EU-CIVCAP
Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU CIVilian CAPabilities for a Sustainable Peace

Report on Civil-Military Synergies on the Ground
Deliverable 5.3
(Version 1.4; 29 May 2018)

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RUC Roskilde University

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## Summary of the Document

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<td>AFBiH</td>
<td>Armed Forces of Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>AMISOM</td>
<td>African Union Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>AWE</td>
<td>Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives</td>
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<td>BHMAC</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre</td>
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<td>BI</td>
<td>Building Integrity</td>
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<td>BiH</td>
<td>Bosnia and Herzegovina</td>
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<td>CBT</td>
<td>Capacity Building and Training</td>
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<td>CFSP</td>
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<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-military Cooperation</td>
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<td>Civil-military Coordination</td>
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<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defence Policy</td>
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<td>DG NEAR</td>
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<td>ESDC</td>
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<td>EUCAP</td>
<td>European Union Capacity Building Mission</td>
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<td>EUMC</td>
<td>European Union Military Committee</td>
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<td>European Union Special Representative</td>
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<td>Head of Mission</td>
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<td>ICSP</td>
<td>Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace</td>
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<td>IPA</td>
<td>Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance</td>
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<td>ITF</td>
<td>Enhancing Human Security (organisation)</td>
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<td>JIMC</td>
<td>Joint Intelligence Management Cell</td>
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<td>JOCC</td>
<td>Joint Operations Coordination Centre</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
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<tr>
<td>KFOR</td>
<td>Kosovo Force</td>
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<td>Liaison and Observation Team</td>
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<td>MIA</td>
<td>Mogadishu International Airport</td>
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<td>MICC</td>
<td>Mines Information Coordination Cell</td>
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<td>Ministry of Defence</td>
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<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
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<td>NSE</td>
<td>National Support Element</td>
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<td>OCHA</td>
<td>Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs</td>
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<td>OHR</td>
<td>Office of High Representative</td>
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<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
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<td>SFOR</td>
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<td>SNA</td>
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<td>Somali National Armed Forces</td>
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<td>Security Sector Reform</td>
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<td>United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia</td>
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<td>UNSOS</td>
<td>United Nations Support Office</td>
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<td>UPDF</td>
<td>Ugandan People’s Defence Force</td>
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<td>WFP</td>
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Civil-military synergies have long been a highly coveted objective in international crisis management and peacebuilding efforts. They have also been a key aim of the European Union’s Comprehensive Approach since 2013. As the clearly defined measures of the Comprehensive Approach are being eclipsed by the new Integrated Approach,¹ this report provides a timely stock-taking. It appraises the success with which civil-military synergies have been pursued and achieved on the ground by EU missions and operations under the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) in two diverse case studies: the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The report supplements previous literature on civil-military coordination by emphasising outcomes at the operational level and by engaging directly with ongoing EU missions and operations to appraise the impact of the pursuit of civil-military synergies under the Comprehensive Approach.

The study conceptualises civil-military synergies as an observable operational level outcome of coordination and cooperation by civilian and military instruments of external action in the framework of the CSDP. Such outcomes are anticipated as either (1) increased impact or (2) reduced resource expenditure. The report then explores civil-military synergies as they have been established through formal means of coordination and pooling of resources between EU CSDP instruments, and through more ad hoc and informal solutions on the ground. Finally, each case study provides a brief chapter on potentials for civil-military synergies not currently pursued in missions and a set of policy recommendations for the particular region.

The report finds that formal mechanisms for coordination have been established at most levels between relevant actors, but that outcomes in terms of tangible synergetic effects are often elusive. This is particularly true for civil-military interfaces, where an apparent ‘difference in mindset’ between military and civilian actors is still regularly perceived as obstructive to effective synergies. This is to a degree where civilian-civilian and military-military synergies are more apparent across nationalities and international organisations than civil-military synergies are between instruments of the EU. In other words, individuals are more likely to establish synergies across international boundaries and organisations within their own sectors than they are across the civil-military divide within the EU. The case studies provide evidence of three persistent challenges to achieving civil-military synergies on the ground: (1) mandates for coordination are left open for individual interpretation and rarely specifies civil-military synergies, (2) there is limited authority for decision-making or prioritisation between EU instruments at the operational level, and (3) host nations rarely have the capacity to manage or coordinate multiple international actors with overlapping mandates.

¹ The European Union Integrated Approach to External Conflict and Crises (ST 10054 2017 INIT) has not yet been released to the public domain but was first put forward in the EU Global Strategy (EUGS, 2016).
1) **Mandates must offer a more detailed and task-based approach to civil-military coordination.** In almost all other areas, open mandates are recommended in order to increase delegation and flexibility on the ground – but as coordination is a continuous struggle for individual actors to adapt beyond their own task and priority, this is a field where a minimum standard must be detailed from the principal level. Too often, catch-all objectives to ‘coordinate with relevant actors’ are left open to interpretation, thus outcomes remain dependent on ad hoc personal relationships and individual interpretations at the highest level (Heads of Mission / Delegation or Force Commanders), making civil-military synergies vulnerable to staff rotations.

2) **The EU should embrace opportunities for using high-level competences to offer leadership in coordinating civil-military actors** with overlapping mandates, especially where no other lead agency is apparent. Staff and leadership in EU offices and missions are typically among the best educated, trained and resourced in their fields. While the EU has many restrictions on its field activities, it stands out from many other actors owing to two clear assets: competence and legitimacy. Both are fundamental for successful leadership in coordination between actors with overlapping mandates and the EU should make more use of this comparative advantage.

3) **More decision-making authority should be delegated to mission leadership and staff** in order to allow CSDP instruments a higher degree of responsibility and adaptability in dynamic environments. The extensive and isolated nature of the EU chains of command produces continuous delays in operational cooperation with partners. EU missions are thus perceived as effective towards their own operational objectives but as slow-moving in cooperation with others. Several more ad hoc synergies and support on the ground between actors could be established if fewer reach-backs to Brussels were required.

4) **Delegation should include authority for taking actions in support of regional strategic objectives or other EU actors.** A combination of more specific and task-based mandates for the coordination and pursuit of civil-military synergies and the delegation of decision-making authority to the operational level should allow instruments to more flexibly establish intra-agency civil-military synergies and support in pursuit of the wider EU objectives.

5) **The EU should consider integrating civil-military chains of command at the theatre and operational level.** Long stovepiped chains of command have meant that in extreme cases the military operation, civilian mission and EU Delegation in a given environment have been required to seek approval in Brussels for very fundamental exchanges of resources and intra-agency support. This could be mitigated with an operational level integrated structure for decision-making and prioritisation similar to the UN Country Team concept.
1. INTRODUCTION

This report contributes to the wider work of the Horizon 2020 research project Preventing and Responding to Conflict: Developing EU Civilian Capabilities for a Sustainable Peace (EU-CIVCAP) by analysing the development of civil-military synergies in EU external actions within the Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) framework. The report reviews the extent to which CSDP missions and operations have succeeded in establishing civil-military synergies on the ground with other EU policy instruments and external partners in international conflict prevention and peacebuilding engagements in the Western Balkans and Horn of Africa. It supplements the wider research on civil-military coordination (e.g. Gordon, 2006; de Coning, 2008; Gross, 2008; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010; de Coning & Friis, 2011; Jayasundara-Smits, 2016) and previous EU-CIVCAP research on cooperation between international organisations and EU regional engagements (Dijkstra et al., 2017) by focusing on the operational level where missions and operations are conducted under the EU regional strategic frameworks. Data for the report was collected at EU field offices and mission environments and the report thus aims to move the analytical scope beyond the policy level and onto implementation.2

The concept of civil-military synergies on the ground is approached by first reviewing EU policies and documents in order to establish working definitions and an analytical framework for comparison across two case studies: the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. The report conceptualises civil-military synergies as an observable operational level2 outcome of coordination and cooperation by civilian and military instruments of external action, distinguishable as (1) increased impact and/or (2) reduced resource expenditure. Acknowledging recent findings on civil-military synergies (Jayasundara-Smits, 2016), the report does not consider the civil-military element as necessarily excluding civilian-civilian and military-military synergies from the analysis. The main emphasis is on the civil-military interface, as it has commonly provided the most challenges for inter-instrument coordination, but the synergetic effect between, e.g. civilian missions and the EU delegations, will be considered regardless. This allows for inclusion of a slightly wider understanding of civil-military divisions, e.g. those found in literature on coordination of humanitarian assistance, where the ‘military actor’ includes civilian staff of politically mandated missions as opposed to independent, neutral and impartial humanitarian mandates (e.g. IASC, 2008; OCHA, 2015).

This conceptualisation of civil-military synergies is then applied to the two case studies through a four-step analysis. Firstly, the EU regional strategic frameworks and deployed CSDP instruments for each case study are analysed to identify relevant partners for operational

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2 The analysis is built on the initial EU-CIVCAP framework report outlining current and previous deployment of EU CSDP instruments in the case areas and in-depth regional conflict analyses (Peen Rodt et al., 2017).

