community dialogue, enabling direct contact among communities. CSOs both in Serbia and Kosovo have used various ‘people-to-people’ and peer-to-peer methods (exchange programmes, workshops, trainings, field trips, etc.) in order to ensure participation and build trust among different communities.¹² In pursuance of greater local participation in their work, CSOs mostly rely on public calls for their events and field research, focus groups and direct communication with people for identification of local needs. Certain organisations also have associates in the field who inform them about practical problems or incidents.¹³ Advocacy campaigns and awareness-raising actions have been emphasised as another way of involving wider public in peacebuilding initiatives.¹⁴

¹¹ Interviews KS13 and KS19.

¹² Interviews KS02, KS05, KS011 and KS12.

¹³ Interviews KS11 and KS16.

¹⁴ Interviews KS13, KS14 and KS15.

Nevertheless, collected data show that most of the initiatives and activities gather the same circle of like-minded people and do not have the necessary reach and impact outside of the ‘civil society bubble’. Some organisations manage to break out the bubble and attract wider audience by avoiding high political topics and by tackling everyday issues which directly affect the citizens' lives.¹⁵ Others remain hampered by donors’ agendas, the current political situation and the obstacles set by governments’ reluctance to cooperate.

Barriers to effective local ownership

Donor priorities

Organisations supported by one donor enjoy greater independence and flexibility in pursuing their own agenda and, hence, opportunity to foster local needs.¹⁶ Project-funded CSOs have to accommodate different donors’ objectives, which leaves them less space to take citizens’ needs into account and to develop locally owned peacebuilding initiatives.

Community-NGO-state interaction

Generally, CSOs in Kosovo have significantly better cooperation with government actors, compared to Serbia, both at the local and central level. CSOs in Kosovo have government partners in many project activities and are able to push through policy recommendations and participate in law drafting processes.¹⁷

On the other hand, in Serbia and Northern Kosovo, civil society organisations are often labelled as “foreign mercenaries” by government officials and are subject to smear campaigns in pro-government tabloids. Civil society inputs on relevant political processes are rarely taken into account and participation in their initiatives comes down to organisations “which are not too critical of government’s work”.¹⁸ Discrediting or excluding civil society does not solely or necessarily hamper communication with the institutions but it does create problems in conveying messages to the citizens and decreases the public trust.¹⁹

Funding structures

Financial sustainability has been emphasised as one of the biggest challenges posed to CSOs, whose agendas greatly depend on donors’ objectives. Some interlocutors have expressed concern over their organisations’ sustainability, since topics they have been dealing with “have gone out of fashion for the donor community”.²⁰ Accordingly, the empirical evidence demonstrates that international actors had little success in ensuring local ownership over the peacebuilding initiatives they supported. Although CSOs predominantly instigate dialogue

¹⁵ Interview KS19.

¹⁶ Interviews KS08 and KS11.

¹⁷ Interviews KS07, KS08, KS09, KS11 and KS16.

¹⁸ KS FGD Participants.

¹⁹ Interview KS14.

²⁰ Interviews KS13 and KS14.

and initiate peacebuilding programmes, they are rather adapting to the criteria imposed by the donor community, than being agenda-setters. By trying to fit international actors' criteria, CSOs fail to entirely grasp and address local needs through their initiatives.

Identified best practices

Subcontracting

Subcontracting has been highlighted as a positive example of engaging smaller organisations and ensuring local ownership in peacebuilding.²¹ Namely, contracting one big, well-established CSO to subcontract a number of grassroots organisations has proven to be very effective. Such model enables both incorporation of local needs in project implementation as well as fosters the smaller organisations' administrative and human resources capacity building.²²

Addressing everyday problems as a mechanism of building ownership

Programmes aimed at addressing mundane everyday issues, such as infrastructural problems, and offering concrete results and products can be identified as a successful model for fostering local ownership. By identifying common problems and jointly developing solutions, such initiatives contribute to increased understanding among communities and enable better communication with the citizens by refraining from political subjects.²³ Thus, in order to support longer-lasting peacebuilding efforts, international donors should dedicate more attention to programmes of such kind, tailored to the ordinary citizens' needs.

Information sharing

Many interviewees highlighted the lack of information as the principal source of conflict among different communities in Kosovo.²⁴ Hence, initiatives aimed at correcting the misperceptions and preventing rumours, by creating informal channels for information exchange, have proven to be very useful.

²¹ Interviews KS08 and KS19.

²² Interview KS08.

²³ Interview KS19.

²⁴ Interviews KS01 and KS11.

4. CASE STUDY: BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

NGOs and peacebuilding in BiH

A space of ethnic conflict during the 1990s, the end of which was marked by the Dayton Agreement in 1995 (Mac Ginty and Richmond 2013: 764), BiH now exists as a sovereign state governing a very complex terrain of identities and territories. BiH today is in a post-war environment, but with ongoing discrimination, structural violence and ethnically-based politics according to the divisions that exist in society. However, additionally and unusually, international authorities were given a large degree of executive power within the state. The High Representative, for example, “may remove from office any individual who violates his or her legal commitments under the Dayton peace accord or obstructs its implementation”, (Caplan, 2004: 234). The result of this has been an increasingly ethnically polarised, nationalist form of politics and the continuing failure to integrate minority ethnicities into the BiH identity (Human Rights Watch, 2017). This has been arguably exacerbated by the intervention of international NGOs and donors.

The early intervention of international NGOs and donors in post-war Bosnia was dominated by service delivery. This meant that while services were delivered at little financial cost to BiH, the deeper effects (and causes) of the war were not addressed, and capacity was not built in civil society or government organisations (Sterland, 2006: 15–16). Furthermore, the geographical location of these NGOs in major cities around BiH meant that social divisions were further entrenched (Sterland, 2006: 17). As a result, these processes have had little positive effect on the BiH government’s ability to govern, with the state left “weak, and socially and economically unsustainable despite the length of time the internationals have been involved” (Richmond, 2006: 303). As one interviewee put it, “there’s the expectation that after 25 years of babysitting, suddenly everything must be done by locals”.²⁵

Conceptualising civil society and local ownership

Interviewees identified civil society in various ways, ranging from formal definitions (registered organisations, primarily NGOs, which were automatically considered to be the legitimate representation of civil society by their very form), to informal ones (groups of individuals who were socially and politically aware, and who acted upon this awareness to affect the lives of others in one way or another). Somewhere in between these two definitions lay a slightly simpler idea of civil society, in which civil society was composed of “registered organisations and associations that aren’t part of governmental structures”.²⁶ In the same breath, however, some identified civil society as a series of institutions whilst claiming that it

²⁵ Interview BH14.

²⁶ Interview BH10; see also Interviews BH04 and BH09.

is not always clear what civil society meant.²⁷ Thus, while a range of definitions were deployed, civil society was overwhelmingly treated as constituted of formal organisations.

Local ownership was conceptualised differently by various actors in BiH, according to their own positions within the context. For example, at one end of the spectrum, it was suggested that local ownership was achieved if international actors stepped back and only partook in distant, soft diplomacy and mediation between locals, whilst the locals themselves found their own solutions to problems.²⁸ At the other end, it was argued that, for as long as internationals had any directing or guiding role over programmes, there could not be local ownership.²⁹ Another interviewee argued that, regardless of what the international actors did in BiH, or how they did it, the local population could not have local ownership of capacity building while the country was economically poor.³⁰

There was a clear commitment running through all of the interviews to a maximal understanding of local ownership. In practice, however, substantial barriers were seen as impeding its achievement. Within the broad peacebuilding sector, localisation has tended to concentrate activities in urban centres and to provide little space for community development of peace initiatives. Greater reach to rural areas is essential.

Barriers to effective local ownership

Economic capacity

Above all else, BiH's economic situation was highlighted by interviewees as a major challenge to sustainable peacebuilding. As one interviewee noted: "We from this region laugh when people come here and tell us that we must live together: we have done this for years. The main problem is employment. Unemployment is so high here." But in this situation, much was "at the mercy of political elites—at every level of operation, one needs to know the political elite to get things done".³¹ This situation led to 'citizens' apathy' whereby those who were educated and able to leave the country would do so, and even where they were not able to leave, they were not motivated to contribute to existing initiatives or start a new one.³²

Sustained inter-ethnic conflict

This applied not only to local organisations and individuals. Internationals, too, attempted to secure the compliance of elite politicians. Because they had significant control in the BiH environment, their collective role in influencing the population was important. Interviewees highlighted "constant abuse by leading politicians of past conflicts by keeping them alive,

²⁷ Interview BH08.

²⁸ Interview BH11.

²⁹ Interview BH09.

³⁰ Interview BH01.

³¹ Interview BH01.

³² Interview BH04.

stirring-up past conflicts”, which served to undermine capacity building efforts.³³ The result of this was also the ethnic polarisation of politics within BiH, to the point where “the liberal people are leaving the country... [leaving] only those who are okay with ethnic division”.³⁴ As such, the population, too, was becoming increasingly interested in speaking to politicians about ethnic issues.³⁵ Meanwhile, any multi-ethnic political party does not command enough political support amongst the electorate to stand a chance of governing.³⁶

Having noted the above observations, however, there was much that international actors could have done to overcome the issues. As one military officer assessed: “International actors should not hide behind politicians saying the latter are not capable. I don’t think our politicians are very good, but this does not mean that we should just assume that BiH is too complex to understand. We should instead learn from EU countries.”³⁷ Therefore, better attempts should be made at encouraging lessons identified in other contexts to be applied to the BiH context. Indeed, much of the failure of the local ownership at capacity building was attributed to the failure of donors to properly support this.

Changing donor priorities

Interviewees drew attention to the repeated calls from donors for reform: “We need *forming* more than reforming. ... When the international community, whatever that means, reaches consensus, someone abroad needs to really assess whether the implementation of the reform that they have decided upon is *necessary*.”³⁸ Similarly, changing priorities prevented organisations from running programmes sustainably. An ever-present issue were the tight timeframes set by donors, who gave preference to programmes promising quick but potentially unsustainable or misleading results, and who were unwilling to fund multi-year programmes: “The US Embassy wanted us to change people’s minds about ethnicity in one year, but it would take 25 years or more to achieve this”, explained one interviewee, adding: “in the end, we quit the project”.³⁹

Lack of a long-term strategy

The reason behind the failure on the part of international actors to understand the need for multi-year programmes was a fundamental miscalculation about the rate at which capacity could be built – not only in terms of what capacity building activities could be delivered, but more importantly, how quickly the content of those activities could subsequently be assimilated by local actors. As one interviewee put it, “if something hasn’t worked, don’t keep funding it just so as to remain popular”. The same interviewee added that “there were times that BiH was being funded as much as Afghanistan. The absorption capacity is not enough for

³³ Interview BH12.

³⁴ Interview BH05.

³⁵ Interview BH05.

³⁶ Interview BH07.

³⁷ Interview BH01.

³⁸ Interview BH01.

³⁹ Interview BH05.

this”.⁴⁰ This was compounded by a preference for organisations that were obviously peacebuilding organisations—that is, that their advertised main activity was ‘peacebuilding’. Yet, it was recognised that most effective organisations in the field of peacebuilding did not do just peacebuilding, but rather focused on one or more less glamorous activities that were essential to peacebuilding.⁴¹

The chances of donors supporting sustainable, locally owned capacity building was further jeopardised by the lack of a coordinated approach between the international actors. For example, attempts were made to build ‘hard’ capacity without actually planning for what training would be necessary. “We went to an ammunition destruction site and there was a machine there that had been donated, but nobody knew what to do with it”, as stated by one interviewee.⁴² This was also true of training programmes, explained by an EUFOR official:

I think 20 to 30% of the training of BiH’s armed forces is coordinated. Everything else is bilateral, with no coordination or choice. The US is doing a lot of training, but not through us. Turkey is doing a lot of training too particularly on communications, but beyond knowing this, we have no idea what they’re actually doing.⁴³

Backsliding on the conflict cycle

Typically, one expects a conflict to go from pre-war, to warfighting, to post-war conditions, in that order. But the post-war condition often has many, if not all, of the features of a pre-war environment. These include a poor economy, high levels of unemployment and poverty, corruption, discrimination and structural violence, and ethnically-defined nationalist politics, to name just some of the conditions. One interviewee explained: “There are lots of local NGOs—victims’ associations—also. But they are mostly involved in instigating conflict, rather than conflict resolution. Their views are all, of course, one-sided, and they promote hatred and fear. In every way we are progress-dependent. And if you look at the conflict cycle, we have passed the post-conflict long ago and we’re well into the pre-conflict phase. So, I think it’s about time that the international community lifts up its head and engages with the big picture” (Interview BH02). It should be noted, however, that all-out war was not expected (Interview BH14); the primary concern was that the structural violence would worsen the prevailing negative peace.

Lack of international accountability

The High Representative was singled-out as an office whose *modus operandi* by definition restricted the extent to which the achievement of local ownership was possible:

The other main mistake made is that the High Representative had the power of an old-style monarch, in a way that has never been held before. They could just implement whatever they wanted, with zero responsibility for the result. Nobody can sue them for what they did, so we should at the very least be able to hold them accountable for it. Even a monarch has to live with their people.⁴⁴

⁴⁰ Interview BH14.

⁴¹ Interview BH14.

⁴² Interview BH06.

⁴³ Interview BH07.

⁴⁴ Interview BH01.

Furthermore, it was argued that where local actors were engaged and asked to implement policies on behalf of internationals, some of the NGO workers were seen as disconnected from the communities they were seeking to assist.⁴⁵

Best practices

Understanding the local context prior to funding NGOs

Interviewees focused on best practices for promoting local ownership, particularly for international actors. Within these, taking the time initially to understand the environment and the genuine needs of locals (measured qualitatively),⁴⁶ and vitally, to gain the local actors' trust, emerged as a pivotal first step for any international actor. One consultant explained: "A lot of things I did early-on was really just trying to get the organisation to be identified as a legitimate actor in the region. And getting trust was a challenge."⁴⁷

Employing community members in scoping studies for peace initiatives

Aside from ensuring the trust of international actors, another best practice for local ownership was to engage members of local communities as researchers on research projects that focused on those same communities. One organisation "had a junior researcher from the community itself—the Roma—as well as others", and as such their organisation demonstrated to the local community "how they could integrate" whilst making sure "that these communities aren't just subjects of our research, but that they are also actually part of the work".⁴⁸

Best practices for international actors ranged from their form of engagement to their individual programmes. By moving from an implementation to an observation role, international actors such as the OSCE inherently promoted a movement towards a locally-owned capacity building.⁴⁹ Indirectness and allowing locals to work at least semi-autonomously was a theme in the best practices identified by interviewees. One interviewee advocated "promoting dialogue and tackling it through link issues. Local ownership and peacebuilding aren't things that can be directly tackled. You have to deal with specific sectoral and social issues and promote local ownership and peacebuilding through these".⁵⁰

Coordinating projects

While there were deficiencies in coordination generally, a best practice was highlighted in the coordination of the demining effort and the destruction of excess ammunition, which runs as a single project but in fact is "a consortium of projects, involving six organisations, including the EU, OSCE, EUFOR, NATO and UN", and therefore requiring much coordination.⁵¹

⁴⁵ Interview BH03.

⁴⁶ Interview BH11.

⁴⁷ Interview BH13.

⁴⁸ Interview BH09.

⁴⁹ Interview BH01.

⁵⁰ Interview BH03.

⁵¹ Interview BH02.

5. CASE STUDY: SOMALIA AND SOMALILAND

Contextual background⁵²

Peacebuilding, in various forms, has occurred in Somalia since the fall of the Siad Barre government. Peacebuilding initiatives have ranged from top-down, international donor organised efforts to grassroots activities driven by local Somalis. Peacebuilding in Somalia largely means improving trust and relations between clans. While the regional conferences that occurred between 2000 and 2012 achieved a political settlement amongst the clans, building trust and enduring peace requires sustained, long-term work. Additionally, work at the national and regional levels must also be supported by work at the local community level. Without effort at all levels, disturbances at one level have the possibility to destabilise gains at the other levels.