3 The operational level defined here as that of an operational theatre, i.e. the totality of the geographic environment covered by the mission’s mandate. In this case, the common denominator for missions and operations is considered to be the geographical scope of the EU’s regional strategic frameworks.
level synergies based on tasks and geographic closeness. The mapping extends from the mandates of CSDP missions and operations, but potential synergetic partnerships include both EU instruments, e.g. delegations, and external actors, e.g. UN missions and unilateral operations. Secondly, the report then explores the formal mechanisms for civil-military coordination and synergies, i.e. meeting schedules, exchange of liaison officers, etc., through an analysis of degrees and scope of interactions and their observable outcomes. Thirdly, a similar analysis is conducted for informal and ad hoc mechanisms. Finally, the fourth element of the analysis explores potential, yet unmaterialised synergies based on stakeholders’ perspectives and the initial task-based analysis to provide recommendations for new forms of cooperation/coordination.

The report concludes with a comparison of findings and recommendations for the two case studies to provide general policy recommendations for increasing civil-military synergies on the ground, not only by pursuing unexploited options but also summarising best practices and lessons identified from the previous analytical steps. The report conclusion highlights that there are a few notable successes in attaining civil-military synergies on the ground but that increased incentives and provisions for implementation must be provided from the strategic level in order for them to be enhanced.

2. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH DESIGN

The EU-CIVCAP project approaches the issue of civil-military synergies and coherence in terms of civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civil-military coordination (CMCO) but also as a broader concept including a comprehensive (nunc integrated) approach and non-CSDP activities and instruments – from supranational to national actors (European Commission, 2013; 2015: 11). This opens a very broad research scope, reaching from the individual operational actor to the strategic policy level of multiple international organisations and individual state actors. Further complicating the concept, the EU’s terminological delineation of cooperation (CIMIC) versus coordination (CMCO) is not aligned with the wider external terminology of civil-military levels and types of coherence and coordination (IASC, 2008: 12; also Coning & Friis, 2011: 253–259). This leaves a certain conceptual ‘fuzziness’ (Jayasundara-Smits, 2016: 4) which must therefore first be tackled.

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4 The task analysis focuses on five sectors of international intervention in crisis management and peacebuilding: security, law and order, government, economy, and society (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse & Miall, 2016).
5 Coherence encompasses a variety of strategies of coordination, from coexistence to cooperation (see de Coning & Friis, 2011).
6 For an analysis of the EU’s Comprehensive Approach vis-à-vis the new Integrated Approach, see Faleg et al. (2018).
7 For a discussion of EU terminology on civil-military synergies, see Jayasundara-Smits (2016: 4–6).
Civil-military synergies: EU policy definitions

In contrast to the above-mentioned concepts of coherence, coordination and cooperation, civil-military synergy has so far existed mainly as an operational term and as a specified aim within the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy where its application has also evolved over time. A review of EU policy definitions is therefore warranted to establish a concept of analytical utility. The European Union Military Committee (EUMC) Glossary of Acronyms and Definitions provides the following definition:

Civil-military synergy aim [sic] at reaching a more comprehensive EU operational capability in conflict prevention and crisis management and should ensure an efficient use of resources in a constrained economic environment (EEAS, 2015).

The glossary thus understands civil-military synergies as primarily aimed at the operational level and as mainly concerned with reducing resource expenditure. This is in line with the EU policy document “Promoting Synergies between the EU Civil and Military Capability Development”, which contains almost identical wording (PSC, 2009: 2). This document identifies civil-military synergies as an objective within ESDP/CSDP capability development and recognises both the political and strategic (Brussels) and operational theatres as relevant levels for obtaining them (PSC, 2009: 3).

The “EU’s Comprehensive Approach to External Conflict and Crises” extends the need for close coordination and “operational synergies” to include “EU-level actors” and independent Member States to work in a “joined-up strategic manner” (European Commission, 2013: 3) and seeks synergy widely “to have a greater impact and achieve better results” (ibid.: 8). The policy thus widens the conceptual scope to span from synergies between international organisations to synergies between specific instruments of external action, and coordination in the operational theatre. It further introduces the idea of increased common impact, further widening the scope from simply reduction of resource expenditure.\(^{10}\)

Based on the above concepts, and with a focus on operational level civil-military synergies,\(^ {11}\) this report will address the concept in two distinct forms. It will explore civil-military synergies as (1) a practical approach to cost-reduction and (2) in a more traditional etymological sense as impact-increasing. Cost-reduction is operationalised mainly as avoiding duplicate efforts and costs within and between EU instruments. Impact-increasing should be understood as operational synergies where a number of activities such as information sharing and temporal/spatial coordination is conducted to maximise coherence and overall impact on the ground for all parties. In a proverbial conceptualisation: to make the whole (impact) larger than the sum of its individual parts. While the concepts regularly overlap, a dyadic distinction has shown the most utility since cost-reduction has been the over-shadowing interpretation and focus most commonly encountered in field guidance and among interviewees.

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\(^{8}\) For a conceptual discussion of levels of coherence and types of relationships, see de Coning & Friis (2011: 253–259).

\(^{9}\) CSDP operated as the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDC) until December 2009.

\(^{10}\) For an analysis of the Comprehensive Approach, see the upcoming EU-CIVCAP DL 5.4: “Implementing the Comprehensive Approach in Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa” at www.eu-civcap.net (expected publication in November 2018).

\(^{11}\) Several analyses already treat the concept of civil-military coordination and synergies at the strategic and political levels (e.g. Gordon, 2006; Gross, 2008; de Coning & Friis, 2011; Metcalfe et al., 2012; Egnell, 2013).
Examples of *impact-increasing* measures may include: (1) coordination or combinations of training to ensure that host-nation internal security forces and military units have functional interfaces for transition from military operations to police investigations and long-term security; (2) ensuring, through active communication with Member States or EU delegations, that external development funding is earmarked or directed to host-nation units’ equipment, facilities or training that consolidates and improves the overall impact of mission activities; or (3) ensuring that communications and information systems and standards implemented within host nations are compatible across units and institutions. None of those three examples brings immediate reductions in resource expenditure – in most cases, in fact, the opposite occurs – but require actors, both external and internal to the EU, to coordinate and mutually adapt for effective coherent results leading to greater and more sustainable overall impact.

**Operationalisation of civil-military synergies**

When operationalising the concept, the European External Action Service (EEAS) considers the potential synergies between EU civil and military capabilities to be a field in continuous development, but to currently include *inter alia* (EEAS, 2014):

- Logistic support
- Communications and Information Systems (CIS)
- Medical support
- Security and force protection
- Information sharing
- Intelligence
- Contracting, e.g. Support Coordination Board
- Lessons Learned

All of the above may include measures of both cost-reduction and impact-increasing or a combination of both. While the list provides the impetus for this research, the report aims to expand it by charting new and unexploited options identified in the fieldwork. This includes areas such as common skills and knowledge building (e.g. human rights, compliance with international humanitarian law, sexual and gender-based violence awareness, etc.), dialogue and mediation, and security sector reform processes.

Data collection was designed to examine (1) the degree to which the above listed categories are coordinated and provide observable synergies, as well as (2) whether there is significant duplication of efforts and assets within the case areas. It further explores (3) stakeholders’ perspectives on potential future areas for developing synergies and (4) particularly successful models or areas from informally implemented civil-military synergies.

**Approach and methods**

A review of EU and EEAS policy documents and field guidance was completed to provide the above conceptual framework. Twenty-seven semi-structured interviews were then
conducted with EU CSDP staff, African Union (AU), United Nations (UN) and other on-the-ground stakeholders as well as host-nation partners in Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), Somalia, and Kenya. Interviews have aimed to identify formal structures for coordination between operational level actors, informal and ad hoc attained civil-military synergies, and currently unexploited potentials for civil-military synergies – all from the perspectives of mission staff at the operational level and relevant external stakeholders.

For formal structures, the analysis identifies the types of interfaces (e.g. appointment or exchange of liaison officers, co-location, fixed meeting schedules, etc.) and the scope of interaction (e.g. frequency and organisational level). For the informal and ad hoc mechanisms, the analysis will outline type and scope as formal coordination, but also attempt to assess the potential for formalisation and projection to other instruments, i.e. whether an ad hoc measure would be relevant to formalising for continuation and to other missions and engagements. Finally, for the outlining of potential civil-military synergies the analysis includes stakeholder and respondent proposals as well as researcher assessments.

This reflects the framework applied for assessing intensity and scope of interactions between international organisations, as applied by previous EU-CIVCAP research considering both the degree of formalisation and the degree of practical interactions (Dijkstra et al., 2017). The former is seen to take the form of formal agreements, documents, and institutional provisions (e.g. coordination boards, mechanisms for service exchange and appointment of liaison officers), while the latter indicates intensity and degree in potentially informal solutions on the ground (e.g. scope and frequency of interactions and ad hoc solutions between instruments as well as personnel on the ground).

Additional scrutiny was applied in cases with a risk of negative synergies, damaging in second or third-degree effects. An example of this, found in preliminary fieldwork in a different region, included exploitation of information gained through humanitarian actors and utilised as operational intelligence for host-nation forces. This involved a clear violation of IASC guidelines (IASC, 2008), potentially leading to increased operational risk for humanitarian partners.