Peacebuilding in Somalia has historically been the remit of traditional elders who both dominate the process and decide the outcomes. This leaves little room for the voices of other actors, particularly marginalised groups, such as women or youth. As traditional elders are affiliated with sub-clans, negotiating clan fault lines and desires becomes critical to successful peacebuilding if one aims to ensure the perceived legitimacy of the process and the buy-in by the Somali population. While groups such as Al-Shabaab pose a significant threat to peace in Somalia, the current conflicts amongst the clans and within the government over resources and power are the main barriers to peacebuilding in Somalia. While inter-clan conflict has become less common in recent years, they still occur and pose a threat to overall peace and stability. Moreover, there must be peacebuilding in the political arena. This would involve federal-level processes and systems, including the finalisation of the constitution, an agreed power-sharing formula and a new national census. This will also involve careful negotiations between the federal government and the federal member states concerning respective rights and responsibilities.

Prior to the term of former President Silanyo, civil society was very strong in Somaliland, but Silanyo co-opted civil society, largely by giving key civil society leaders positions in his government.⁵³ In recent months, a number of journalists and activists have been arrested by the Somaliland government following their criticism of the actions of the government and important political figures (Committee to Protect Journalists 2017). The independence of civil society in Somaliland was weakened by these developments with civil society serving as an extension of the government's interests. As a result, the public does not see civil society as representing them or focusing on issues that are important to them. The situation is different

⁵² For further background to the recent history and peacebuilding record of Somalia/Somaliland, see Hansen 2016; Kapteijns 2014; Lewis 2008; Williams 2018.

⁵³ Interview HA14.

in Somalia where civil society is somewhat stronger, has retained its critical voice, and is more able to disagree with the government.⁵⁴

Local ownership is a stated priority for civil society and NGOs in Somalia, but that it is largely absent in reality and where it is present, it is largely driven by locals themselves; there remains a large disconnect between stated intent and impact. While each individual or organisation interviewed had methods for consulting with locals and engaging with the community, these measures have failed to adequately take the local context into account in a meaningful way. Where international actors such as the EU are seen as being involved directly in peacebuilding, they have normally bypassed traditional Somali systems and are thus seen as being disconnected from local and traditional forms of peacebuilding. This detachment can be personified in the construction of a new EU building within the Mogadishu International Airport (MIA). The MIA is almost exclusively the realm of internationals, as it is extremely difficult for Somalis to access it and many internationals do not leave the MIA.

Conceptualising and enacting local ownership in Somalia and Somaliland

All interviewees stated that they saw local participation as crucial to peacebuilding activities. Echoing the academic literature, the participants stated that to achieve local ownership, projects and need to be driven by local needs, not by donors and their priorities.⁵⁵ For example, the High-quality Research Training Programme (HQRS) was a multi-donor funded two-year project in Somaliland that focused on providing quality social research training to Somali researchers.⁵⁶ The programme was a clear success, met a need in the local population, and was promoted by the community; however, its funding was not renewed due to changing donor priorities. Additionally, all too frequently communities are not consulted until after a project award has taken place rather than being consulted before the proposal is formed or the bid constructed.

All interviewees stated that their organisations utilised methods and tools to

Lessons from Failure – Need for Local Consultation

One participant told a story of a project failure that he witnessed in Somaliland (HA FGD Participant 12). The organisation was tasked with bringing toilets to a rural community, however, what had not been taken into account was the on-going drought. The community rejected the toilet project as they currently did not have access to clean drinking water and a minimal supply of water of any kind; toilets were not a priority for the community nor were they a good match for the current context of that locality. Similarly, another project hosted a large workshop in rural Somalia with villagers coming from many miles and nomads coming to attend. Once the workshop began it was clear that the community had not been consulted, during a drought that was threatening many of the attendees livelihoods, the topic of the workshop was safe-sex, which seemed absurd to the attendees in light of their current struggles (Interview HA14).

⁵⁴ HA FGD Participants 01, 03 and 04.

⁵⁵ Interview HA05; HA FGD Participants 01, 02, 03, 04, 08, 09, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

⁵⁶ Interview HA14.

determine local needs, through meetings with the local community and/or important stakeholders, community needs assessments, and dialoguing with the local population. Two participants reported that their organisations use specific tools, Participatory Rural Appraisal (PRA) and Shier's Pathways to Participation (see Shier, 2001), to gauge the needs and to fully engage the local community.⁵⁷

Local ownership of programmes

Ten interviewees' organisations already employ locals, which was seen as both increasing the likelihood that the project would meet the needs of the community and that the community would feel a sense of ownership of the project. Locals both know their community's context and have existing networks, giving them the strong potential to be effective in their roles and strengthening ties between the project and the community.

This illustrates the ways in which localisation in Somalia is perceived by NGO representatives as a process by which communities are able to shape the work of NGOs engaged in peace activities on the one hand, and a mechanism by which the work of NGOs is able to achieve a degree of legitimacy within communities. *This crucially reflects a more minimal conceptualisation of local ownership. Additionally, it is all too frequent that communities are not consulted until after a project award has taken place rather than being consulted before the proposal is formed or the bid constructed.*

Barriers to effective local ownership

Donor priorities

One participant stated that while assessing local needs was important, their organisation determined local needs based on available donors and funding, rather than primarily engaging with the local community.⁵⁸ This response is not uncommon in Somalia as many NGOs, instead of having a particular specialisation, adapt their organisation to match available funding, shifting their focus to match donor priorities rather than community needs.⁵⁹

Local capacity

While the participants had many opinions about the best practices to promote localisation in Somalia, they also expressed that there are currently many barriers to local ownership that affect their work. The most commonly cited barrier was a lack of local capacity.⁶⁰ There are

⁵⁷ Interviews HA10 and HA11

⁵⁸ Interview HA04.

⁵⁹ Interview HA14.

⁶⁰ Interviews HA01, HA03, HA04, HA05, HA06, HA07, HA08, HA09, HA10, HA11, HA12, and HA13; HA FGD Participants 08, 12 and 13.

currently many capacity building projects throughout Somalia, but there is a widespread lack of understanding as to exactly what that means. Yet, most participants failed to elaborate on what exactly they meant by capacity or what shape capacity building should take.

Funding structures

The second most-cited barrier was a lack of resources and funds.⁶¹ Participants identified two primary issues associated with the lack of funds: 1) their organisations lack the resources necessary to better engage with the community in order to assess their needs and 2) donors need to provide additional funds dedicated to promoting local engagement within project budgets. Another common barrier brought up by the participants was the short-term nature of many projects.⁶² Participants stated that short-term projects severely limit their ability to engage with the community, particularly at the beginning of projects, thus reducing project effectiveness and minimising the ability of the organisation to effectively engage the community and for the community to effectively engage with the project.

Transparency and accountability

Some participants stated that the lack of transparency from all parties, donors, civil society, NGOs and the government detrimentally affected localisation.⁶³ The lack of accountability enables corruption to occur, decreases people's trust and calls into question the motives and reported outcomes of organisations. This is particularly problematic as there is a widespread perception in Somalia that civil society and NGOs take money without giving anything back to the community.⁶⁴ The lack of transparency on the part of civil society and NGOs in Somalia has created the widespread perception that they are out to take what they can get with little or no regard for the greater Somali population.

Development exhaustion

Three participants in the second of the Hargeisa focus groups held a lengthy discussion about the impact of 'community fatigue' and disillusionment with local ownership rhetoric.⁶⁵ These participants remarked that local communities are tired of participating in projects and research as, in the past, they have given their time and shared their opinions, only to receive no feedback or to be told the results of the project. This leads local project participants to believe that their contribution does not matter and that nothing amounts from their effort, decreasing the likelihood that they will engage in future civil society and NGO efforts.

Reporting requirements

Finally, the bureaucracy of INGOs and donors, such as paperwork and detailed financial reporting and invoicing, is frustrating to local partners, damaging the relationships between the entities.⁶⁶

⁶¹ Interviews HA01, HA02, HA04, HA05, HA06, HA07, HA09, HA10, HA11, HA12 and HA13; HA FGD Participant 10.

⁶² Interviews HA09, HA10, HA11, HA12 and HA13.

⁶³ HA FGD Participants 02, 03, 05, 07, 10 and 11.

⁶⁴ Interview HA14.

⁶⁵ HA FGD Participants 11, 12 and 13.