**Comparative case studies**

The report outlines findings on civil-military synergies in two case studies of EU regional engagements in conflict prevention and peacebuilding: the Western Balkans and the Horn of Africa. For the Western Balkans, the CSDP missions EULEX and EUFOR Althea/BiH are considered one operational theatre. For the Horn of Africa, the three active missions EUNAVFOR Atalanta, EUCAP Somalia (Nestor), and EUTM Somalia are similarly considered one operational theatre in which a certain level of coordination and synergy should be expected between individual missions, other EU instruments, and external partners, particularly as they are all deployed under the EU Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union, 2011).

The two case areas vary significantly in terms of political context, geography, and in the types of instruments deployed by the EU. Furthermore, the crises addressed are significantly different in intensity and scope. Thus the cases are considered diverse (see Gerring, 2012: 12)

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12 Interviews in Bamako in November 2016.
52). What is found to be of value in one case study may therefore not be considered directly transferable to the other and vice versa. The two case studies become representative, however, if understood as representing ends of a continuum of EU involvement: one with a long-term history and partnership in stabilisation and continuous instrument development in the Western Balkans, and one of more recent involvement in the Horn of Africa for which the CSDP and EU Comprehensive Approach has been a concurrent policy development and planning foundation. Apart from representing the wide range of CSDP instruments available to the EU, the cases also differ as, respectively, a lesser and more likely scenario in terms of policy implementation. While coordination, cooperation and synergy have always been objectives within EU engagement, their explicit formalisation in policy and regional frameworks have come after the initial engagements in the Western Balkans but coincided with the deployment of CSDP missions and operations in the Horn of Africa. As such, a certain level of path dependency should be expected in the Western Balkans, where policy adherence would be achieved through incremental changes to already established structures. In opposition to this, the case of the Horn of Africa is a regional engagement planned and deployed more or less in synchronisation with the formalisation of the EU Comprehensive Approach and as such should represent in mandates and operational plans a more ideal setting for adherence to formalised policies of pursuing civil-military synergies.

For both case areas, instruments outside CSDP, such as the corresponding EU delegations, as well as European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations (ECHO), Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations (DG NEAR), and Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DEVCO) partners and recipients, have been included in the analysis to the degree that they were found to have interfaces with the CSDP instruments.  

3. CASE STUDY: WESTERN BALKANS

The EU is currently present in the Western Balkans with two CSDP missions: one civilian (EULEX Kosovo) and one military (EUFOR Althea in Bosnia and Herzegovina) (see Peen Rodt et al., 2017: 30-35). The common feature of the EU engagement in the region is that CSDP plays a minor role in comparison to enlargement policy. For its part, enlargement has shaped the EU’s approach to post-conflict stabilisation – with the promise of EU membership regarded as a key factor contributing to stabilisation (EC, n.d.). Both in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) and Kosovo, the EU has worked alongside other international actors, including the Office of the High Representative in BiH and the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

At the strategic level, cooperation with NATO has been crucial to EU crisis management in the Western Balkans. EUFOR Althea has been carried out under the Berlin Plus Agreement (EEAS, 2016), meaning that it has relied on NATO’s assets and capabilities. Furthermore, the EU and NATO agreed on a concerted approach to security and stability in the Western Balkans in

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13 For brevity, instruments in countries within the regional scope, e.g. one of the eight countries included in the Horn of Africa framework, but without a current presence of a CSDP mission or operation as outlined above, have been included in the analysis only when directly relevant to a mission in the case study. This is mainly to maintain DL 5.3 focus on theatres where civil and military crisis management is ongoing.

Nonetheless, the EU’s engagements in BiH and Kosovo differ substantially from each other. While the EU has a military presence in BiH, it has used exclusively civilian competences in Kosovo, with the NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) providing the international military presence. Hence, an important part of this analysis will focus on mechanisms for attaining interagency civil-military synergies in Kosovo and analysing inter-agency military-military synergies in BiH.

3.1. DEPLOYED EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS AND FRAMEWORK

**Bosnia and Herzegovina**

The EU presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina includes the EU Special Representative (EUSR), the EU Delegation, and EUFOR Althea. The EUSR has been double-hatted as the Head of the EU Delegation since 2011 and the EUSR team is co-located with the Delegation.

Operation EUFOR Althea (hereafter EUFOR) was launched in 2004, when UNSCR 1575 authorised it to assume a peace stabilisation role from the NATO-led Stabilisation Force (SFOR). Thereby EUFOR was endowed with an executive mandate and tasked to oversee compliance with the military aspects of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the so-called ‘Dayton Agreement’. EUFOR’s mandate was extended by the Council of the EU in 2010 to include a non-executive aspect: capacity building and training of the Armed Forces of BiH (Council of the EU, 2010). As of 2018, EUFOR encompasses three elements: capacity building and training (CBT), a multinational battalion with an executive mandate, and 17 liaison and observation teams (LOTs), deployed in 16 cities and municipalities country-wide. EUFOR has been carried out in the framework of the Berlin Plus Agreement, and has relied on NATO’s capabilities and assets in the following areas:

- **Command and control**: The EU Operation Commander is the Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for Europe. The chief of staff at JFC Naples also serves as the Head of the EU Command Element. The EU Operation Commander is not to be confused with the EU Force Commander, who leads the operation in the field (hereafter COMEUFOR).
- **Reserves**: EU Balkan reserves are under NATO Joint Force Command Naples. In case of need, NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) would be authorised to support EUFOR in BiH.
- **Administration and logistics**: EUFOR is co-located with NATO Headquarters Sarajevo (NHQSa) in Camp Butmir. EUFOR uses NHQS’s information and communication technologies. There is a single personnel office. NHQS has assigned a liaison to EUFOR just for logistic arrangements (Interview 1). Since EUFOR is significantly larger than NHQS with nearly 600 staff as opposed to about 50 employed by NATO (Patton, 2018), it has taken over a vast part of running the camp, but NATO is still formally the ‘landlord’ (Interview 1).
- **Intelligence sharing**: EUFOR and NATO have separate intelligence cells, but there is close cooperation (Interview 1).
In addition, EUFOR has provided training for an engineering platoon committed under the Partnership for Peace activities so that the unit obtains capabilities in line with NATO requirements (Interview 1). There is an expectation that cooperation in regard to CBT will be reinforced (Interview 2). But, at the moment, NATO is not formally involved in EUFOR’s planning, including CBT (Interview 1).

BiH has its own Armed Forces (AFBiH) and Ministry of Defence (MoD). The AFBiH were created through the defence reform process that took place in 2006, when the two entities’ armies (of Federation BiH and Republika Srpska) were merged. Unlike the armed forces, law enforcement structures remain highly fragmented: there are 16 police bodies in total, none of which are superior or subordinate to the others (Kovačević & Hadžović, 2015).

Oversight of civilian aspects of the Dayton Agreement has been exercised by the Office of the High Representative (OHR). The High Representative has broad competences, though they are dependent upon the decisions of the Peace Implementation Council, a body encompassing 55 countries, international organisations and institutions, including the European Commission (OHR, n.d). The OHR was double-hatted as EUSR between 2002-11.

**Civilian and military engagement under CSDP before synergies were considered:**
For eight years, the EU ran both a military operation and a civilian mission (European Union Police Mission, EUPM, 2003-12). The EUPM was legally instructed to coordinate with the OHR/EUSR (Council of the EU, 2002). However, cooperation with other EU actors on the ground became problematic, in particular with EUFOR in the fight against organised crime (Mustonen, 2008: 19-20). A key lesson was that separate operational planning in Brussels, replicated in the field, led to duplication of tasks in policing (Gross, 2012). As lessons from this period have already informed policy practice, coordination between EUFOR and EUPM will not be part of this analysis.

**Kosovo**
International presence in Kosovo is based on the UN-NATO-EU triumvirate, which has since 1999 developed by default rather than by design. The EU has used exclusively civilian capabilities in Kosovo, while NATO-led KFOR provides international military presence. The UNSCR 1244 (1999) established a relatively complex international governance system in Kosovo in the vacuum between withdrawal of Serbian institutions and development of Kosovar ones. The basic division of labour was set between the UN-led civilian presence built around UNMIK and the NATO-led military presence (KFOR). Due to disagreements within the international community about recognition of Kosovo’s statehood, UNSCR 1244 is still formally in place. UNMIK has formally remained the leading international actor in Kosovo, even though its de facto relevance diminished after 2008.

Apart from deterring renewed hostilities and demilitarising the Kosovo Liberation Army, KFOR’s mandate initially included (1) ensuring security and public order, (2) providing medical assistance, (3) protecting heritage sites, and (4) border monitoring duties “as required” (UNSCR 1244). These tasks were later transferred to Kosovo civilian authorities, foremost Kosovo Police, and KFOR was drastically downsized to around 4,600 troops in 2017 (KFOR,
KFOR is still tasked as the third responder in case of public disorder, with Kosovo Police as the first and EULEX as the second.