⁶⁶ Interview HA11.

Identified best practices

Funding community engagement

Community engagement needs to be financially supported in all projects and initiatives from the design phase to implementation. Specific resources should be allocated to these efforts so that they are not redistributed to other areas or the budget reduced. Dedicating funds specific to community engagement will ensure that it remains a priority rather than a voluntary step or an afterthought.

Employing local staff

Another best practice brought up by four participants is the employment of local people, ensuring that their jobs are not simply tokenistic and ensuring that they are integrated into the organisation, project team and placed in leadership positions.⁶⁷ The majority of the interviewees stated that their organisations employ local community members, seeing this as one of the limited ways that they have to increase local participation and ownership of projects.⁶⁸

Working with existing structures

Several participants recommended that civil society and NGOs invest in local structures that are already in existence and are having a positive impact on their communities.⁶⁹ This best practice is in opposition to the tendency of organisations to bring in new and novel ideas, rather than working with what already exists. For example, in Somaliland, among the main goals of the Guurti (Somaliland's House of Elders—the upper house of parliament) are peacebuilding and conflict resolution and while the institution has already been very active in these areas, it could benefit from additional capacity building efforts for its members, reform efforts and increased institutional capacity. These are all things that could be provided by civil society and NGOs.⁷⁰ Additionally, the clan is a significant society structure in Somalia, with clan elders being a primary mechanism for conflict resolution. Instead of trying to build alternative conflict resolution structures, civil society could work to host forums where elders from all clans could discuss issues and work together towards solutions.

Community-NGO-state interaction

A best practice recommended by several participants was that civil society, NGOs and the government should work together.⁷¹ By combining their efforts and resources, local communities could be better heard and better served. This recommendation, however, came with the caveat that civil society and NGOs need to retain their independence and their own voice in this setting. While coordination between the government, civil society and NGOs

⁶⁷ Interviews HA06 and HA11; HA FGD Participants 09 and 11.

⁶⁸ Interviews HA02, HA04, HA05, HA06, HA08, HA09, HA10, HA11, HA12 and HA13.

⁶⁹ Interviews HA01, HA02, HA03, HA04 and HA11; HA FGD Participants 08, 09 and 10.

⁷⁰ Interview HA14.

⁷¹ Interviews HA11 and HA13; HA FGD Participants 01, 04, 05, 06, 07, 10, 11, 12 and 13.

might be desirable, the participants urged caution so that civil society and NGOs can continue to promote the public good and not simply the government's agenda. This was especially a concern of the organisations operating in Somaliland, where civil society has become largely politicised and the government restricts criticism.

Disseminating the project's outcomes to the local communities

Following the completion of a project or initiative, civil society and NGOs must take the time and make the effort to disseminate their findings and outcomes to the local community in a contextually appropriate and adaptive way. Our research found that many in the local population feel a sense of exhaustion, disconnection and misuse due to frequent civil society and NGO projects. Locals have the feeling that civil society and NGOs are receiving funding in their name, but that they are receiving very little in return and that the funds are instead funnelled into NGOs. In order to change this, civil society and NGOs need to ensure that local communities are receiving feedback for each initiative that they are involved in. This could, for example, take the form of a community workshop at the end of a project to inform the community of the results and to thank them for their participation. This would help to change the dynamic between civil society, NGOs and the community, reminding civil society and NGOs that they are not doing their projects and initiatives mainly for the donors but rather for the local Somali population. This best practice also requires that all of civil society and NGOs operating in Somalia have the budget and personnel to translate project documents, reports and findings into Somali. This will allow for wider dissemination and deeper public understanding as well as show respect for Somali people and customs, enabling them to make projects and results their own.

Establishing a civil society database

Finally, it is recommended that a central database or system be developed to record civil society and NGO activity in Somalia and Somaliland. Such a system will accomplish three central goals: 1) reduce project duplication, which will help counter 'respondent fatigue'; 2) encourage cooperation between groups working on similar projects or with similar aims; and 3) increase the accountability of the groups. Further research should be conducted into the possibility of creating such a record and the best method for bringing it about.

6. CASE STUDY: MYANMAR/BURMA

Contextual background

In 1962, a military coup enabled the Union Revolutionary Council to take control of the government, and over the following decades a new form of Army-controlled authoritarianism settled in. As guardian of the state, the military junta installed a centralised apparatus, which repressed dissent and civil society, prevented interactions with foreign groups and states and fought Ethnic Armed Organisations (EAOs) over control of borders, resources and power (Kivimäki and Pedersen, 2008). In 1988, an uprising was led by NLD, a pro-democracy movement promoting its agenda through non-violence, dialogue and non-engagement, and whose iconic figure, Aung San Suu Kyi (ASSK), was kept under house arrest for 15 years. In 2008, in a surprise move, the Army started a process towards establishing a civilian administration. Between 2010 and 2015, elections were held, under the condition that the Army kept 25% of seats in Parliament and that ASSK would not assume the role of president. The NLD progressively won control of Parliament. Meanwhile, a deadly escalation between state forces and a militant group in Rakhine State in 2017 led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with mass killings of thousands of Muslim Rohingya, the exodus of more than 65,000 of them to Bangladesh, accrued international scrutiny and the re-imposition of sanctions (Amnesty International, 2018: 269–273).

The territory and populations in Myanmar are extremely fragmented and divided, a result of the colonial divide-and-conquer legacy, shifting allegiances and enmities, competition over natural resources and trauma from decades of conflict and displacement. In a context in which isolationism enabled the systematic dismantling of the free press and the devastation of the economy, there is a lack of (peaceful) interaction and deep mistrust between various segments of society and between the Bamar majority, conflated with the ruling factions, and the rest of the population. Even as the transition is leading to change in the political landscape, significant progress in transitional justice had not taken place and people continue to have negative perceptions of each other as they are processing trauma from conflictual interactions. Ethnic groups are caught in between their desire for autonomy and their interdependence with the dominant Bamar group. Finally, the growth of state-sponsored Buddhist nationalism fuels hatred towards non-Buddhists and creates a climate of impunity for apartheid, vigilantes and crimes against humanity.

With the 'Opening', often symbolised by the establishment of a new government in 2011, the space for engagement with civil society widened dramatically (Petrie and South, 2013). 2011 paved the way for a 'gold rush' of international assistance during which offers of trade partnerships, economic and development cooperation but also peace support exploded.⁷²

⁷² The MIMU recorded a record number of assistance projects in 2015. See MIMU's Interactive visualisation of all Myanmar 3W data by State/Region and Townships, available at: <http://themimu.info/3w-dashboard>.

There is clearly a *before* and an *after* the ‘Opening’ (2011). Myanmar civil society had been brutally suppressed since the 1962 coup and its active elements were essentially organised around ethnic groups. Support to democracy and peacebuilding had traditionally been focused on diaspora and grassroots groups in borderlands, because of the absence of civic space (Bächtold, 2017). There used to be smaller funding schemes, especially at the beginning of the transition when they were not tied to high expectations and large-scale development.⁷³ After the start of the ‘Opening’, international support increased dramatically and with it the need to disburse the funds. Large-scale funding in the form of multi-donor funds became the prominent approach, which only larger organisations and government agencies were able to absorb and process.

Conceptualising capacity building in Myanmar/Burma

Support for peacebuilding has been offered by the traditional peace and development actors: Western and regional governments, UN agencies, INGOs, national NGOs and a number of CSOs. The leading organisations involved in capacity building include, more specifically, the members of the International Peace Support Group.⁷⁴

Most internationally-supported peacebuilding in Myanmar involves local capacity building. *While there is an apparent commitment to a maximal understanding of local peacebuilding, in practice the measures that have been adopted are led by civil society groups rather than local communities, and they reflect donor priorities. The engagement with local communities is predominately of a minimal type, focusing on the needs of civil society groups (through capacity building of NGO workers), and through community outreach activities after project design (focusing on community analysis and mediation support).*⁷⁵

According to a majority of interviewees, the emphasis of peacebuilding initiatives is to build trust and increase the participation of local actors in official talks and peacebuilding processes. All the surveyed professionals highlighted the prevailing bureaucratic and hierarchical culture in formal and informal organisations as an obstacle to changing mind-sets, and half of them reported that their capacity building programmes explicitly aimed to address organisational culture. Some projects also aim to promote understanding the value of engagement with government officials. At grassroots level, capacities needed include communication and negotiation skills, being familiar with international standards on gender, and conflict analysis skills. Most importantly, creating space for informal dialogue is always an implicit or explicit intended outcome of local capacity building projects.