The EU initially engaged by coordinating “Reconstruction and Economic Development” within the international civilian presence led by UNMIK (UNMIK, n.d.). In 2008 a rule of law ESDP mission, EULEX, was launched. The EU presence in Kosovo now includes the EULEX mission, the EUSR, and the EU Office. The EUSR is double-hatted as Head of the EU Office.

EULEX Kosovo has two functions (EULEX, n.d.): 1) mentoring, monitoring, and advising competent Kosovo institutions on all areas related to the wider rule of law (judiciary, prosecution, police, customs service); and 2) an executive function in the rule of law (judiciary, prosecution, policing), with focus on sensitive cases, i.e. war crimes, corruption, and organised crime.

The executive mandate has been limited since 2014 and EULEX is now downsizing, with a current authorised strength of 800 staff (EULEX, n.d.), which is significantly lower than in late 2008, when it counted 3,200 personnel (Grilj & Zupancic, 2016: 64).

Kosovo does not have its own armed forces beyond the lightly armed Kosovo Security Force (KSF), whose current mandate is to “participate in crisis response operations”, assist civilian authorities in emergency management and civil protection, and conduct explosive ordnance disposal (Law on KSF: Article 10). The NATO Advisory and Liaison Team (NALT) is co-located with the Ministry for KSF and assists them in capacity building and reform processes. As of 2018, Kosovo is pursuing a transformation of KSF into proper armed forces but faces strong opposition by Serbia (Savic & Filipovic, 2018).

3.2. FORMAL COORDINATION AND MECHANISMS FOR ATTAINING CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

In BiH, EUFOR is subject to political coordination by the EUSR by the Council Joint Action 2004/570/CFSP, which states the EUSR’s responsibility to coordinate all EU actors in the field and for COMEUFOR to take EUSR local political advice into account. In practice, coordination has since 2011 been facilitated through the position of Political Advisor to COMEUFOR, which is at the same time attached to the EUSR team. Moreover, COMEUFOR and EUFOR meet biweekly in the framework of the HoMs meetings (Interview 2).

EUFOR has assigned a liaison officer at the OHR, but overall coordination with OHR is less formal than it used to be (Interview 3). There are no interagency meetings specifically held to share analysis about ongoing security developments (Interview 1). The OHR chairs a biweekly Board of Principals meeting, gathering relevant international organisations in order to enable information sharing and avoid overlapping. In addition, the office of the EUSR organises biweekly meetings attended by political advisors, at which EUFOR and NHQSa are present (Interview 1). With regards to local authorities, EUFOR has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Ministry of Security of BiH and 16 law enforcement agencies, which covers exchange of classified and unclassified information (Jones, 2013).

The EU civilian mission in Kosovo, EULEX, was designed to take account of interactions with other international actors working in the field. Its mandate obliges the Head of Mission to ensure that EULEX “works closely and coordinates with the competent Kosovo authorities and with relevant international actors, as appropriate, including NATO/KFOR” (Council Joint Action 2008/124/CFSP: Article 8). EULEX and KFOR have thus signed an MoU, which is said to
entail arrangements concerning response to riots, military support to police operations, and exchange of information (Van der Borgh et al., 2017: 19). However, the MoU has also been criticised as “putting in paper a plan how to evacuate internationals in case something happens” rather than a document outlining joint planning capacities (Interview 4) and the mandate to include “relevant international actors” has been left open for interpretation.

The principal mechanisms for coordination between EULEX/EU and KFOR in the field are (1) liaison officers and contact points and (2) meetings. EULEX and KFOR have exchanged liaison officers, and a contact point for KFOR is maintained in the EU Office (Interviews 4 and 5). There are several forms of regular meetings organised among international organisations’ missions in Kosovo, aimed at information sharing. The oldest form are Monday morning meetings organised by UNMIK with participation of the EU Office, EULEX, KFOR, OSCE, and Council of Europe representatives. Regular meetings among chiefs of staff of the EU Office, EULEX, OSCE, UNMIK, and KFOR are organised on a rotational basis. There are also Tuesday morning interagency security meetings in ethnically divided Mitrovica (Interview 4). But no joint strategic planning between international civilian actors and KFOR is undertaken and no joint threat assessment is conducted (Interviews 4, 6 and 7). When asked for observable synergies as outcomes of these coordination activities, respondents were rarely able to provide any examples, and one expressed the observation that many mechanisms have been established for the sake of their “existence” but without producing any tangible outcome (Interviews 1 and 4). Coordination is thus regularly claimed to take place, but synergies where parties mutually adapt or align are rarely established.

There are three discernible types of cooperation foreseen between EULEX and KFOR, corresponding with the domains where the EU sees potential for developing civil military synergies (EEAS, 2011: 1):

- **Sharing information and intelligence**: EULEX and KFOR share information and threat assessment, especially ahead of (Serbian) Orthodox holidays (Interview 5).
- **Security and force protection**: There is a possibility for KFOR to provide protection for EULEX staff, as well as other internationals, in case of emergencies.
- **Training and exercise**: EULEX and KFOR, as the second and third responders in riots, carry out biannual joint exercises along with Kosovo Police, the Kosovo Security Force, and the Emergency Management Agency with the aim of strengthening interoperability (KFOR, 2017b).

Overall, formal coordination structures between EULEX and KFOR are in place but their scope is rather narrow and observable synergies limited. There are indications that interactions between the two actors are even weaker in practice than on paper, in spite of their cooperation during several cases of unrest in northern Kosovo, including the ‘barricade crisis’ of 2011-12 when Kosovo Police tried to establish control of two checkpoints (Andric, 2011). According to one international official that used to work in Kosovo, either side is likely to withhold information from the other (Interview 8). KFOR is distrustful towards EULEX’s capacity to act as a second responder due to the small number of EULEX police officers engaged in the anti-riot unit, and the mission’s risk-averse posture. For its part, EULEX staff perceives KFOR as unwilling to cooperate (Interviews 4 and 8). For instance, KFOR support to EULEX police searches in northern Kosovo has been varied, and at best unpredictable (Collaku, 2011; Interview 8). EULEX has also been criticised for failing to coordinate with KFOR in the fight against trafficking in northern Kosovo (Group for Legal and Political Studies, 2013: 13).
3.3. INFORMAL AND AD HOC CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

While international engagement in Kosovo does not offer observable examples of informal synergies, practice in Bosnia has delivered several examples of *ad hoc* attained synergies, some of which have in time become formalised.

A good practice was observed in the disposal of surplus ammunition and weapons. BiH has struggled with large quantities of weapons and ammunition remaining from the war, compounded by the fact that until 2006 each entity had its own army. EUFOR inherited from SFOR the oversight of compliance with the requirement to establish lasting security and arms control measures. Nevertheless, this role was initially limited to record-keeping and supervision of overall stockpiles (Carapic et al., 2015: 18). When AFBiH was formed, it did not have sufficient capacities for life cycle management and demilitarisation of surplus ammunition. Hence, several international partners got involved in this field, including UNDP, OSCE, and the US, providing financial and technical support. Upon the expansion of EUFOR's mandate to include capacity building (2010), a mobile training team was set up to build AFBiH's capacities for ammunition and weapon storage site management (Carapic et al., 2015: 21). However, overall coordination was lacking and there were instances of overlapping with other actors (Interviews 9 and 10). In 2012, a review of the Dayton Agreement implementation to determine residual tasks to be completed by EUFOR found that proper management of ammunition, weapons, and explosives (AWE) was still not in place and was recognised as a priority (Carapic et al., 2015: 38). EUFOR and EUSR created a non-paper on the ways to improve ammunition storage and disposal through better international coordination (Interview 2). A Master Plan on Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives (AWE) was drafted in 2013, in a process formally owned by the Bosnian Ministry of Defence but coordinated by EUFOR. EUFOR proved to be particularly suitable for coordination because of its twofold mandate: the executive mandate authorises and obliges EUFOR to monitor compliance with Dayton Agreement requirements, while the non-executive mandate puts it in a position to run capacity building and training for AFBiH and building local ownership through AWE life cycle management. Upon adoption of the Master Plan, the following coordination mechanisms were created:

- The **Strategic Board** is chaired by the Minister of Defence and composed of high-level representatives from the MoD and AFBiH and key international organisations. Through Strategic Board meetings, which take place three or four times a year, the MoD streamlines strategic priorities in the framework of the AWE Master Plan (Interview 9). These meetings are also attended by interested donors and thus facilitate coordination of financing at the highest level.

- The **Coordination Committee** gathers project managers from international organisations involved in AWE programmes and coordinates work in this field at operational level (Interview 9).

Several advantages of involving civilian international agencies are recognised by interlocutors in the field. Civilians may have expertise on certain issues that the military is lacking, such as human security (Interviews 9 and 10), and civilian agencies are more flexible in comparison to the military (Interview 10). The political factor also plays a role: BiH is a member of the UN and OSCE and these organisations are perceived as politically neutral (as opposed to NATO
and even the EU) and enjoy higher acceptance by different local stakeholders (Interviews 9 and 10).