⁷³ Interview MM06.

⁷⁴ According to the Myanmar Peace Monitor (n.d.): “The International Peace Support Group is made up of INGOs involved in capacity building initiatives to support the ethnic armed groups negotiate for just and equitable peace. It is an informal network of 20 members that holds a coordination meeting once a month in Bangkok. These include the International Crisis Group (ICG), Center for Humanitarian dialogue (the HD Centre), Euro-Burma Office (EBO) and Fairness International.”

⁷⁵ Interviews MM01, MM02, MM03, MM04, MM05, MM06, MM07, MM08 and MM09; Warren et al., 2018: 23.

As the peace process is stalling, interviews suggested that peacebuilding projects have shifted from increasing the participation of stakeholders in the peace process to lowering their expectations. Skills-building is still necessary for engagement at the local level and for future high-level negotiations.⁷⁶

Barriers to effective local ownership

Political space

This study identified a number of challenges to local participation and ownership in peacebuilding activities. CSOs have to abide by a new NGO law and they face increased administrative scrutiny, creating more pressure and constraining their resources. People working with national and local authorities are reluctant to engage with civil society for fear of how they will be seen by their superiors. A number of respondents emphasised the need to resist disengaging national and local authorities and to not solely focus on building-capacity of CSOs. As a result, civil society-led projects are becoming less viable in the state.

International organisations, the government and a number of civil society groups do not have full access to conflict-affected areas. In Rakhine State, communications are scarce, suspicion is high and it is difficult for NGOs to know what peacebuilding activities are taking place.

Any issue area that is seen as politically sensitive such as peace, the security sector, the judiciary, intercommunal harmony or the crisis in Rakhine State, offers less space to navigate. Gender equality and sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV) are also sensitive subjects. Many peacebuilding organisations avoid openly addressing these topics.

Limitations of joint funds and consortia

Joint funds, consortiums and coalitions have formed naturally or by design: as a method, joint support involving a diversity of actors yields mixed results. While it may simplify management and coordination from a donor's point of view, a number of those interviewed reported that the funds would sometimes support activities that would not include conflict transformation goals and deplored the overwhelming bureaucratic requirements which ultimately marginalised smaller groups doing meaningful peacebuilding work away from urban centres and offices (including diaspora, cross-border grassroots groups).

The disconnect between donor priorities and local needs

The shift to a focus on local ownership has resulted in local and national CSOs being designated "implementing partners". Many reported a disconnect between donor priorities and local needs and a disregard for local capacities, overlooking people directly affected by

⁷⁶ Interview MM01; Warren et al. (2018).

the conflict and focusing excessively on Yangon-based organisations.⁷⁷ This context increases support opportunities but narrows the space for tailored, inclusive and needs-based capacity building.

More worrying is the over-extending of these fast-growing organisations by donors and their declining political involvement. Disproportionate expectations put an unfair and existential burden on national organisations, which are not able to deliver effectively and qualitatively on projects.⁷⁸

Timescales

International actors have designed capacity building programmes as if they can provide quick fixes for negotiations and the peace process. A number of respondents confirm that there is still high donor interest in capacity building support but they find it difficult to get funding to strengthen capacities in the longer term, in particular for organisational strengthening. Challenges include short-term programming, time-consuming procedures, donors' reluctance to fund overhead costs and activities that do not yield "immediate value for money". Donors' representatives are aware of the flaws of the current system but this does not lead to concrete changes.

Overall, the lack of conflict sensitivity and due diligence by international actors is the key challenge to effective capacity building and local ownership identified by this study. Donors' competing and conflicting agendas can do harm by causing fractures and exacerbating fragmentation and divisions between groups engaged in peacebuilding.⁷⁹

Identified best practices

This analysis identified a series of practices which, in the eyes of practitioners, allow capacity building to contribute to peace in the contexts where they work in Myanmar. According to the respondents, assessing impact is one of the most challenging dimensions of capacity building.⁸⁰ One interviewee observed, however, that overall tendencies are visible because the country was closed off for so long that the contrast with today's situation is noticeable.⁸¹

Longer-term projects with effective inception phases

Interviewees consistently pointed out that time is needed to establish relationships, to define entry points for trust-building processes and to conduct thorough conflict analysis with input from a diversity of local actors.⁸² Long inception phases (six months and beyond) for projects help mapping entry points and key actors who need to be involved and allow for inter-group affinities to appear. Flexibility, understood as the ability to change the course of an activity, was raised by all respondents as crucial to effectiveness. As the peace process is stalling, some

⁷⁷ Warren et al. (2018, 25–26).

⁷⁸ Interviews MM01 and MM08.

⁷⁹ Interviews MM01, MM04, MM05, MM06, MM07 and MM08.

⁸⁰ Interviews MM02, MM05 and MM08.

⁸¹ Interview MM08.

⁸² Interviews MM01, MM02, MM05, MM08 and MM09.

organisations were able to shift their capacity building support from advocacy skills to managing local level expectations. Practitioners are seeking flexibility that allows people to be at the right time and the right place for the right action.

Training the trainers

There was mixed feedback on training and on the training of trainers. Training is one of the main capacity building tools used by interviewees.⁸³ One interviewee found it to be an effective tool when it led to the replication of peer-to-peer knowledge-sharing exercises, which are indicators of sustainability.⁸⁴ Others found that in their specific area, knowledge and skills did not transfer well beyond participants in the initial training workshops and they stopped using this tool.⁸⁵

Necessity of core funding

One of the most powerful instruments to build organisational strength is core funding. Core funding instruments were reported to exist before the Gold Rush and are now disappearing.⁸⁶ They can alleviate the ailments of the 'projectisation' and 'siloesation' of peacebuilding support and help national and local CSOs to work as organisations and not as fragmented project teams.

When international peacebuilding fuels conflict

Two interviewees mentioned that the misunderstanding of the complexity of the context and lack of coordination between external actors may have fuelled tensions in Rakhine State (Interviews MM01 and MM04). A deadly escalation between state forces and a militant group in Rakhine State in 2017 led to an unprecedented humanitarian crisis, with mass killings of thousands of Muslim Rohingya, the exodus of more than 65,000 of them to Bangladesh, accrued international scrutiny and the re-imposition of sanctions. Ill-informed international reactions to this crisis has fuelled the anti-Rohingya narrative among Rakhine communities who feel just as marginalised as the Rohingya. There have been "disastrous peacebuilding attempts" related to economic development and social cohesion, which highlight the lack of a common understanding of what peacebuilding is, a dramatic ignorance of the local context and the lack of interaction between humanitarian and peacebuilding sectors. One interviewee recalls an event he attended in Rakhine where he did not recognise any member of the international peace support group which meets monthly. Another recounted the story of a Rakhine Muslim peacebuilder who became a donor 'darling', triggering negative backlash from his/her peers. Donors need better understanding of these dynamics to avoid unintentionally inciting suspicion towards civil society groups active in peacebuilding.

⁸³ Interviews MM02, MM03, MM04, MM05, MM07, MM08 and MM09.

⁸⁴ Interview MM05.

⁸⁵ Interview MM01.

⁸⁶ Interviews MM01 and MM08.

7. CASE STUDY: CAMBODIA

Contextual background

The case of Cambodia is distinct from the other countries addressed in this report. It was chosen as a site of analysis due to the amount of time that has passed since the formal end of the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) in 1993. The state has held regular elections at the state and commune levels, most of which have been declared as having achieved a basic threshold of being ‘free and ‘fair’. Since the completion of the mission, Cambodia has maintained relative stability and over the past decade has achieved solid rates of economic growth. The country is also unique in having been the site of unprecedented growth in the formal associational sector. Prior to the commencement of UNTAC, there were only 16 international NGOs operating in the country, and these were predominately focused on working with the Government in technical capacity building. The UNTAC era ushered in a dramatic increase in the number of NGOs operating within the state. Thus, by many indicators Cambodia has been a relative success in peacebuilding.