Engagement by several international actors in this framework has enabled each to specialise in different niches and thus reduce duplication and increase overall impact: EUFOR coordinates the process and provides capacity building and training for AFBiH, UNDP administers industrial demilitarisation and improving ammunition safety, OSCE specialises in physical security of ammunition sites, while the US government sponsors a US company to conduct demilitarisation using open detonation method (Interviews 9, 10 and 11). The EU has also financed two demilitarisation projects through the Instrument Contributing to Stability and Peace (ICSP). This helps to avoid overlapping and thus contributes to cost reduction, but at the same time enables a holistic approach to ammunition management and demilitarisation where outcomes and processes are aligned between several stakeholders, i.e. impact increasing. Crucially, it appears that developing the coordination mechanisms has created a tight international community specialised in this field with a sense of common ownership, which is still atypical in other fields of international peacebuilding. According to one interviewee, the agencies involved in AWE do not just fend for themselves but tend to send interested donors to other agencies if the latter have more knowledge on a specific issue (Interview 10).

Another area involving a significant number of BiH and international civilian and military actors is demining. Demining is carried out by three types of actors: government (AFBiH and civil protection services organised at entity level), NGOs, and commercial companies. It is funded by a number of bilateral and multilateral donors, including the EU through the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance (IPA), and the Slovenian government-established agency Enhancing Human Security (ITF), which acts as an intermediary between projects and potential donors. A legally established Board of Donors (Law on Demining in BiH: Article 7) meets once or twice per year, but there are no coordination committees discussing issues at the ground level (Interview 12). Coordination and control of demining activities is carried out by a local authority, the Demining Commission, and an agency working under it, the Bosnia and Herzegovina Mine Action Centre (BHMAC). BHMAC maintains contacts with all actors involved in demining but is struggling with a modest budget and lack of capacities (Interview 12). EUFOR’s role in demining is multifaceted. The Mines Information Coordination Cell (MICC) submits monthly information about mine threats to BHMAC via the risk warning system, which also includes other actors working in the field (e.g. Red Cross, Interview 12). Furthermore, MICC is credited, along with ITF, for facilitating contacts between interested donors and AFBiH (Interview 13).

After 2010, EUFOR provided capacity building to AFBiH in demining and mine risk education to the wider population (Love, 2014a; Williams-Alden, 2014). EUSR and EUFOR have recently stepped up their efforts to support demining after a report by the BiH State Audit institution showed that implementation of the current demining strategy was unsatisfactory (Interview 2). Consequently, EUSR and EUFOR came up with the idea of a resurvey project, “to see what is still to be demined”, which should serve as a basis for the new 2020-25 mine action strategy (Interview 2). The project is financed by the EU through ICSP and implemented by BHMAC, with EUFOR resorting to its executive mandate to oversee the implementation of this process (Interview 2). Even though the EU as a donor and EUFOR in different capacities have constantly been involved in demining since 2003-04, there is an impression that the EU is
“[only] starting to do something” with the resurvey project (Interview 10) and it appears that coordination in demining is still lagging behind what is done with regards to disposal of surplus ammunition.

EUFOR also participated in emergency management and disaster relief during and after the 2014 floods. EUFOR carried out rescue operations and transported supplies, with one helicopter brought in from KFOR to strengthen EUFOR’s capabilities in the air (Love, 2014b). After the flooding, EUFOR CBT was aimed at “practical” exercises for AFBiH engineering units to repair bridges that had been damaged (Pehr, 2015; Routledge, 2015). Moreover, EUFOR assisted in repairing water supplies, disinfecting streets, removing garbage, and transporting aid (Love, 2014c). Many disaster relief activities in which EUFOR was engaged were funded through the EU Floods Recovery Programme, managed by UNDP (EUD, n.d.).

At the beginning of its mandate, EUFOR conducted operations to support local law enforcement agencies in the fight against organised crime, which drew considerable criticism, in particular because of possible overlapping with EUPM’s mandate (Juncos, 2013: 157; Suhonen et al., 2015: 71-2). Currently, EUFOR occasionally works with police forces, for instance, through the annual exercise Quick Response. The exercise Quick Response 2017 was held with the aim to increase interoperability between EUFOR and AFBiH and two law enforcement agencies in counterterrorist actions (EUFOR Forum, 2017: 10). EUFOR Liaison and Observation Teams have also occasionally implemented joint activities with the police at municipal level, such as reconnaissance flights (Weller, 2017a) or road safety awareness campaigns (Weller, 2017b).

When it comes to international engagement in Kosovo, the first two heads of the EULEX mission had a military background – in fact, both were former KFOR commanders. However, there is no indication that this enabled closer cooperation between KFOR and EULEX during their terms. KFOR senior officers commencing their tour are obliged to get familiarised with civilian actors (EULEX, 2017). At the same time, there are complaints that interaction is lacking even at the most superficial level, as KFOR and EULEX personnel tend to drive past each other when they meet in the field, without stopping to greet each other (Interview 1).

No major community support projects are undertaken jointly by EU/EULEX and KFOR except for occasional support for more symbolic activities. For instance, both missions provided volunteers for the ‘Mini Olympic Games’ for athletes with special needs (KFOR, 2017c). While these activities are laudable in projecting a joint international front, their outcomes do not qualify as civil-military synergies.

3.4. POTENTIAL CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

After Regulation 230/2014 establishing ICSP was amended in December 2017 to allow for exceptional support to the military in conflict prevention, crisis management, and stabilisation (European Parliament and the Council of the EU, 2017), there was an expectation that this could lead to synergies in equipping the AFBiH through purchases by the EU Delegation, under advice from EUFOR. As one interviewee sees it, “If you have military [AFBiH] doing humanitarian demining, why wouldn’t you assist them with equipment?” (Interview 2). In this case, contracting would be carried out by the EU Delegation, but the military operation could contribute its expertise to assessing whether the procurement requirements coming
from the local armed forces really match their needs (Interview 2). Whether this synergy will occur remains to be seen.

Coordination in implementation of the Ammunition, Weapons and Explosives Master Plan in BiH has also led to suggestions of other fields in which formalising civil-military coordination between different EU instruments and international organisations to create synergies would be desirable. Examples include demining (where cooperation is being developed) and disaster management (see above) (Interview 10). There have also been proposals that EUFOR could extend its role to support the “highly fragmented” law enforcement sector (Interview 2) or lead cooperation with international partners in a specific domain, such as building the capacities of the Border Police (Interview 10).

EUFOR Liaison and Observation Teams have regular contacts with local police, municipalities, and ordinary citizens, but so far they have not contributed to EUSR/EU Delegation reporting (Interview 2). Even though they have relatively few personnel, the teams are situated in 16 cities/municipalities and could monitor development in the field and provide several valuable inputs for reports and overall situational awareness. It has also been pointed out that the EU/EUFOR could more often make use of other international organisations’ missions and staff with more expertise in soft security issues and monitoring at municipal level (Interview 11).

In the case of Kosovo, the Concerted Approach (NATO, 2003) emphasises Security Sector Reform as one of the core areas of EU-NATO cooperation. Nonetheless, support for SSR and capacity building of security institutions in Kosovo has so far been clearly split along the civil-military divide. The EU – both through the EULEX and its enlargement policy – has been engaged in building the capacity of the Kosovo Police and Customs Administration, whereas NATO has provided support for Kosovo Security Forces. There are, however, horizontal issues where it would make sense to pursue synergies. For instance, it has been recently recognised within NATO that integrity building is an area where strengthening cooperation with the EU would be desirable (NATO BI Conference, 2017). The NATO Building Integrity programme has developed certain standards which could be applied in other areas of governance than defence. In 2017, DG NEAR pledged €11 million for this programme in the Southern Neighbourhood (EC, 2017: 8).

NATO has also declared its support for the Belgrade-Pristina EU-brokered Normalisation Agreement (2013) and announced that KFOR stands ready to support its implementation (KFOR, n.d.b.). This indicates that KFOR is aware of a possibility to further engage in providing security and protection for the EU and other international actors implementing this agreement. It will, however, require a forward-looking, proactive approach to conflict prevention and joint operational planning in the field (Interview 4).

To conclude, the first step towards strengthening civil-military synergies would have to be awareness-raising among those who are intended to implement them. In Kosovo, most international organisation respondents did not appear to be thinking about possibilities for resource sharing in general, neither between KFOR and civilian actors or among civilian actors. According to one interviewee, the international actors are so “focused on their daily business” that they do not see the benefits of seeking a joint approach on the ground (Interview 4). Frequent staff rotation, especially of seconded staff (for example, some seconded staff in the EULEX are only available for one year), is also a factor in explaining this lack of awareness, as members of missions have less time to develop relationships with their counterparts.
3.5. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: SUCCESSES AND UNEXPLOITED POTENTIAL FOR SYNERGIES

Inter-agency military-military synergies are more common than civil-military synergies. In the case of EUFOR Althea, this has emerged not only from like-mindedness of military staff but also from having a clear policy framework (the Berlin Plus Agreement) that defines the specific guidelines for cooperation in crisis management. Similar specificities could benefit other actors in areas with a more general approach. Despite the existence of an overall policy framework for cooperation, the EU and NATO have largely failed to set a specific approach for their cooperation in Kosovo, which has allowed members of their missions/forces in the field to ignore the possibilities for informal or ad hoc synergies. Therefore, achieving a concerted approach in the field requires concretising a general policy framework into operational guidelines. These in turn must be tailor-made to the needs of the environment where the missions are active. Such guidelines would also help strengthen institutional knowledge and sustainability of cooperation in a situation where staff is frequently replaced.

Practice in BiH suggests that synergies are more likely when there are clearly defined tasks and task-specific coordination mechanisms – or, as one member of international community put it, “Whenever they [EUFOR] have a defined task, they coordinate” (Interview 1). Developing task-specific coordination and moving beyond information sharing to tangible synergy requires a lead actor: in BiH, EUFOR is recognised as the most suitable actor, as it has the executive mandate and a more convenient and legitimate political position, rather than, for instance, NATO, which is not always warmly welcomed by all entities (Interview 10). In fact, one interviewee stressed that the lesson is: “Whoever has the strongest mandate should coordinate” (Interview 10).

Finally, looking underneath even the good practice in BiH shows that, despite formal ownership by local authorities, the success of processes such as demining and disposal of ammunition still depends on (1) EUFOR’s willingness to step up and coordinate involved national and international parties, and (2) the engagement of international organisations in administering EU funding. This suggests that policies pursuing civil-military synergies at the operational level should consider practical aspects of transferring post-conflict stabilisation activities to local ownership and explore ways for a sustainable capacity building of local military and civilian actors to facilitate transition.

4. CASE STUDY: HORN OF AFRICA

In the Horn of Africa, EU engagement predates the establishment of a strategic regional framework, but CSDP missions and operations in the region have all – unlike those reviewed above – been developed alongside the EU’s Comprehensive Approach (European Commission, 2013) and the regional strategy for the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union, 2011, 2015). With the CSDP missions and operations at the core of the analytical framework, the case study is therefore considered to be a more likely environment for achievement of positive civil-military synergies. Firstly, because civilian and military CSDP instruments are both found within the scope of the EU’s own engagements, i.e. civil-military interfaces within CSDP (intra-agency relationship) rather than inter-agency relations (such as between EU and NATO); and secondly because their mandates have been developed
somewhat concurrently with the strategic regional frameworks, and therefore should include a view to regional objectives as well as incorporating the key provisions of the Comprehensive Approach.

Twenty-five years of instability in the Horn of Africa has drawn the attention of large parts of the international community, and whereas the EU could claim a certain neighbourhood status relative to the Western Balkans, the Horn of Africa proves a more tumultuous environment with no apparent or natural leadership among international actors, particularly within Somalia (Interviews 15, 18, 19 and 20). This leaves several ongoing coordination challenges between a plethora of independent international actors and the few Somali recipient agencies and institutions. In this environment, the EU’s ability, in general, to aggregate numerous European positions is valued by the recipient agencies and limits the resource demand for host-nation coordination (Interviews 18 and 19). The EU thus engages a wide array of instruments in the Horn of Africa, ranging from ECHO as the single largest international humanitarian donor for Somalia, through DG DEVCO and the Instrument for Stability, to the three active CSDP missions and operations from which the following analysis will take its impetus.

4.1. DEPLOYED EU CRISIS MANAGEMENT INSTRUMENTS AND FRAMEWORK

EU engagement in the Horn of Africa is guided by the Strategic Framework for the Horn of Africa (Council of the European Union, 2011) and the subsequent regional action plan (Council of the European Union, 2015). The framework provides five distinct areas in which the EU should work: (1) democratic and accountable state structures, (2) peace, security, conflict prevention and resolution, (3) mitigation of the effects of insecurity in the region, (4) poverty reduction, economic growth and prosperity, and (5) regional cooperation.

In terms of CSDP, the region has seen the deployment of a purely military naval operation, EUNAVFOR Atalanta (2008), aimed at countering piracy and increasing maritime security; a military training mission (EUTM Somalia, 2010) that advising, mentoring and contributing to the training of Somali armed forces; and, since 2012, the civilian maritime capacity building mission EUCAP Somalia.14

EUNAVFOR Atalanta Operational Headquarters is geographically based in Northwood, United Kingdom, but due to rotations it operates a changing composition and number of ships within its area of operations stretching from the Gulf of Aden to India’s west coast. The mission’s current mandate includes (1) protecting World Food Programme vessels, (2) deterring and disrupting piracy and armed robbery at sea, (3) monitoring fishing activities off the coast of Somalia, and (4) supporting other EU missions and international organisations that work to strengthen maritime security in the region (EUNAVFOR, n.d.).

EUTM Somalia initially deployed to Uganda in 2010 to contribute to the training of Somali National Armed Forces (SNAF) in cooperation with the Ugandan People’s Defence Force (UPDF). The mission mandate was extended in 2013 to include strategic advice and mentoring at government level, and from 2014 the mission headquarters and training activities relocated

14 Due to distance from the other CSDP instruments in tasks and space, EUAVSEC South Sudan (2012-14) is not included in this report.
from Kampala to Mogadishu. In its lifetime, the mission has developed from providing training aimed at non-commissioned officers, junior officers, and trainers to battalion-level command and specialist training, where the mission implements a three-pillar mandate of training, mentoring and advising at strategic and political level through close links and cooperation with the Somali federal government and security institutions with a main emphasis still on the Somali National Army (SNA) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) (Interview 23; EUTM, n.d.).

EUCAP Somalia initially deployed in 2012 as EUCAP Nestor with a regional focus to increase and build maritime security capabilities in Djibouti, Somalia, Seychelles, and Tanzania. From 2015, activities in all states except Somalia concluded and the mission was realigned and renamed with a single focus on Somalia and a relocation of the mission headquarters to Mogadishu, with staff also deployed in Hargeisa and Garowe (Interviews 21 and 36). Its current mission mandate is solely to contribute to the establishment and building of maritime civilian law enforcement capability in Somalia, which is pursued through the establishment and development of the Somali Coast Guard as part of a wider Security Sector Reform and Rule of Law process (Interview 21; EUCAP, n.d.).

From the perspective of tasks and mandates, the external actor immediately relevant to the EU CSDP instruments is the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), deployed under UNRES 2372 (United Nations Security Council, 2017). AMISOM is mandated to (1) reduce the threat posed by Al-Shabaab and other armed opposition groups while (2) supporting and operating with Somali security forces and (3) providing necessary assistance to the Somali government and UN engagements. The AMISOM Force Headquarters is located next to the EUTM and EUCAP headquarters in Mogadishu International Airport (MIA), and AMISOM regularly conducts combined operations with SNA troops (Interview 14), thus bringing to the field some of the capacities built and trained by EUTM. Military capacity building and training is provided by a number of other independent actors including EU Member States (e.g. the UK via Operation Tangham), non-EU NATO members (e.g. the US and Turkey) and third countries operating across a wide and varied spectrum of transparency and international coordination (Interviews 17, 18 and 27).

The United Nations presence in Somalia, particularly in Mogadishu, includes the political United Nations Assistance Mission in Somalia (UNSOM) mandated to provide policy advice to the Somali federal government and AMISOM on peace and state-building including governance, SSR, rule of law, democratisation, and international donor support coordination (Interview 20; United Nations Security Council, 2016). UNSOM is logistically supported through the UN Support Office (UNSOS) that also services AMISOM, and the Somali Federal Security Institutions, including SNA and Somali National Police (SNP) (Interview 20; United Nations Security Council, 2015). Finally, additional UN presence includes a great number of independent agencies, funds and programmes, chief among them the World Food Programme (WFP), Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO), and the United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) (Interviews 17 and 20).
4.2. FORMAL COORDINATION AND MECHANISMS FOR ATTAINING CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

In terms of formal structures, EUCAP headquarters, EUTM, and the EU Delegation for Somalia are all located within the Mogadishu International Airport. The same goes for most of the relevant external partners such as UNSOS, UNSOM, and AMISOM headquarters. As the airport is only 3.5 km in length, initial observation might suggest that all actors are close to co-location. There is, however, often a greater emotional distance between offices and camps within the airport than objective observation would suggest (Interviews 14, 20, 24 and 26), and a few hundred meters of movement between camps often demands extensive security provisions and planning due to the EU’s highly restrictive security regimes. EUCAP and EUTM have the majority of staff co-located in the International Campus (IC) on the southern end of the airport, while a forward element of the EU Delegation15 is located in the northern end along with some individual EUCAP staff members.

The EUCAP Deputy Head of Mission has been purposely co-located with the delegation to enhance coordination, while the remaining EUCAP staff in the delegation compound have been co-located mainly due to lacking accommodation space in IC, rather than in pursuit of synergy (Interviews 24 and 26). For some staff members, the co-location with the EU Delegation and the security restrictions on movement inside MIA has had a direct negative impact on their performance in their main functions with EUCAP. Few staff members hold the necessary licences to drive the required armoured vehicles, and thus depend on ‘hitching rides’ or booking a private security provider to transport them the 3.5 km between the EUCAP offices and their accommodations with the EU Delegation. This trip, which includes passing through several checkpoints, regularly takes up to 30 minutes each way (Interviews 25 and 26) and regularly poses a challenge to coordinating meetings and ad hoc activities outside daily working hours.