The recent history of the state, however, provides some crucial cautionary notes about the long-term viability of peacebuilding initiatives. Despite regular elections, the Cambodian Peoples’ Party has been able to maintain power, with the Prime Minister, Hun Sen, consolidating his personal position within the state. The country remains gripped by enduring problems with corruption and the rule of law. While there is a large NGO sector in the country, there have long been indications that the sector was only tolerated by the state, which remains reliant on international development assistance. Over the past two years this situation has been steadily deteriorating as the Prime Minister and the CPP (Cambodian People’s Party) have begun limiting the democratic space in the country. There have been apparent assassinations, arrests, and charges laid *in absentia* against public critics of the state elites, the closing down of news agencies, notably the Cambodian Daily, and the formal suspension of the major opposition party. At the same time there has been a gradual reduction in foreign direct and indirect aid being allocated to the state, reducing the available resources to Cambodia’s NGO sector, alongside changing donor priorities in the state.

Conceptualising and enacting local ownership in Cambodia

Local ownership of peacebuilding was held as a core mechanism to ensure a stable peace by all of the interviewees. The interviewees expressed a broad range of approaches to how to conceptualise local ownership and how it is best achieved within the Cambodian context. One can usefully distinguish between a maximal and minimal definition of the ownership. The maximalists prioritise the local communities in the breadth of the work, from agenda setting, programme design, implementation and sustainment. The organisations working within this framework see themselves as being the servants of communities and of providing technical

support and in some instances training where there is a clear demand from local communities. According to one interviewee:

We need to empower them but do not act as the guardian of the community. We do not lead. We only give technical experience that could help, but they need to develop their own strategies, take leadership themselves. This makes the communities stronger.⁸⁷

It was also stated that the international community must not assume that there is no sense of ownership over peacebuilding at present and that by trying to ‘improve’ the situation the international community runs the risk of undermining existing practices.⁸⁸ *The maximalist position on ownership thus seeks to identify mechanisms to support communities, such as providing an organising space for villagers, rather than doing the organising themselves.*⁸⁹ *The drive is to avoid a situation of dependence on the work of NGOs.*

The minimalist position on community ownership, while still striving to acquire local support for initiatives, tends to see villages as lacking the social capital required to organise. In such instances the role of NGOs in achieving local ownership is to work with communities to identify and deliver projects that foster community cohesion, address underlying causes of conflict and build local capacity in resolving conflict.

Finally, in three different interviews, the individual questioned the notion that peacebuilding might be understood as the elimination of conflict.⁹⁰ As one interviewee stated, there are moments when issues arise that demand a conflictual response (using non-violence) to push for the needs of communities against entrenched interests, such as in questions of land-grabbing, forced migration and intimidation.⁹¹ Donors seemingly seek to avoid areas of potential controversy, which may serve to undermine community cohesion on the one hand, and erode local confidence in civil society as being able to assist in redressing communities’ concerns.

Barriers to effective local ownership

While numerous barriers to local ownership of peacebuilding were mentioned by the interviewees, including a lack of technical capacity, lack of information,⁹² the erosion of local trust in NGOs through dynamics of over-promising by organisations⁹³ and a general over-supply of such groups,⁹⁴ a number of interviewees stressed the lack of community cohesion

⁸⁷ Interview CA04.

⁸⁸ Interview CA01.

⁸⁹ Interviews CA01, CA02 and CA04.

⁹⁰ Interviews CA02, CA09 and CA10.

⁹¹ Interview CA02.

⁹² Interview CA06.

⁹³ Interview CA04.

⁹⁴ Interviews CA02 and CA09.

and trust.⁹⁵ Building local capacity in such an environment requires long-term engagement with communities in a manner that shows respect for community priorities, while recognising the local power dynamics.

Political space

One concern that was voiced in most of the interviews pertains to the broader political space in Cambodia and how this may be eroding the capacity of civil society organisations to continue to push for a sustainable peace.⁹⁶ The government passed the Law on Associations and Non-Governmental Organizations on 13 July 2015, and its interpretation has resulted in a restriction of the space available for formal civil society. The law is accompanied by a perception that the government is increasing its monitoring of civil society. Some interviewees indicated that the state has taken steps to make their work more difficult.⁹⁷ These include making it more complicated to acquire visas for international staff,⁹⁸ more intensively auditing groups' activities and their publications, formally closing down groups and intimidating communities that work with NGOs.⁹⁹ There is a fear that the state is moving towards ending all activities that may be seen as hostile to the interests of the CPP. One individual stated: "Our requests for information from the Ministry of the Interior on the NGO Law are not answered."¹⁰⁰

In a related vein, concern expressed over the common rhetoric used by state officials who speak about civil society organisations as being a part of the opposition in Cambodia. This is happening alongside a broader crackdown on opposition parties, including charges against opposition parties and activists. Several interviewees stated that following the 2015 commune elections the government was becoming increasingly worried about the idea of community mobilisation and the potential for a 'colour revolution'.¹⁰¹ Against this backdrop, one interviewee (CA10) stated that the international community had a crucial role to play in trying to protect communities and civil society by seeking to influence government policy.

Flexibility in programme design and implementation

Linear planning, demanded by most formal donor programmes can be a significant barrier to effective project design and implementation (Interviews CA02 and CA06). To achieve local participation we need to avoid... "going in with a fixed agenda on local needs. This needs stakeholder mapping at the outset, and then we need to get their views." It was stressed that this may result in needs of the loudest being heard the most. That said, it was reiterated that you need to go in empty – free of preconceptions of requirements. This was followed up with a statement that the current funding mechanisms make this very hard. 'Log frame' methods of project design and management do not allow for this (Interview CA06).

⁹⁵ Interviews CA09 and CA10.

⁹⁶ Interviews CA01, CA02, CA03, CA04, CA05, CA09, CA10, CA11 and CA15.

⁹⁷ Interviews CA01, CA02, CA03, CA04 and CA09.

⁹⁸ Interview CA01.

⁹⁹ Interviews CA02, CA09 and CA04.

¹⁰⁰ Interview CA08.

¹⁰¹ Interviews CA10 and CA11.

Donor policies

The NGO representatives in Cambodia overwhelmingly decried the changing funding landscape, arguing that donors were not sufficiently engaged with the requirements for long-term investment in peacebuilding.¹⁰² Developing peacebuilding capacities within civil society and at the community level was noted as being a long-term endeavour. Providing skills training in matters such as conflict resolution, research skills, or even awareness raising on issues related to peace, requires both continual learning, but also subsequent support for recipients to embed their training. But this is not being achieved with shifting donor priorities, and the relatively short-term project focus. A number of organisations' representatives that work broadly in the area of peacebuilding noted that donors seem much more interested in funding human rights work. While they noted that this was important, this appeared to come at the expense of funding for broader peacebuilding activities.¹⁰³ Three interviewees expressed a concern, however, that this preference for human rights advocacy over broader peacebuilding activities may be contributing to an overly adversarial approach to the government, fostering a conflictual relationship.¹⁰⁴

Changing donor priorities

Related to the previous point, a number of interviewees indicated that donors now seem much less interested in funding peacebuilding initiatives,¹⁰⁵ shifting their priorities into other issue areas, some of which may serve the broad ends of peacebuilding, such as the protection of human rights, but much of which is removed from the direct support of peacebuilding. Interviewee CA09 stated: "Peacebuilding is no longer sexy here now for donors. Some LNGOs are reframing what they do as a result [to acquire funding for their activities]."¹⁰⁶ Interviewee CA05 argued that donors seem to look at the immediate post-conflict era and then shift their attention to issues related to building peace elsewhere. This ignores the ways in which a continued focus on peacebuilding efforts in post-conflict states, even two decades out, may be essential to achieving a sustainable democratic system.

This shift highlights the ways in which donor priorities drive NGO work, and how this in turn reflects a general lack of clear local engagement in agenda setting. Crucially, it suggests that even if the initial phase of peace operations are effective, and NGOs are able to develop a degree of competency in various peacebuilding initiatives, that this may be quickly eroded as organisations are required to chase after new funding. As a result of this policy, it was noted: "Actors (NGOs) often fail after the short term funding ends."¹⁰⁷ Crucially, the European Union was named by Interviewee CA09 as one of the few institutions that were able to provide more long-term funding (over four to five years).¹⁰⁸

¹⁰² Interviews CA03, CA04, CA05, CA09 and CA10.