Apart from co-location, the EU Delegation, EUTM, and EUCAP have established regular interfaces through formal meetings conducted at Head of Mission (HoM), Head of Operations (HoO) and working group levels. Most coordination relates to political and practical advice for engagements with Somali federal authorities and only to a very limited extent coordination and pursuit of tangible synergies (Interviews 21 and 23). The nature of the meetings and their impact have changed – recently improving significantly – as individual leading staff members have been replaced. In general, the effectiveness of the established meeting schedules between CSDP missions and the EU Delegation has been determined more by personalities in mission leadership than by the structures themselves (Interviews 21 and 23). While this allows for stronger cooperation when relations are positive, personal grievances between high-level staff have led to extended periods of a “complete lack of coordination [...] with no communication whatsoever” because of tensions between leadership personalities (Interview 23).

An EUNAVFOR liaison officer is embedded with EUCAP and several activities and engagements with Somali maritime security authorities have been conducted in joint cooperation between the two missions as tangible examples of civil-military impact-increasing synergies. There is, however, a tendency among staff to safeguard their own mandates, as there are several

15 The majority of the EU Delegation staff is still located in Nairobi along with an EUCAP ‘back office’ (Interview 21).
potential overlaps between the two missions and concerns that competitive mandating may shape and influence future cooperation (Interview 21). For relations between EUTM and EUCAP, coordination is of a smaller scope due to the difference in mandate and the military focus (Interviews 21, 23 and 26). EUCAP staff observed that donors and activity sponsors tend to favour engagements with civilian authorities over those with the Somali Ministry of Defence, and EUCAP therefore purposefully maintains a certain level of differentiation from EUTM in spite of the missions’ co-location (Interview 21).

In addition to the exchanged liaison officers, EUNAVFOR holds a common role as the emergency evacuation mechanism for the EU Delegation and CSDP staff. This role is considered in need of revision, as the number of EUNAVFOR vessels has been drastically reduced since the inception of the emergency plan (Interviews 22 and 23).

Extensive and continued coordination also takes place between EUCAP, UNSOM, and the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to ensure the anchoring of projects through the UN’s ‘strategic patience’ embodied in the agencies’ open-ended mandates as opposed to the time-limited mandating of EU missions (Interviews 20 and 21). This is established through regular meetings in the Maritime Security Coordination Committee chaired by EUCAP where Somali authorities typically present needs and requests to the relevant partners, and through the Oceans Against Piracy group where donor nations coordinate responses. Formal meetings in both bodies generally happen as required and least on a monthly basis, and the division of tasks between independent actors under a structuring chair has in turn led to successful impact-increasing synergies (Interview 21).

AMISOM and EUTM are, on account of their military and force protection capabilities, both included in the civil-military working groups (CMWG) chaired by OCHA (Interviews 17 and 22) and invited to contribute to and benefit from information sharing in the Joint Operations Coordination Centre (JOCC) and its Joint Intelligence Management Cell (JIMC) under the Somali Ministry of Internal Security (Interviews 14 and 16).  

The CMWG coordination tasks include protecting – and creating conditions for – the delivery of humanitarian assistance. In this respect, most protection of humanitarian actors and operations is provided by AMISOM as a key mandated task (Interview 14). The main coordination between EUTM and the CMWG is therefore related to the implementation and coordination of community support projects such as minor non-UN Quick Impact Projects conducted by the Italian National Support Element (NSE) to facilitate EUTM operations (Interviews 17 and 22). Thus the representative of EUTM is the Italian civil-military coordination officer from the NSE. This helps coordinate community support for which the Italians have a national budget, but it is a challenge for coordinating operations and other forms of civil assistance since the NSE does not have access to the EUTM’s mobility, intelligence, and force protection. As a national, rather than mission, contribution, the Italian NSE has not been granted access to participate in planning and management of EUTM operations (Interview 22). This in turn means that their role as an interface to the CMWG does not fully represent the EUTM, a fact that has not been clear to partnering UN agencies

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16 The JOCC is a Somali national measure to coordinate counterterrorism and operations against Al-Shabaab across national security services and ministries. All international military and security missions and operations are invited to participate in joint coordination and sharing intelligence. EUTM participates alongside AMISOM (Interviews 14 and 15).
(Interviews 17 and 22) and *de facto* prevents some synergic outcomes from the coordination activities.

Notable successes attained through formal coordination and pursuit of impact-increasing synergies include (1) the development of a joint work plan between EUCAP and UNODC (Interview 21), (2) a joint work plan and embarkation of EUCAP staff and trainers on EUNAVFOR vessels to increase maritime situational awareness and access (Interview 21), (3) initial co-location of EUCAP staff with UNSOM in Hargeisa and Garowe during geographical expansion of activities (Interviews 20 and 21), and (4) close and well-coordinated cooperation with UNOPS as implementing partner on the development of Mogadishu Maritime Police units (Interview 21). With regards to cost-reduction, very few intra-agency advances have been made, as all CSDP instruments and the EU Delegation maintain fully independent systems of logistics, medical support, intelligence, contracting, and communication (Interviews 21, 22, 23, 24, 25 and 26) – a situation directly at odds with the specified actions and objectives of the Comprehensive Approach.

Though formal interfaces and coordination mechanisms are widely available, respondents report a general lack of action in terms of cost-reduction synergies between CSDP missions, particularly EUTM and EUCAP in spite of their co-location (Interviews 21, 23, 25 and 26). External partners observe that while interfaces and formal coordination mechanisms are plentiful, the EU CSDP missions and operations tend to show a low degree of flexibility to any requests relating to extraordinary circumstances or crises within ‘mandate grey-areas’ such as sudden crises or changed demands (Interviews 17, 18, 19 and 20). This is generally attributed to a high degree of risk aversion and complex bureaucratic command structures with decision-making authority allegedly retained in Brussels and not delegated to the operational level. There, authority to assign resources in support of regional objectives or EU partners would allow higher operational flexibility and ability to engage in a more holistic EU approach (Interviews 22 and 23).

### 4.3. INFORMAL AND AD HOC CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

While interviewees all provided observations on situations where *ad hoc* measures have been attempted, there is a consensus that CSDP missions have shown very little flexibility and short-term adaptability to seizing time-sensitive opportunities for operational synergies (Interviews 14, 17, 18 and 19). This is applicable for inter-CSDP synergies as much as for synergies with external partners. A single positive example of cost-reduction synergy between EUTM and EUCAP includes the availability of the EUTM role 1 medical clinic to EUCAP staff. This is a necessity, though, as the EUCAP Medical Officer has been co-located with the EU Delegation and is thus unavailable to EUCAP staff outside working hours and, during work hours, has no separate office or private examination room (Interview 24).

EUTM and EUCAP have both participated in the extraordinary coordination of drought response in 2017, led by OCHA, but with limited effect in terms of contributions (Interview 17), in part due to the poor linkage between CMWG and EUTM mentioned above. It was observed that while international partners and ECHO were scrambling to refocus resources

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17 Apart from an *ad hoc* use of the EUTM medical clinic by EUCAP (Interview 24).
to mitigate an impending humanitarian crisis, it took several months to realign CSDP actors from a NATO/CIMIC project-based mindset to one of pooling resources to effectively deliver drought relief, at which time AMISOM had already committed to most tasks (Interviews 14 and 17). In this respect, a higher degree of flexibility and local decision-making capability is warranted from EU instruments to ‘pick low-hanging fruits’ within the larger strategic intent when opportunities arise, and, if external expectations cannot be met, to effectively balance expectations through local dialogue or independent coordination between CSDP instruments and ECHO.

Somali officials observe a similar low degree of flexibility and adaptability from CSDP instruments as compared to the EU Delegation, UN actors, and individual states (Interviews 16, 18 and 19). In this regard the interfaces with Somali security authorities, e.g. the Joint Operations Coordination Centre, have been hampered by the difficulties of sharing actionable intelligence from EU Member States and CSDP instruments with both Somali authorities and AMISOM (Interviews 14 and 16). This is in part due to a reasonable concern for information security and the potential effects of EU intelligence as a basis for legal processes within Somalia (Interview 22). This has led to slow progress in targeting and certain counterterrorism operations, and, in the case of AMISOM, led its chief of staff to openly lament the lack of actionable intelligence provided by international partners to the troops fighting Al-Shabaab on the ground (Matiiri, 2017). Ad hoc solutions for individual operations and legal processes have sometimes been established but not in a sufficiently responsive and structured way that significantly increases the effectiveness of SNAF and AMISOM operations (Interviews 14 and 16).

4.4. POTENTIAL CIVIL-MILITARY SYNERGIES

Within Somalia, and even within Mogadishu itself, there is a high and unexploited potential for all listed EU areas of intended civil-military synergies, particularly within the scope of cost-reduction. When presented with the list of potential areas and asked whether any were shared between the co-located EUCAP and EUTM, one key respondent replied, “None of them. Absolutely none of them...and I truly don’t understand why we can’t do it” (Interview 21). This sentiment is shared within both missions, particularly in discussions of procurement and logistics (Interviews 21, 23, 25 and 26), but with no remedial actions being planned.