¹⁰³ Interview CA05.

¹⁰⁴ Interviews CA05, CA09 and CA10.

¹⁰⁵ Interviews CA03, CA05 and CA09.

¹⁰⁶ Interview CA09.

¹⁰⁷ Interview CA03.

¹⁰⁸ Interview CA09.

Core funding

In addition to concerns raised over the reduction of funding for peacebuilding activities, a number of interviewees also highlighted the relative lack of availability of core funding.¹⁰⁹ This situation makes it exceedingly difficult for organisations to sustain themselves, limiting their capacity to conduct any of the necessary work to make their organisations and projects sustainable.

Reporting requirements

Alongside a reduction in funding levels for peacebuilding activities and the lack of core funding, donors have been steadily increasing the reporting requirements of NGOs. While this is understandable as it provides a degree of transparency and oversight, the practical demands of such measures were noted as being onerous for smaller organisations. From the outset, LINGOs may be at a disadvantage in submitting applications for funding as they often lack the necessary resources in grant-writing.¹¹⁰ One of the organisations interviewed stated that they had to employ one part-time advisor solely for the purpose of editing reports in English to meet donor requirements. “This is the big question; NGOs here rely heavily on external experts and consultants”.¹¹¹ It was also noted, that against a backdrop of a closing political space, that the detailed reports that are required by donors may in some instances actually put organisations at greater risk as state officials have shown that they actually read these reports.¹¹²

Community-NGO-state interaction

Despite the broadly expressed concern over the political context in Cambodia, a number of interviewees stated that it was essential to include government representatives, particularly locally elected officials in local NGO activities aimed at conflict resolution and fostering peacebuilding.¹¹³ In this way communities have the opportunity to raise concerns and to make recommendations to their councillors, serving to increase political accountability. This was most succinctly expressed by one interviewee who stated that the government is a core component in peace transformation and cannot be excluded from such endeavours.¹¹⁴ Others stated that a number of NGOs pursued methods that by-passed the government on sensitive issues and that this could result in the government shutting down such organisations.¹¹⁵ It is important to note, however, that these interviewees worked in areas that they stated were not sensitive to the government.

¹⁰⁹ Interviews CA03 and CA05.

¹¹⁰ Interviews CA02 and CA08.

¹¹¹ Interview CA08.

¹¹² Interview CA02.

¹¹³ Interviews CA03, CA05, CA07, CA08, CA09 and CA13.

¹¹⁴ Interview CA05.

¹¹⁵ Interviews CA07, CA08 and CA09.

Identified best practices

Long-term funding for peacebuilding

While there was disagreement amongst the various interviewees about which mechanisms were most effective in achieving local ownership, there was broad-based agreement that long-term funding for peacebuilding initiatives was essential.¹¹⁶ Peacebuilding, as an ongoing process, necessarily entails efforts that will take generations to achieve. While the requirements of post-conflict countries will change over the long term after the initial resolution of violence, requiring a shifting of resources into broader development activities, this should not come at the expense of all funding for peacebuilding activities. This funding should be provided, in keeping with some current European Union practices, over four to five years, and should allow overhead expenses to ensure the sustainability of initiatives.

Reducing reporting and grant writing burdens

Providing additional funding and support for grant writing by local NGOs and for the translation of reports into English and other donor languages would increase the capacity of smaller organisations resident in the post-conflict states. This, in turn, would free up more of the grant money for the provision of services to communities.

Inter-generational peacebuilding and justice

The Cambodian case demonstrates that new avenues of conflict can emerge, particularly as the needs of generations change. Providing support to educational initiatives that ensure that youth are given training in conflict resolution and are provided opportunities to interact with older generations with direct experience with atrocities is a crucial component in educating for peace.

¹¹⁶ Interviews CA11 and CA15.

8. CONCLUSION: ACHIEVING LOCAL OWNERSHIP IN PEACEBUILDING

The narrative of local ownership has been embraced and integrated into the planning processes of both donors and NGOs. In discussing the importance of the concept to peacebuilding, two broad arguments have been advanced. The first is that local ownership is essential if one is to obtain the cooperation and collaboration of communities in the broad peace processes, and to ensure that the work of NGOs in this sector is effective. This is a minimal expression of the value of ownership, but one that was reflected in the interviewees' discussions of the role of local ownership, and that was replicated within many NGOs' policies of outreach. The methods that are closely aligned with this minimal conception include NGO-led information gathering at the local community level, community participation models that seek to improve policy delivery, and the creation of many policies to provide technical training on peacebuilding, mediation, and related issues to community members. Running through this is an interest in reflecting local needs but within a space where NGOs hold that the local communities lack the capacity either to determine their own peacebuilding needs or to implement programmes. In contrast, the maximal approach to local ownership derives from a position in which local agency is foregrounded in projects, from project design, through implementation to assessment. While the latter is a goal that is clearly expressed by organisations in all of the cases surveyed, not a single interviewee pointed to a successful form of such engagement, but most noted the restriction of local capacity and the structural barriers arising from funding regimes.

Key policy recommendations

Local context. There are significant disparities between the needs of different contexts. These relate to local civil society capacity, the nature of societal divisions and the time elapsed since war or conflict.

1. **Fund a broader range of civil society actors.** A focus on funding formal associations has side-lined traditional forms of civil society, thereby silencing actors with a crucial role in peacebuilding. NGOs are a pathway to local (grassroots) ownership of peacebuilding, but they are not the only pathway. Mechanisms to directly fund communities and to fund community-based organisations (CBOs) need to be developed. The EU should require that local practitioners collaborate with community-based organisations and other traditional forms of civil society as implementation partners.

Sustained Peacebuilding. Peacebuilding must be seen as a long-term endeavour, requiring continued engagement along a multi-generational time-frame. While development priorities will evolve over time, it is essential to fund programmes over a period of decades to avoid the loss of capacity.

2. **Inter-generational peace.** As time passes after violent conflict, a gap opens between the experiences of generations, which poses significant challenges to sustaining peace initiatives, addressing the structural causes of violence and ensuring inter-generational justice. A core component of peacebuilding initiatives should therefore involve inter-generational peace programming.

3. **Long-term stable peacebuilding fund.** Peacebuilding takes generations, yet donors quickly shift their funding to new priority areas. The EU should establish a long-term peacebuilding fund to ensure that peace initiatives are sustained for decades following the formal end of violence.
4. **Empowering communities and addressing everyday problems as peacebuilding.** To build intra-community peace and to foster trust in local government, it is essential to address everyday problems (such as access to clean water and improving infrastructure). The EU should provide mechanisms for supporting flexible projects that allow for the rapid and efficient use of funds to respond to community-led initiatives as a mechanism of peacebuilding.

Funding structures. Funding mechanisms should be permissive rather than prescriptive. These must allow for the evolution of programmes, for mistakes to be made and for institutional/community learning to take place. Community engagement must be a part of the project's design and implementation. Communities should be partners in developing aims and objectives, not just passive recipients of them. This in turn requires creative thinking by donors to facilitate community engagement, ideally with funding provided, to ensure that local communities are able to participate in or lead the bids and applications for grants, rather than being integrated as recipients after funding is secured.

5. **Core funding.** The shift away from providing core funding has made it difficult for organisations to sustain their activities, thereby requiring them to pursue additional funding sources and, as a result, taking time and resources away from project delivery.
6. **Long-term funding.** By its nature, peacebuilding is an ongoing process that does not have a clear 'point of achievement'. While states may appear stable years after the cessation of violence, addressing the underlying causes of violence remains crucial for generations following the end of warfighting. It is recommended that future development projects in all post-war and post-conflict contexts reserve a percentage of funding to sustain peacebuilding capacities.
7. **Fund community engagement during the design stage of the tender process.** Small amounts of seed money should be provided when funding calls are announced to facilitate community-led programme design.

Reporting requirements

8. **Reduce the reporting burden on NGOs.** To ensure that small local organisations are able to direct funding and human resources to project design and implementation, it is recommended that formal reporting requirements placed upon organisations by funders be reduced to one mid-programme and one end-of-programme review. NGOs should be allowed to submit the mid-programme review in an official language of the target country in which they operate. The costs of translating this review should be covered by the funders. This would reduce the local organisations' reliance on foreign development contractors, and would ensure that the project reports would be easily accessible by the target communities.

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ANNEX A: SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE

Local Capacity building and Ownership in Peacebuilding Questionnaire

Interviewer
Identifier

Required Information (obtain business card if possible)

Interviewee Name/s:

Interviewee Title:

Organisation Name:

Interview Date / Place:

Consent Form: y/n

Consent Form Reference Number:

Organisation Type
(add rows as required)

Policy Sectors	Local NGO Partners	Government Partners	Target Community	Funder

Planning Horizon

How far in advance does your organisation plan (in years)?

What are the top five risks your organisation faces for long-term sustainability over five to ten years?

- 1)
- 2)
- 3)
- 4)
- 5)

NGO Type

Type: International Organisation / Local Organisation

Do you employ international staff?

Do you employ local staff (*are they paid or volunteer*)?

Do the local staff have direct ties with the target communities?

Understanding of Civil Society

How would you define civil society?

Local Participation Models

What means of local participatory methods do you employ?

How do you determine local needs?

Do you employ local community members?

What is the value of your organisation's work to fostering conflict resolution capacities within local communities?

What would you identify as 'best practice' in achieving local participation in your organisation's work?

For international organisations:

Do you deliver projects on your own, do you deliver through local partners?

Do you have a policy to localise your project activities, if so on what time line?

Interaction with the State / International Actors

What local government partners does your organisation have?

What are the areas of cooperation with the local/regional/state government?

Has the government put in place barriers to your organisation's activities?

Has the government encouraged or discouraged local communities' participation in your activities?

Have International Actors/Donors encouraged or discouraged your organisation's activities?

Are there sectors of policy work that are more difficult to work in than others within the state?

Do you formally cooperate with any International Actors, if so in what areas and in what manner?

Best Practices in Peacebuilding and Local Ownership

What would you identify as a best practice in promoting local ownership of peacebuilding capacities?

What can international donors do to encourage local ownership of peacebuilding capacities?
Are there any common mistakes donors/international actors make in seeking to promote sustainable peacebuilding activities at the local level?

ANNEX B: INTERVIEW TABLES

Numbered list of interviews – Bosnia and Herzegovina

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
Interview BH01	Military	Sarajevo, BiH	02/10/2017
Interview BH02	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	03/10/2017
Interview BH03	Academic	Sarajevo, BiH	04/10/2017
Interview BH04	Embassy	Sarajevo, BiH	04/10/2017
Interview BH05	International NGO	Sarajevo, BiH	04/10/2017
Interview BH06	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	05/10/2017
Interview BH07	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	05/10/2017
Interview BH08	Military	Sarajevo, BiH	07/10/2017
Interview BH09	Think tank	Sarajevo, BiH	09/10/2017
Interview BH10	International NGO	Sarajevo, BiH	09/10/2017
Interview BH11	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	10/10/2017
Interview BH12	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	09/10/2017
Interview BH13	International organisation	Sarajevo, BiH	26/10/2017
Interview BH14	International organisation	Via Skype	09/11/2017

Numbered list of interviews – Burma/Myanmar

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
Interview MM01	International NGO	Brussels, Belgium	08/03/2018
Interview MM02	International NGO	Via telephone	24/01/2018
Interview MM03	International organisation	Brussels, Belgium	22/03/2018
Interview MM04	International NGO	Via telephone	12/03/2018
Interview MM05	International organisation	Via telephone	07/03/2018
Interview MM06	International NGO	Via written survey	12/01/2018
Interview MM07	International NGO	Via written survey	24/01/2018
Interview MM08	International NGO	Via Skype	25/06/2018
Interview MM09	International NGO	Brussels, Belgium	06/03/2018

Numbered list of interviews – Cambodia

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
Interview CA01	International NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	11/09/2017
Interview CA02	International NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	12/09/2017
Interview CA03	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	12/09/2017
Interview CA04	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	13/09/2017
Interview CA05	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	13/09/2017
Interview CA06	International consultant	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	14/09/2017
Interview CA07	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	14/09/2017
Interview CA08	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	15/09/2017
Interview CA09	International NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	15/09/2017
Interview CA10	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	16/09/2017
Interview CA11	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	16/09/2017
Interview CA12	International organisation	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	15/09/2017
Interview CA13	International NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	18/09/2017
Interview CA14	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	18/09/2017
Interview CA15	International NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	19/09/2017
Interview CA16	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	22/09/2017
Interview CA17	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	22/09/2017
Interview CA18	International researcher	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	22/09/2017
Interview CA19	International NGO	Via Skype	23/09/2017
Interview CA20	Local NGO	Phnom Penh, Cambodia	23/09/2017
Interview CA21	International NGO	Via Skype	04/10/2017
Interview CA22	International NGO	Via Skype	10/10/2017
Interview CA23	International advisor	Via Skype	14/11/2017

Numbered list of interviews – Kosovo and Serbia

Kosovo and Serbia Table 1: Interview participant information

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
Interview KS01	Kosovar NGO	Mitrovica, Kosovo	21/04/2017
Interview KS02	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	27/03/2017
Interview KS03	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	31/03/2017
Interview KS04	Kosovar NGO	Mitrovica, Kosovo	02/02/2017
Interview KS05	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	31/07/2017
Interview KS06	Kosovar NGO	Mitrovica, Kosovo	21/04/2017
Interview KS07	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	31/03/2017
Interview KS08	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	11/07/2017
Interview KS09	International organisation	Pristina, Kosovo	30/03/2017
Interview KS10	Kosovar NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	19/10/2017
Interview KS11	International organisation	Mitrovica, Kosovo	22/04/2017
Interview KS12	Serbian NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	27/10/2017
Interview KS13	Serbian NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	09/10/2017
Interview KS14	Kosovar NGO	Belgrade, Serbia	17/10/2017
Interview KS15	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	12/07/2017
Interview KS16	International organisation	Pristina, Kosovo	19/10/2017
Interview KS17	International organisation	Belgrade, Serbia	17/10/2017
Interview KS18	International NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	13/07/2017
Interview KS19	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	19/10/2017
Interview KS20	Kosovar NGO	Pristina, Kosovo	28/03/2017

Kosovo and Serbia Table 2: Focus Group Discussion participant information

Reference	Organisation Type	Location	Date
KS FGD Participants	Kosovo and Serbian NGOs	Krusevac, Serbia	22/03/2018

Numbered list of interviews – Somalia and Somaliland

Somalia and Somaliland Table 1: Interview participant information

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
Interview HA01	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	01/08/2017
Interview HA02	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	02/08/2017
Interview HA03	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	03/08/2017
Interview HA04	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	04/08/2017
Interview HA05	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	05/08/2017
Interview HA06	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	17/08/2017
Interview HA07	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	13/08/2017
Interview HA08	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	13/08/2017
Interview HA09	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	13/08/2017
Interview HA10	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	13/08/2017
Interview HA11	International NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	16/08/2017
Interview HA12	International NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	17/08/2017
Interview HA13	International NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	19/09/2017
Interview HA14	Governance and Research	Hargeisa, Somaliland	20/09/2017

Somalia and Somaliland Table 2: Focus Group Discussion participant information

Reference Number	Organisation Type	Location	Date
HA FGD Participant 01	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	09/08/2017
HA FGD Participant 02	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	09/08/2017
HA FGD Participant 03	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	09/08/2017
HA FGD Participant 04	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	14/01/2018
HA FGD Participant 05	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	14/01/2018
SO FGD Participant 06	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	14/01/2018
SO FGD Participant 07	Local NGO	Mogadishu, Somalia	14/01/2018
SO FGD Participant 08	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	23/08/2017
SO FGD Participant 09	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	23/08/2017
SO FGD Participant 10	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	23/08/2017
SO FGD Participant 11	International NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	28/02/2018
SO FGD Participant 12	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	28/02/2018
SO FGD Participant 13	Local NGO	Hargeisa, Somaliland	28/02/2018