An illustrative example of how little synergy is achieved between the EUTM assets for security and force protection and other EU instruments is one of the national support elements. A CIMIC budget of $500,000 per year has been provided by the Italian government in support of the EUCAP mission (Interview 22). Firstly, since the finances and projects are managed by the Italian national support element, the EUTM operations centre has rejected efforts to coordinate their use to facilitate a better operational environment and asked the NSE to manage it independently (Interview 22). Secondly, if and when force protection has been needed for an NSE officer to move outside MIA, EUTM has not been able to assign it locally. Instead, a request for each instance has been forwarded for approval at the level of EUMS in

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18 In this case including “assistance and technical cooperation in food security [and] drought preparedness” (Council of the European Union, 2015: 10).
19 See this document, pp. 11–12.
Brussels (Interviews 22 and 23). This has created an environment where a significant operational CIMIC function and budget have been employed in general but uncoordinated support of EUTM. In the 2016-17 funding cycle, more project coordination was thus undertaken with UN agencies than with the mission and other EU instruments in spite of the resources being intended as support for EUTM actions (Interview 22).

Interviews have yielded no instances of shared reporting, documentation, lessons learned, intelligence, contracting, or of accessible sharing of security and force protection measures across the civil-military divide between EUCAP, EUTM, and the EU Delegation.

4.5. PRELIMINARY CONCLUSIONS: SUCCESSES AND UNEXPLOITED POTENTIAL FOR SYNERGIES

In general, several formal interfaces have been established between the CSDP instruments deployed under the regional strategic framework. Strong cooperation and impact-increasing synergies have been established between EUCAP and EUNAVFOR and between EUCAP, UNODC, and UNSOM. A noteworthy observation here is the overlapping mandates between these actors, and the comments that the risk of competitive mandating is sometimes a concern.

Interfaces with EUTM face more criticism, and although common observations commend EUTM for effective mobility and core mandate delivery, their ability to support and coordinate with other actors also faces criticism. In this respect, Somali officials generally critique the ‘mentality’ of EU military officers as compared to Turkish and United Arab Emirates’ trainers in terms of social understanding and operational investment and flexibility (Interviews 18, 19 and 23).

It appears that within mandate overlaps significant synergies may be established, but that structural limitations in the EU CSDP separate lines of command and Brussels-centralised decision-making limits the options on the ground for pursuit of time-sensitive opportunities. Coordination of activities that may be on the fringes of mission mandates, such as drought relief or support for CIMIC operations, rarely happens, although it could create synergies in support of the larger international agenda and the EU’s regional strategy. Strategies are technically supported by CSDP mandates but are not being pursued as overarching objectives on the ground.

Finally, it remains a puzzle that allocation of assets, logistics, force protection, lessons learned, and information sharing remains challenged between EU CSDP civilian and military missions. The only tangible explanation in the collected data is that it is allegedly a matter of mindsets, personalities, and separate funding structures. The former two indicate a direct need for specifying positive synergies as specific tasks to be pursued under each CSDP mandate and success should be rewarded. For the truism stands: “Everyone wants to coordinate, but no one wants to be coordinated.” For missions to adapt to the mandates of others, or to the regional objectives, in order to exert a greater impact, the task to do exactly that must be formally assigned to create incentives for its pursuit.

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20 Interviews collected prior to the establishment of MPCC in which the authority would likely rest today.
5. CONCLUSIONS

Operational civil-military synergies are generally pursued through coordination activities and the formalisation of relationships in mandates, policies, and interfaces, for example meeting schedules, exchange of liaison officers, and so on. These relationships are well-established in both case areas, for example between EULEX and KFOR, and between EUCAP, EUTM, and EUNAVFOR. But findings indicate that the formalisation of relationships does not necessarily translate into operational synergies when and where possible. In spite of formalised relationships, the personalities and mindsets of high-level staff significantly influences potential outcomes. This is a persistent challenge in the civil-military interface where differences in culture and lack of multidimensional understanding continue to create periods of grievance for mission staff when “issues” arise between senior military officers and high-level civilian staff (Interview 23).

To build a sustainable environment in which civil-military synergies are continuously and effectively pursued by CSDP instruments as envisioned at the policy level (PSC, 2009; European Commission, 2013), mandates should provide a more detailed and task-based approach to coordination, while still keeping a door open for wider inclusion. Task-based coordination is found to be most effective when larger agencies and actors take up the responsibility for coordination. This is evident in many aspects of humanitarian assistance and in complex environments with larger UN missions. Where no lead agency is apparent, the EU should embrace these opportunities for using high-level competences to offer leadership in the coordination of multiple actors with overlapping mandates. A best practice example is provided by EUFOR’s leading role in the coordination of AWE processes in the Western Balkans and in the successful coordination of capacity building in maritime security by EUCAP in Somalia. This model could easily benefit the tumultuous multi-actor capacity building of the Somali National Armed Forces, where multiple actors provide training, some provide equipment, and the Somali Ministry of Defence has limited influence on the alignment of provided training (Interviews 18, 19 and 27).

In the Western Balkans inter-agency relationships are well-established but mutual distrust and concerns over capabilities and intentions limit the actual scope of synergies, many of which may only exist in theory. In the Horn of Africa successful impact-increasing synergies have been attained between EUCAP and partners (EUNAVFOR, UNODC, and UNSOM) with somewhat overlapping mandates. Several examples were identified, however, where CSDP missions could have increased impact-creating synergies with international actors (or even other EU instruments) operating on the fringes of CSDP mandates but have been slow or failed to do so due to centralised decision-making and very limited structural incentives to provide support within the EU’s regional and strategic objectives.

Finally, in terms of cost-reducing synergies, very little success seems to have been established between civil and military manifestations of CSDP. While EUTM and EUCAP have co-located in Mogadishu, neither has easy access to the resources of the other and even Member State support elements supposedly need to have any use of mission resources approved in Brussels rather than at the Head of Mission or Force Commander level. This creates an inflexible stovepipe structure on the ground where several EU staff members experience easier cooperation with UN offices than with their neighbouring CSDP instruments whenever allocation of resources and support of ‘sister’ mandates are concerned.
This contributes to an overall perception of EU missions as inflexible and bureaucratic despite the fact that the effectiveness of missions regarding their individual mandates is generally considered successful. This negative perception of the CSDP missions' responsiveness should be mitigated with a higher degree of delegation of decision-making authority to the Head of Mission and Force Commander level or by integrating chains of command at the operational level. If CSDP missions and operations are to be instruments of crisis management in complex environments, then leading EU institutions must allow for a decentralisation of decision-making to act in line with the dynamics of an often unpredictable setting and to consider the wider scope of EU regional and strategic interests in support between instruments. The policy recommendations arising from this report therefore are as follows:

1) **Mandates must offer a more detailed and task-based approach to civil-military coordination.** In almost all other areas, open mandates are recommended in order to increase delegation and flexibility on the ground – but as coordination is a continuous struggle for individual actors to adapt beyond their own task and priority, this is a field where a minimum standard must be detailed from the principal level. Too often, catch-all objectives to ‘coordinate with relevant actors’ are left open to interpretation, thus outcomes remain dependent on *ad hoc* personal relationships and individual interpretations at the highest level (Heads of Mission / Delegation or Force Commanders), making civil-military synergies vulnerable to staff rotations.

2) **The EU should embrace opportunities for using high-level competences to offer leadership in coordinating civil-military actors** with overlapping mandates, especially where no other lead agency is apparent. Staff and leadership in EU offices and missions are typically among the best educated, trained and resourced in their fields. While the EU has many restrictions on its field activities, it stands out from many other actors owing to two clear assets: competence and legitimacy. Both are fundamental for successful leadership in coordination between actors with overlapping mandates and the EU should make more use of this comparative advantage.

3) **More decision-making authority should be delegated to mission leadership and staff** in order to allow CSDP instruments a higher degree of responsibility and adaptability in dynamic environments. The extensive and isolated nature of the EU chains of command produces continuous delays in operational cooperation with partners. EU missions are thus perceived as effective towards their own operational objectives but as slow-moving in cooperation with others. Several more *ad hoc* synergies and support on the ground between actors could be established if fewer reach-backs to Brussels were required.

4) **Delegation should include authority for taking actions in support of regional strategic objectives or other EU actors.** A combination of more specific and task-based mandates for the coordination and pursuit of civil-military synergies and the delegation of decision-making authority to the operational level should allow instruments to more flexibly establish intra-agency civil-military synergies and support in pursuit of the wider EU objectives.

5) **The EU should consider integrating civil-military chains of command at the theatre and operational level.** Long stovepiped chains of command have meant that in extreme cases the military operation, civilian mission and EU Delegation in a given environment have been required to seek approval in Brussels for very fundamental exchanges of resources and intra-agency support. This could be mitigated with an operational level integrated structure for decision-making and prioritisation similar to the UN Country Team concept.


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## 7. LIST OF INTERVIEWS

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